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Executive summary
Technological advances are reshaping today’s elec-
tricity markets. More mature technologies for local 
renewable generation and decreased investment costs 
thereof, joint with national support schemes, led to a 
significant market penetration of distributed genera-
tion in many EU countries. Not only distributed gen-
eration but a newly emerging broad range of distrib-
uted energy resources (DER), including local storage, 
electric vehicles and demand response, are driving or 
at least allowing for potentially significant changes in 
the planning and operation of power systems. These 
changes also pose challenges for the regulation of 
power systems. Today, some challenges are only a pos-
sibility, and might arise once technologies mature and 
be more widely deployed, as for instance with electric 
vehicles. Other challenges, foremost related to dis-
tributed generation, are already established facts and 
observable in many EU distribution systems. Howev-
er, the same technologies that are causing substantial 
challenges can – with the right regulation and market 
design – be exploited to establish a more efficient and 
also cleaner electricity system than our current one. 
In the light of these changes, this THINK report dis-
cusses regulatory implications of changing local elec-
tricity markets and to this end sets the focal point on 
electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) as 
regulated local entities and local market facilitators. 
First, we shed light on where the current regulation of 
DSOs needs updates to allow for welfare-enhancing 
DER technologies to be adapted efficiently and in a 
timely fashion. We find that a major challenge is to 
update regulation such that distribution companies 
are not negatively affected by the development of 
DER and are incentivized to foster the integration of 
viable new technologies into the market. Moreover, 
we find that updates are needed to provide the right 
regulatory tools to DSOs such that they can also ben-
efit from the services DER can offer for system op-
eration and planning. Ultimately, the priority task of 
regulation is not to try to predict what the future will 
be, but to design DSO incentives that make possible 
all welfare-enhancing business models under any fu-
ture market development. 
Section 2 demonstrates the need to review existing 
regulation. We illustrate the impact of distributed en-
ergy resources on electricity markets at the distribu-
tion level. The broad range of new technologies offers 
plenty of possibilities for new business models, whose 
performance and even viability may critically depend 
on the regulatory regime of DSOs. These new busi-
ness models may potentially even lead to a paradigm 
shift that might shake up the traditional value chain 
and cause a radical change of the power market archi-
tecture as we know it today. For this reason, DSO reg-
ulation has to be examined in its full spectrum. We 
identify four major areas of regulation that need to be 
reviewed: allowed DSO remuneration; distribution 
grid tarification; potential new infrastructure tasks of 
DSOs vis-à-vis energy market actors (such as ICT in-
frastructure for advanced meter data or EV charging 
stations); and the potential new roles and functions of 
DSOs in system management vis-à-vis transmission 
system operators. 
Section 3 sets the scene and discusses the present 
state of electricity distribution in the EU. Today’s 
DSO landscape resembles a huge patchwork with di-
verse national implementations of relevant pieces of 
EU legislation and resulting heterogeneous end-user 
market structures in different Member States. Sub-
stantial differences arise regarding operated voltage 
levels, the scope of activities, the size and number of 
DSOs in a country, the level of unbundling, applied 
regulation, et cetera. Even though full eligibility of 
vi
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customers is mandatory, and the choice of suppliers 
and tariffs increased in many EU retail markets, the 
degree of retail market liberalization and competition 
still varies significantly across the EU. Insufficient un-
bundling poses one of the most serious obstacles to 
retail competition in many distribution markets. This 
heterogeneity in regulation and market structures 
aggravates the problem of finding a unanimous ap-
proach to appropriate DSO regulation.
Section 4 assesses the four identified areas of regula-
tion that may have a significant impact on the per-
formance of the potential new business models and 
the DSOs themselves. First, remuneration schemes 
for DSOs need to be reviewed. Increasing amounts of 
DER require substantial investments to connect all 
new resources and to enable the system to deal with 
increased volatility of net demand and peak demand 
fluctuations. With massive DER penetration, an ac-
tive management of DER has the potential to decrease 
the total costs of DSOs compared to a business-as-
usual handling of these resources, and hence DSOs 
also need to invest in ICT infrastructure that empow-
ers them to employ DER for their daily grid opera-
tions. While overall remuneration has to increase, a 
sound regulation that efficiently incentivizes DSOs to 
engage in active system management has to take ac-
count of i)  changing OPEX and CAPEX structures, 
ii) the optimal choice among both, and of iii) how to 
incentivize DSOs to deploy innovative solutions. 
Second, the present design of network charges does 
not provide a level-playing field among all agents 
that use the distribution network. With an increas-
ing penetration of DER, ill-designed distribution 
network charges will become even more problematic. 
Business models exploiting, for instance, inefficient 
arbitrage possibilities caused by differentiated treat-
ments of different DER technologies, or of certain 
types of producers and consumers, might flourish in 
the absence of sound tarification procedures. Moreo-
ver, grid users are becoming complex, sophisticated 
agents, which can have very diverse consumption 
and/or production patterns, and being able (and will-
ing) to react to price signals. Tariffs, therefore, should 
reflect the true costs (or benefits) of different types 
of load and generation for the distribution system, 
which will depend on the agent’s geographic location 
in the system as well as on the profile of injection/
withdrawal from the connection point. Any hidden 
subsidies should be removed and replaced by suffi-
cient but direct subsidies that do not turn into inef-
ficient signals. A reference framework to design the 
new network tariffs is proposed in this report. 
Third, regarding new infrastructure tasks and hence 
new DSO activities vis-à-vis markets, there are a num-
ber of areas in the newly emerging market environ-
ment where there is no consensus about whether the 
respective tasks should be under the responsibility of 
the DSO or not. The regulatory challenge here is to 
clearly define the roles, boundaries and responsibili-
ties of DSOs. Different proposed (regulated as well as 
liberalized) models for (1) the ownership and man-
agement of metering equipment, (2) data handling 
and (3) EV charging infrastructure all have their ad-
vantages and disadvantages. These tasks may or may 
not be offered at lowest cost (due to sufficient syner-
gies with grid operation) and/or in a more qualitative 
way by the DSOs as compared to other third regulated 
agents or commercial actors. The suitability of a cer-
tain model will depend on system-specific conditions, 
such as scale and scope economy potentials, degree of 
uncertainty regarding best technological solutions, 
or concerns with respect to possible market entry 
barriers. Though, if a full rollout of advanced meters 
(including data management), and also EV charging 
infrastructure must be provided in a timely fashion, 
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advantages lie in the domain of the DSO. Regulators, 
however, have to take care not to foreclose market 
structures through DSOs becoming incumbents once 
new technologies are deployed at scale and commer-
cial actors want to enter the market. 
If general exemptions from unbundling for small 
DSOs prevail, additional regulatory means gain in 
importance. As for ICT and EV infrastructure, stand-
ardized access for third parties is crucial to counteract 
non-existing unbundling. Likewise, also small DSOs 
need to provide for sufficient data availability such 
that entry costs for third parties (especially compet-
ing retailers) are further reduced. Incentivizing joint 
ventures of several small DSOs may reduce costs for 
new infrastructure and also reduce problems related 
to limited unbundling.
Last, regarding DSO activities vis-à-vis the TSO, the 
general responsibilities of network operators with re-
spect to grid management do not change, but the set 
of tools available to perform their tasks is enriched by 
DER. The increasing amount of DER establishes the 
need for a clearly defined differentiation and coop-
eration of tasks between distribution and transmis-
sion system operators. National regulatory authori-
ties should aim at establishing a hierarchy between 
the DSOs and TSOs with respect to their actions that 
have an impact on final system balancing. Further-
more, products that DSOs and TSOs use to ensure 
reliable grids (and often procure for this sake) should 
be clearly defined in terms of geography and tim-
ing. Coordination needs will differ among systems. 
It makes a difference whether a distribution system 
contains only an insignificant amount of DER, or 
whether it contains a whole portfolio of DER includ-
ing also non-negligible volumes of local storage and 
DR potential. Moreover, regulation or coordination 
efforts have to take account of which voltage levels 
are part of the distribution activity, with coordination 
needs probably increasing when DSOs also operate 
MV (or even HV) grids. 
In the European context, regulation has to be kept at 
minimum level, respecting the principle of subsidi-
arity. Accordingly, we see neither the need nor a solid 
justification for an EU-wide comprehensive harmo-
nization of the regulation of DSOs, although we rec-
ommend setting clear minimum requirements in a 
few key regulatory aspects, as well as the publication 
of EU guidelines to spread, encourage and monitor 
good regulatory practices in some of the critical areas 
that have been identified in this report: 
First, EU guidelines for a sound regulation and ad-
equate remuneration of DSOs as well as for distribu-
tion grid tarification should be formulated, followed 
by regular monitoring and benchmarking to reveal 
shortcomings of national regulatory approaches. Ur-
gent research is needed to develop adequate proce-
dures for remuneration of DSOs and distribution net-
work tariff design. Second, the EU should mandate 
that consumer data are made available to registered 
agents (provided that individual consumers give their 
authorization for the use of their personal profiles). 
The definition of the specific format of data provi-
sion (i.e. one of the three data models proposed, or a 
combination thereof) can then be left to the Member 
States. Third, depending on system complexity and 
the number of tasks to be accomplished by DSOs, 
stricter unbundling requirements should be man-
dated. As the complexity of the system increases, an 
insufficiently unbundled DSO could either stay with 
a restricted set of tasks, or the DSO could expand its 
portfolio of activities, but accompanied with “higher 
Chinese walls” between the DSO and its subsidiary 
retailers that engage in trading of distributed sources. 
Finally, procedures and principles of coordination 
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between DSOs and TSOs also should be defined at a 
European level in order to avoid distortions in com-
petition and barriers for market entry due to different 
rules and market designs in different Member States. 
It needs to be ensured that the interactions between 
these different types of system operators are well de-
fined and that they are in compliance with the net-
work codes. 
Section 5 concludes.
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1. Motivation
Recent technological advances are reshaping today’s 
electricity markets. While changes of electricity mar-
ket architecture in the past generally related to whole-
sale markets, today, new advancing technologies are 
expected to radically change local electricity markets 
at the distribution level. More mature technologies 
for local renewable generation, decreased investment 
costs thereof and ambitious national support schemes 
for low-carbon generation led to a significant mar-
ket penetration of distributed generation in many 
EU Member States. At the same time, innovation in 
metering and appliances allows consumers to react 
to local and upstream generation patterns and pric-
es. Consequently, traditional top-down power flows 
from centralized generation sources connected to the 
transmission grid to consumers are challenged by lo-
cal distributed generation and local means of electric-
ity trade. Moreover, existing decades-old distribution 
infrastructure may need significant renewals soon in 
many systems. In order to allow for further market 
penetration of advanced local generation and con-
sumption technologies and an efficient operation of 
distribution grids, the renewal and expansion of ex-
isting networks should go hand in hand with a mod-
ernization of distribution systems. 
In a bigger perspective, even though patterns of elec-
tricity generation, transportation, distribution and 
consumption are revolutionized (along with increas-
ing consumption per se, e.g. due to the electrification 
of other sectors such as transportation), the tradition-
al triangle of EU energy market policy – competition 
(“2014”), sustainability (“2020”, “2050”) and security 
of supply – remains valid. Although these three high-
level EU energy policy objectives traditionally were 
discussed on the transmission and wholesale level, 
they have large implications for the distribution level 
as well. Competition implies competitive retail mar-
kets including adequate consumer response to eco-
nomic signals; sustainability implies the facilitation 
of low-carbon generation or the implementation of 
energy efficiency enhancing measures, et cetera; and 
supply security relates to the reliability and quality 
of electricity supply, which also requires an adequate 
level of distribution grid investments.
Changes driven by the newly emerging broad range 
of distributed energy resources – be it distributed 
generation, local storage, electric vehicles or demand 
response – hence also might impact the balance be-
tween the three EU policy pillars. As a consequence, 
the existing regulatory compact has to be examined 
within a broad range of energy policy fields. Distrib-
uted generation may enhance sustainability, but poses 
challenges for distribution system operators (DSOs) 
because all distributed generation wants to be con-
sumed and major grid investments, especially in rural 
areas, are required. Without a sound regulation, how-
ever, grid investments might not be optimal. Distrib-
uted generation competes with traditional upstream 
power sources and the idea of well-functioning and 
competitive markets mandates that cheapest sources, 
whether from upstream or local, find demand first. 
But for effective competition, also network tariffs have 
to provide a level-playing field for all types of genera-
tion. Furthermore, distributed energy resources add 
many new coordination tasks to local energy mar-
kets. It has to be identified whether the responsibili-
ties for those tasks will be with regulated authorities 
such as the DSOs or with commercial market actors.
In the light of these changes, this THINK report dis-
cusses the regulatory compact related to electricity 
DSOs. First, we shed light on the missing blocks in 
the current regulation to allow for the welfare-en-
hancing technologies to be adapted efficiently and in 
a timely fashion. A major challenge is to design regu-
lation such that distribution companies are not nega-
2Final Report – June 2013
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tively affected by the development of distributed en-
ergy resources, and, thus do not have an incentive to 
hamper their deployment. We develop proposals on 
how to adjust to a new regulatory compact that pro-
vides a level-playing field for current and new energy 
services and that properly treats regulated actors that 
provide this level-playing field. Moreover, we also ask 
how to design the right regulatory tools so that DSOs 
can also benefit from the services DER provide for 
system operation and planning. It is argued that the 
priority task of regulation is not to try to predict what 
the future will be, but to make possible all welfare-
enhancing business models under any future market 
development. 
Welfare enhancements and cost savings that can be 
achieved in future distribution markets are substan-
tial. The share of distribution costs in the final cus-
tomer’s electricity bill lies in the range of 15% (in the 
UK) and 30% (in the Czech Republic), see ECME 
(2010), indicating that the regulatory framework of 
DSOs has a substantial impact on electricity prices 
in the EU. In the future, distribution costs are likely 
to increase as massive grid investments have to be 
undertaken. The IEA Energy Outlook estimates that 
investments in distribution networks will amount for 
about two thirds of all transmission and distribution 
investments by 2020, with this share growing to al-
most three quarters by 2035. Hence, a cost-effective 
regulation of DSOs will have a positive effect in re-
ducing the total cost of electricity, with a beneficial 
impact on consumers and the competitiveness of 
European firms alike. Well-regulated DSOs also con-
tribute to a better functioning of (local) electricity 
markets. 
The report is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
identify the areas of DSO regulation that are chal-
lenged by the new technologies. In Section 3 the 
shortcomings in the respective regulatory areas are 
identified before regulatory changes are proposed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. This report primarily 
focuses on the impact that the new technologies men-
tioned above have on the DSO business and touches 
upon other classical issues in regulation such as con-
sumer protection only whenever needed.
2. Why and where the existing 
regulation needs to be reviewed
In what follows, we first illustrate the impact of re-
cently matured technologies on electricity markets 
at the distribution level. Having this impact in mind, 
the existing regulation is examined. Four major ar-
eas of regulation are challenged: DSO remuneration, 
distribution grid tarification, but also regulation con-
sidering the DSO as a key player along the full value 
chain (i.e. DSO activities vis-à-vis markets as well as 
vis-à-vis the TSO). These areas have to be reviewed, 
because the broad range of new technologies offers 
plenty of possibilities for new business models, and 
potentially may even lead to a paradigm shift that 
might shake up the traditional value chain and cause 
a radical change of the power market architecture as 
we know it today. 
2.1 New technologies challenge exist-
ing regulation
Distributed generation (DG) and resulting increas-
ing system imbalances, congestions and need for con-
nections in distribution grids are no new phenom-
enon. There already is a massive deployment of DG 
technologies in distribution networks at low-, medi-
um- and high-voltage levels. For example, Eurelectric 
(2013) reports that “in many places [in Germany], 
the DG output of distribution networks already ex-
ceeds local load – sometimes by multiple times.” Such 
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DG sources include rooftop solar PV, wind, biomass, 
micro-cogeneration and a multitude of back-up gen-
erators that are installed in the premises of hospitals, 
banks, hotels and firms. While these technologies are 
not always entirely new, significant cost reductions, 
that can make them competitive with conventional 
centralized generation soon, will lead to ever higher 
degrees of DG penetration and many consumers be-
coming active “prosumers”.
Another field of current technological advances is 
distributed storage (DS), which might become viable 
soon at all voltage levels and also in larger amounts. 
While several forms of electricity storage have been 
installed and different battery types are currently 
showing high market growth rates, bulk pumped 
hydro is still the by far most widely used technology 
with more than 127 GW of operating capacity world-
wide (EPRI, 2010). However, a lot of R&D is ongoing 
to improve technologies and reduce costs (Ruester 
et al., 2012), and many experts consider that small-
scale, local energy storage connected to the distri-
bution grid or to end-consumers will complement 
centralized large-scale storage and become a critical 
component of “the grid of the future” (Kaplan, 2009; 
Eyer and Corey, 2010; He et al., 2011).
Third, the use of electric vehicles (EVs, both purely 
electric and hybrid) which have to charge from the 
grid and may also inject power back to it in order to 
provide valuable services to ensure system stability 
and avoid congestion (“vehicle-to-grid”, V2G), is ex-
pected to grow. Kampman et al. (2011) present three 
scenarios for the penetration of electric vehicles. In 
the ‘most realistic’ scenario, a market penetration of 
about 3.3 million EVs in the EU is achieved in 2020, 
increasing to 50 million EVs in 2030 (with a share of 
about 60% of these electric vehicles being PHEVs). 
Smart charging is assumed to become standard after 
2020. 
While the above technologies all relate to physical 
consumption and production, recent technological 
advances in metering and communication enable ac-
tive demand response (DR)1 and enhanced distribu-
tion automation, thereby also facilitating and allowing 
for a wider deployment of DG, DS and EVs. Whereas 
at the beginning of the liberalization process, DR has 
been considered only interesting for large custom-
ers, technological advances (e.g. cost reductions of 
intelligent metering systems; advanced energy boxes 
that can optimize consumption subject to individual 
constraints reducing risks and efforts of reacting to 
price signals) make this concept interesting also for 
small-scale and residential consumers. Given a posi-
tive cost-benefit analysis, by 2020, at least 80% of all 
European consumers shall be equipped with intelli-
gent metering systems (EC, 2009), and consequently, 
time-varying pricing will be technically possible.
In the remainder, we denominate the above tech-
nologies collectively as distributed energy resourc-
es (DER). Today, some challenges arising with DER 
technologies are only a possibility, as for instance it 
is currently not known how successful EVs or stor-
age will be. Other challenges, foremost related to DG 
technologies, are already established facts. 
Accordingly, these new technologies entering the 
grid at low-voltage levels change power system ar-
chitecture and functioning. The integration of opera-
tion technology and IT is key. Traditional systems 
had been designed to distribute electricity top-down 
from generation connected to the transmission level 
to end consumers, and the distribution system had 
been designed accordingly such that there were 
1. DR means that consumers are able to change their load 
(into both directions) in response to signals, be it price-
based (time-of-use, real-time pricing, critical peak pricing) 
or volume-based (e.g. direct load control based upon a pre-
vious agreement with the customer).
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no bottlenecks or congestion (“fit-and-forget ap-
proach”). In contrast, today’s distribution systems are 
challenged by new features such as increased vola-
tility of net demand and peak demand fluctuations, 
reverse flows from the distribution to the transmis-
sion level in times of local generation exceeding local 
demand, and increasing possibilities of energy and 
power trades at the local level. Many related markets, 
such as ICT applications, are expanding. Hence, even 
though the DSOs’ objective remains to “ensure the 
long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable 
demands for the distribution of electricity […] [and 
to operate] under economic conditions a secure, reli-
able and efficient electricity distribution system” (EC, 
2009), the set of available tools to ensure this core task 
is expanding.
The same technologies that are bringing these chal-
lenges today can – with the right regulation and mar-
ket design – be exploited in order to arrive at a more 
efficient and also cleaner electricity system than our 
current one. As Figure 1 describes, all DER technolo-
gies can be employed for downward and upward ad-
justments. Of course, there is a limited potential for 
all these types of devices (e.g. availability of storage 
to ‘consume’ electricity is restricted by the size of the 
reservoir; no possibility to increase production from 
solar PV panels if the sun is not shining; no V2G 
service provision if EV users are driving, et cetera). 
Moreover, available potentials will depend on the 
system characteristics, see also Olmos et al. (2011). 
Consequently, the value of these devices in providing 
certain services will differ by service, by location in 
a specific system, by agent, and over time. Nonethe-
less, employing and aggregating DER services offers a 
powerful and flexible tool for power trade and system 
balancing, and can help to decrease the total cost of 
DSOs (with respect to a more traditional approach of 
merely connecting the new devices to the network) 
by allowing for an active distribution system manage-
ment (Box 1). 
2.2 New business models arise from 
DER technologies
The massive introduction of DER technologies will be 
made possible and also reinforced by new business 
models that might evolve (and actually are already 
evolving). Some of them, if successful, can change the 
structure and organization of power systems substan-
tially and also offer opportunities for DSOs to make 
efficient use of the operation services with economic 
value that DER technologies may offer. Many poten-
Figure 1: DER’s ability to provide downward and/or upward adjustment to the system 
Source: Own depiction
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tial and existing business models associated to DER at 
the distribution network level typically involve some 
sort of aggregation, such as the aggregation of “smart” 
grid users to participate in energy markets and to 
provide ancillary services or the offering of energy 
services to customers. A group of aggregated DER in 
the following will be referred to as a distributed local 
system or DLS. 
Hence, in general terms we can define a distributed lo-
cal system as a grid-connected ensemble of demand, 
energy storage and generation resources, i.e. DER, 
with advanced control and communication capabili-
ties, which provide energy services to their members 
and offer energy services to their DSO and/or TSO.2 
At the individual residential level, some local “energy 
control box” would be in charge of managing all the 
energy appliances, as well as the generation and stor-
age resources, and deciding the best joint utilization 
given the energy needs of the customer and the exist-
2. The DLS is a broader and more flexible concept than 
the micro-grid, which is ubiquitously used in the technical 
literature and appears to refer to a subsystem that is con-
nected to the rest of the system by a single point and that 
is meant to operate mostly autonomously. DLSs do not re-
quire the capability of being autonomous or of requiring 
all its members to be connected (in exclusivity) to a single 
point in the network. 
ing economic and reliability conditions in the power 
system. The same approach can be valid for a group of 
residential units or a larger aggregation of residential 
and commercial entities, up to the level of a neighbor-
hood or a small town. The key point is that local man-
agement and control could make better use of the ex-
isting local synergies and use resources closer to the 
existing constraints. The magnitude of these potential 
advantages still remains to be proven. 
All business models on local level can boost their 
competitive advantages vis-à-vis upstream sources 
by relying on aggregation. There are several reasons 
to consider that aggregation and hierarchical control 
might have sizeable advantages over centralization: 
 • Aggregation of DER can reduce the risk for each 
individual DER to not meet its market commit-
ments. When aggregating individual DER within 
one market portfolio, the risk of not meeting 
market commitments is hedged among units. 
For instance, in case tariffs for end-consumers in-
clude a capacity component linked to a maximum 
instantaneous consumption limit, it might make 
sense to aggregate a group of end-consumers to 
take advantage of the fact that not all consumers 
demand their maximum at the same time. 
Box 1: Three-step evolution of distribution systems (Eurelectric, 2013)
The development towards ‘smart’ distribution systems can be described in three steps. First, the traditional passive distribution 
networks have been developed based on a “fit-and-forget” approach. With an increasing penetration of DER, also system ‘smart-
ness’ should increase. An approach used already today in some countries with a high share of DG, therefore, is a reactive network 
integration, or “operation only” approach. Congestion and other grid problems are solved at the operation stage by restricting 
load and generation, i.e. DSOs solve problems once they occur. 
An active system management would allow DSOs to become “real system operators”. The existing hosting capacity of the distri-
bution network can be used more efficiently if an optimal use of DER is considered. Eurelectric (2013) proposes that DSOs should 
have the possibility to buy flexibility on so-called “flexibility platforms” to optimize network availability in the most economic 
manner and to solve grid constraints. Network reinforcement then could be deferred until it becomes more cost-effective than 
procuring services from DER. However, in-depth analyses going beyond the current more conceptual discussion are required 
to propose suitable concrete architectures and responsibilities, including an answer to the question on who should set-up and 
coordinate such a flexibility platform.
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 • Aggregating otherwise relatively inflexible DER 
products to one DER product bundle further-
more increases the possibility for DER units 
to take part in the markets for system services. 
Moreover, individual DER might not be interest-
ed in overcoming by themselves the complexities 
of market participation just to make a small sum 
of money. Aggregated DER solve this problem 
and can offer more complete and flexible prod-
ucts to DSOs and/or TSOs, who often demand 
system services with particular technological 
features. For instance, TSOs often ask for mini-
mum bidding capacities to be accepted as offer 
in their markets.
 • Aggregating DER can exploit arbitrage poten-
tials if existing network charges preferentially 
treat larger devices from the same type, or ag-
gregations of devices of different types. Hence, 
aggregation might reduce grid charges for each 
aggregated DER unit. For instance, a TSO might 
require unlimited interruptibility in the month 
of August. Gathering together a portfolio of dif-
ferent consumers allows intermediaries to enter 
into more limited agreements with their custom-
ers (e.g. instead of asking one consumer the pos-
sibility to reduce her load three days per month, 
they can contract with three consumers to re-
duce load once). 
 • Aggregating DER can decrease potential costs 
from not meeting market commitments, espe-
cially when balancing markets are lacking liquid-
ity. If markets would be “perfect”, it would always 
be possible to buy or sell the commodity at the 
competitive market price. But in case of lack of 
liquidity, this is not the case. With low market 
liquidity, individual DER units risk having to buy 
costly services from dominant actors in the bal-
ancing market in order to correct for imbalances. 
For instance, in such a setting, holding a portfolio 
of a storage facility and a wind turbine could de-
crease imbalance costs.
If DER technologies might – or might not – cause a 
paradigm shift from the traditional centralized top-
down system towards decentralized local sub-sys-
tems depends on the total costs of energy provision 
from DER compared to upstream sources, including 
the network costs. Even if DER will not become a real 
Box 2: Examples of different distributed local systems
A DLS could be located within just one physical site, say at the household level: as a combination of active demand response, 
plus electricity generation (rooftop solar PV, for instance), micro-cogeneration, heat and/or electricity storage and the family EV. 
A DLS could also include several agents at one location: a fleet of EVs whose charge is managed from a single control entity in 
collaboration with the users of the vehicles, who receive an economic compensation for the ancillary services that all together 
provide to the local DSO and/or the corresponding TSO, plus other benefits in terms of maintenance of the vehicles, parking 
priorities or car renting could be a DLS.
A DLS could also include several agents at several locations: a company might form a DLS by owning solar PV panels that are 
installed at the rooftops or the premises of their clients, selling them full electricity services, where the energy may come from the 
PV panels or from the main grid, but the customers only interact with this company as their only electricity retailer. 
A DLS could also include several agents, locations and resources: a DLS may combine some wind or solar PV farms, plus a portfolio 
of loads of several types and a fleet of EVs and some local storage, all of them sited in the same geographical area under the same 
DSO, but not all necessarily connected to the same point in the grid, and offer energy services to its consumers and deals to its 
producers that better the conditions offered by any centralized incumbent utility, the default tariff or the electricity spot market. 
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game changer, the power system has already changed 
and will continue to do so. In any case, DER have to be 
able to participate in the market, even more so once 
national support schemes are running out and there 
is also a need to rethink regulation if no full paradigm 
shift occurs. The critical importance of a clear regula-
tory roadmap that provides sufficient certainty to the 
regulated companies and the market agents cannot be 
overemphasized. 
2.3 Four areas of existing regulation 
need to be reviewed
As discussed above, the market penetration of de-
centralized energy resources opens possibilities for 
decentralized trade of energy. These trade opportuni-
ties allow for new business models, mainly related to 
aggregation and marketing of DER. Also DSOs can 
use DER resources for their daily tasks of ensuring 
system functioning and planning grid investments. 
However, to exploit the full range of potentials that 
DER offer, DSOs have to undertake significant up-
front investments in grid (and related) infrastructures 
(EC, 2010). At the same time, for DER to flourish and 
to enable DER to compete with resources connected 
to the transmission grid, DSOs also have to provide 
adequate conditions for network access and usage. 
The latter also includes adequate conditions for new 
business models related to the aggregation of DER.
As a consequence, existing regulation needs to be re-
viewed with respect to both, the incentives for DSOs 
as a network operator (and owner), and the incen-
tives for DSOs as a key player along the value chain. 
Reviewing incentives for DSOs as a network operator 
implies revisiting regulatory schemes for allowed re-
muneration and resulting incentives to innovate, as 
well as revisiting network tariff design. First, DSOs 
are a natural monopoly for which allowed remunera-
tion has to be regulated. Second, this allowed revenue 
will be collected via distribution grid charges. The 
structure and format of these charges will have an 
important impact on grid users’ behavior. Finally, re-
viewing the existing regulation considering DSOs as 
key players along the value chain, including their role 
in the market when becoming active system manag-
ers, implies revisiting the regulatory base of DSOs 
both vis-à-vis the TSO and vis-à-vis energy and pow-
Figure 2: Relevant areas of regulation 
Source: Own depiction using pictures from http://www.westernpower.com.au 
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er markets. Figure 2 illustrates all areas of regulation 
covered in the remainder of this report.
With the above overview of critical points in current 
regulation, we can add precision to our initial ques-
tions addressed in this report. Do we need to rethink 
regulation at distribution level? In particular, we have 
to examine if there is a need to rethink
 • the methods of determining the regulated remu-
neration of distribution companies, 
 • the design of distribution network charges,
 • the functions and the level of unbundling of 
DSOs, and
 • the relationship between distribution and trans-
mission system operators.
When providing the overall regulatory compact, the 
above issues are interdependent. Allowed remunera-
tion heavily influences the design and foremost the 
level of tariffs. The design of tariffs, in turn, has a 
major impact on the energy market. And the DSO 
can become a more active player and in this light its 
remuneration and tariff setting vis-à-vis other active 
market players becomes even more delicate. Before 
deriving in-depth recommendations on each of the 
above issues, we first discuss the shortcomings of the 
existing regulation in the following section.
3. The present state of electricity 
distribution in the EU
Electricity distribution in the EU is characterized by 
very diverse national implementations of relevant 
pieces of EU legislation and resulting heterogene-
ous end-user market structures in different Member 
States. This section gives a brief overview on the pre-
sent regulation of electricity distribution activities 
and the current organization of distribution sectors 
throughout the EU. We also point out two major 
shortcomings in EU retail markets – ill-designed reg-
ulated prices and insufficient unbundling, and infer 
what these mean for the regulation of DSOs as market 
facilitators.
3.1 The present regulation of electric-
ity distribution in the EU
Common understanding: European legislation 
(Directive 2009/72/EC) defines distribution as “the 
transport of electricity on high-voltage, medium-
voltage and low-voltage distribution systems with a 
view to its delivery to customers”. DSOs are under-
stood as “natural or legal persons responsible for op-
erating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if neces-
sary, developing the distribution system.” Article 29 
does explicitly also allow for ‘combined transmission 
and distribution system operators’. However, in most 
Member States, TSOs and DSOs are separate enti-
ties.3 Furthermore, regulators agreed on a definition 
of smart grids which is technology-neutral and fo-
cuses on what they can deliver, with smart grids be-
ing “electricity networks that can cost-efficiently inte-
grate the behavior and actions of all users connected 
to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – 
in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable 
3. In Ireland, for instance, the situation is different in that 
electricity transmission and distribution networks are 
owned by ESB, a state-owned, vertically integrated com-
pany also active in production and supply. A legally sepa-
rate company, ESB Networks, has been established to carry 
functions relating to the operation of networks (Source: 
IEA (2012) Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Ireland 2012 
Review). Note, however, that the remuneration scheme 
and the tariff design differ and are separately applied to 
transmission and distribution.  
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power systems with low losses and high levels of qual-
ity and security of supply and safety” (CEER, 2011).
Tasks of DSOs: According to Article 25 of the Elec-
tricity Directive, DSOs are responsible for ensuring 
the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable 
demands for the distribution of electricity, for oper-
ating, maintaining and developing a secure, reliable 
and efficient electricity distribution system. When 
planning the network development, energy efficiency 
and demand side management measures or distrib-
uted energy resources that might supplant the need 
to upgrade or replace capacity shall be considered. 
DSOs shall facilitate market functioning by providing 
non-discriminatory access to the grid and by provid-
ing system users with the information they need for 
efficient access to, including use of, the system. More-
over, Member States may require the DSO to give pri-
ority access to RES generators or CHP units.
Unbundling requirements: There are different re-
quirements for DSO and TSO unbundling.4 For 
DSOs, legal unbundling is required, demanding legal, 
functional and operational (staff) separation of the 
DSO from other actors in the supply chain, but not 
creating “an obligation to separate ownership of assets 
4. TSOs have a basic choice between three models: (1) 
ownership unbundling, (2) an independent system opera-
tor (i.e. transmission system remains with vertically in-
tegrated company, but system operation is performed by 
ISO), or (3) an independent transmission operator (i.e. as-
set ownership and system operation stay within vertically 
integrated company, but ITO supposed to be independent 
from the integrated company. The transmission system op-
erator “shall not, in its corporate identity, communication, 
branding and premises, create confusion in respect of the 
separate identity of the vertically integrated undertaking 
or any part thereof ” nor “share IT systems or equipment, 
physical premises and security access systems with any 
part of the vertically integrated undertaking nor use the 
same consultants or external contractors for IT systems or 
equipment, and security access systems.” For further rules 
see Annex 1 of this report).
of the DSO from the vertically integrated undertak-
ing.” Where the DSO is part of a vertically integrated 
undertaking, it shall be independent in terms of its 
organization and decision-making from the other ac-
tivities not related to distribution. Member States also 
shall ensure that the activities of vertically integrat-
ed undertakings are monitored so that they cannot 
take advantage of their vertical integration to distort 
competition. In particular, vertically integrated DSOs 
“shall not, in their communication and branding, 
create confusion in respect of the separate identity of 
the supply branch of the vertically integrated under-
taking.” Member States may, however, decide not to 
apply this rule to integrated electricity undertakings 
serving less than 100,000 connected customers.
Regulation of DSO revenues and distribution grid 
tariffs: The Electricity Directive specifies a number 
of very general provisions related to the regulation 
of DSO revenues and distribution grid tariffs. Ac-
cordingly, it is under the responsibility of national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) to adequately regulate 
the DSO(s) in their territory. NRAs shall also fix or 
approve conditions for connection and access to the 
network, including the grid charges themselves or the 
methodologies used to calculate them. Those tariffs or 
methodologies shall allow the necessary investments 
to be carried out in a manner allowing those invest-
ments to ensure the viability of the networks. Tariffs 
shall further be transparent and non-discriminatory. 
Any cross-subsidies between transmission, distribu-
tion and supply activities are to be avoided. 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/
EC) specifies some further criteria for energy net-
work regulation and grid tariffs. First, tariffs shall be 
cost-reflective of cost-savings achieved from DSM 
and DR measures as well as from DG, including sav-
ings from lowering the cost of delivery or of network 
investment and a more optimal operation of the net-
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work. Second, national network regulation and tar-
iffs shall “take into account the cost and benefits of 
each measure, provide incentives for grid operators 
to make available system services to network users 
permitting them to implement energy efficiency im-
provement measures in the context of the continuing 
deployment of smart grids.”5 
Retail market competition: By 2007 at the latest, 
electricity markets in all EU Member States had to be 
opened up to competition. Full eligibility for custom-
ers is mandatory. DSOs are supposed to carry out the 
switch of suppliers without any delay or discrimina-
tion and it should be guaranteed that the incumbent 
supplier does not have any advantage. Moreover, 
where roll-out of advanced meters is assessed posi-
tively, at least 80 % of the consumers shall be equipped 
with intelligent metering systems by 2020. The need 
to accelerate the deployment of smart grids, to estab-
lish a sound regulatory framework supporting fur-
ther improvements in competition and responding 
to new challenges, and to facilitate the participation 
of new flexibility sources in energy/power markets 
is also recognized in recent EC Communications on 
smart grids (COM(2011) 202) and on the internal en-
ergy market (COM(2012) 663). 
Summarizing, the broad architecture for the internal 
electricity market in general and for distribution sys-
tems in particular is laid out in the Third Package and 
complementary legislation. However, existing EU 
regulation leaves room for differing national imple-
mentation and for country-specific approaches to 
5. In particular, this concerns (a) shifting load from peak 
to off-peak periods; (b) energy savings from DR by energy 
aggregators; (c) demand reductions from energy efficiency 
measures undertaken by energy service providers, includ-
ing ESCOs; (d) the connection and dispatch of generation 
sources at lower voltage levels; (e) the connection of gen-
eration sources from closer location to the consumption; 
and (f) energy storage.
DSO regulation. The four areas identified in Chapter 
2 are not adequately addressed yet.
3.2 The present organization of elec-
tricity distribution in the EU 
In what follows we illustrate that the EU legislation 
and according national implementations also result-
ed in different organizations of electricity distribution 
in the EU. We first outline the diversity of European 
DSOs along several parameters, such as size or scope. 
Subsequently, we briefly discuss how retail markets 
differ throughout Europe in terms of competition, 
regulated prices and unbundling, and infer what 
these differences imply for the regulation of DSOs as 
market facilitators.
3.2.1 The present organization of European 
electricity DSOs
First, there is already huge diversity among Member 
States regarding what is understood as “distribution”. 
The boundary between transmission and distribu-
tion in terms of operated voltage levels covers a wide 
range (Figure 3). For instance, in the UK, distribution 
companies operate networks up to 132 kV and only 
very high voltage lines fall under the responsibility of 
the TSO. In contrast, in Belgium, the TSO – besides 
the high voltage grid – is also responsible for the 70- 
and 36 kV lines. 
There also is diversity regarding how DSOs are des-
ignated. Based on Article 24 of the Electricity Direc-
tive, it is the Member States who “shall designate or 
shall require undertakings that own or are responsi-
ble for distribution systems to designate […] one or 
more distribution system operators.” Between the two 
poles of purely public – and often also vertically inte-
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grated – distribution companies (e.g. Malta) and full 
privatization (e.g. several German and British DSOs 
such as EVB Netze GmbH or UK Power Networks), 
various forms of public-private-partnerships have 
been implemented. The French ERDF, for instance, 
holds more than 700 concession contracts with the 
network belonging to local authorities. In Slovenia, 
a limited liability company has been licensed by the 
government and was granted a concession for a pe-
riod of 50 years. This company then signed leasing 
contracts for the grid with the regional distribution 
companies.
Different arguments speak in favor of appointment 
procedures that involve certain competitive elements. 
Contracting out public services might allow pub-
lic authorities to take advantages of scale and scope 
economies of their private partners. Using tendering 
procedures also should increase the incentives for a 
more efficient service provision by generating compe-
tition for the market where competition in the market 
is absent (Williamson, 1985; Saussier and Yvrande-
Billon, 2007). However, such contracts can involve 
high transaction costs, and there is mixed evidence on 
the efficiency of public-private agreements in differ-
ent network industries (Saussier et al., 2009, Ruester 
Figure 3: Voltage level operated by DSOs in selected Member States 
Source: Own depiction based on DG-GRID (2007)
Figure 4: Scope of DSOs (survey data) 
Source: Eurelectric (2010)
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and Zschille, 2010, and references therein). Moreover, 
after a period of privatization, a recent trend evolved 
back to municipal utilities (“re-municipalization”, see 
Bauer, 2012; Menges et al., 2012).6 
Regarding the scope of activities, all European DSOs 
have some responsibilities in common, whereas other 
tasks are part of the DSO business model in certain 
countries but not in others. Obviously, all DSOs oper-
ate the grid, even though it has to be recognized that 
concrete grid operation activities and complexities 
will also depend on operated voltage levels. In most 
Member States, the meter is owned and managed by 
the distribution network operator, albeit this ‘tradi-
tional distribution network operator task’ has been 
opened for competition in a limited number of coun-
tries. Moreover, DSOs might have certain public ser-
vice obligations (e.g. ‘supply of last resort’), might be 
responsible for public lighting, et cetera. 
There is huge diversity regarding the number of 
DSOs and their size. Whereas some countries have 
6. In Germany, for instance, between 2007 and 2012, more 
than 170 expired concessions (for electricity, water and 
other sectors) have not been tendered again by local au-
thorities and more than 60 new “Stadtwerke” have been 
founded (VKU, 2012).
only one (e.g. Slovenia) or a few (e.g. Hungary, Neth-
erlands) DSOs, countries like Sweden, Spain or Ger-
many with more than 150, 300 and 800 distribution 
companies, respectively, have a sector structure be-
ing shaped by the presence of many small-scale DSOs 
supplying a relatively small area with a limited num-
ber of connected customers. 
The first (1996) Electricity Market Directive required 
DSOs to hold separate accounts from their parent 
companies, that is, generation, transmission and 
distribution accounts had to be separated. Directive 
2003/54/EC in addition mandated “functional un-
bundling” (organizational and decisional independ-
ence), “informational unbundling” (confidentiality of 
information) and “legal unbundling”. Finally, in 2009, 
Directive 2009/72/EC introduced rules for a more 
separated branding and customer-communication. 
For electricity transmission system operators, owner-
ship unbundling is implemented in about half of the 
Member States. For DSOs, legal unbundling is much 
more common than (voluntary) ownership unbun-
dling. In the majority of countries, exemptions from 
DSO unbundling rules provided for in Art. 26 of Di-
rective 2009/72/EC are applied in the cases that DSOs 
fall below the 100,000 customer threshold (see Table 1).
Figure 5: Number of DSOs in selected Member States (2012 data) 
Source: Own depiction based on CEER (2013)
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Regarding the regulation of DSO revenues, the de-
centralized decision making and development of na-
tional regulatory regimes (dependent on individual 
sector characteristics, the historical evolution of the 
regulatory design, national policy priorities, or reg-
ulatory capabilities) have resulted in a wide hetero-
geneity in current regulatory practices. In general, a 
revenue allowance is determined taking into account 
operating and capital expenditures, as well as depre-
ciation together with the rate-of-return set by the 
regulator. Methods for determining the regulated as-
set base and the weighted average cost of capital differ 
widely. There is cross-country variation regarding the 
numerous parameters applied, such as risk-free inter-
est rates, debt- and market premiums, the assumed 
capital gearing share, beta factors, et cetera. The 
calculation of the allowed rate-of-return might be 
based on nominal or real values. Moreover, in some 
countries an extra return can be made from incen-
tive schemes for specific performance related to for 
instance losses or quality of service. Regulators today 
put strong emphasis on OPEX reduction (Eurelectric, 
2010). Benchmarking DSOs is a common concept.
There is a huge diversity also regarding distribution 
grid tarification (see also Table 5 to 7 in Annex 1). 
Eurelectric (2013c) offers an extensive overview on 
the legal basis and responsibilities of different actors 
in setting network tariffs in different EU Member 
States. Grid fees typically involve connection charges 
and charges for system usage. Connection charges for 
new grid users cover the whole spectrum from shal-
low to deep charges. While shallow charges only ac-
count for the costs of connecting new resources, deep 
charges include all externalities that newly connected 
sources impose on the system. Tariffs for system use 
Country Total number 
TSOs
Ownership 
unbundled
Total number 
DSOs
Ownership 
unbundled
Legally 
unbundled
Less than 
100,000 cust.
Exemption
Austria 3 - 128 - 11 117 yes
Belgium 1 1 27 11 27 12 no
Bulgaria 1 - 4 4 4 1 no
Czech R. 1 1 3 - 3 NA yes
Denmark 1 1 77 - 77 71 no
Estonia 1 1 37 NA 1 36 yes
Finland 1 1 85 - 51 82 no
France 1 - 148 - 5 143 yes
Germany 4 2 869 - 146 794 yes
Hungary 1 - 6 - 6 - no
Italy 11 1 144 119 10 134 yes
Lithuania 1 - 2 - 2 4 yes
Luxembourg 1 - 6 - 1 5 yes
Malta - - 1 - - - no
Poland 1 1 22 - 7 15 yes
Portugal 3 1 13 10 11 10 yes
Romania 1 1 37 5 8 29 yes
Slovak R. 1 1 3 - 3 162 yes
Slovenia 1 1 1 - 1 - no
Spain 1 1 351 - 351 345 yes
Sweden 1 1 173 - 173 167 yes
The Netherl. 1 1 8 5 8 3 no
UK 3 1 19 13 6 5 no
Table 1: Unbundling of electricity TSOs and DSOs of selected Member States (2010 data) 
Source: EC (2012c) 
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may contain fixed-, energy-related as well as capac-
ity-related elements. Many countries, such as Ger-
many for instance, also introduced exemptions from 
network charges for certain types of grid users, such 
as low-carbon generation connected to distribution 
networks. In addition, use-of-system charges often 
include also various regulatory charges (e.g. RES fees, 
taxes paid to local authorities or other energy poli-
cy costs; Table 6 in Annex 1). According to ECME 
(2010), taxes and levies account for relatively large 
parts of the final bill, with their share ranging from 
11% in the UK to about 62% in Denmark. 
3.2.2 Competition in European retail markets 
and implications for DSOs
DSOs shall act as market facilitators in retail mar-
kets. However, retail market structures differ widely 
across and within countries, especially with respect 
to competition, price regulation and implemented 
unbundling. Hence, also DSO approaches to market 
facilitation should differ, as argued in the concluding 
paragraphs of this section.
First, there are significant differences in terms of the 
structure of electricity generation and national retail 
markets. Markets still are highly concentrated – in 
eight Member States, more than 80% of power gener-
ation is controlled by former incumbents and energy 
markets in general are perceived as not being suffi-
ciently transparent and open for new entrants such as 
aggregators and ESCOs (EC, 2012b). Although prices 
on wholesale markets have converged to some extent, 
significant differences in retail prices can be observed 
(Figures 8 and 9 in Annex 1), which of course to a 
certain extent can be explained by differences in net-
work cost and taxation. Consumer prices were among 
the highest in Germany and Denmark, including 
a higher tax burden due to national energy policies 
subsidizing the use of RES. Net retail prices excluding 
taxes where the highest in Cyprus and Malta (both 
being energy islands and relying on expensive elec-
tricity generation based on oil-fired plants) as well as 
Ireland (having only one interconnection). 
Customers in two thirds of the Member States can 
now choose from several suppliers. However, switch-
ing rates are still quite low; in 2010 fewer than 10% 
of the households changed their supplier in most 
countries (Table 8 in Annex 1). Estimates indicate 
that these small-scale consumers EU-wide could save 
up to €13bn per year if they switched to the cheapest 
electricity tariff available (EC, 2012b). Though, low 
levels of supplier switching do not necessarily have to 
be an indicator for ineffective competition. In a ma-
ture market, prices would probably have converged 
already. And a lack of switching can also be explained 
by other than price-related factors, such as custom-
ers’ satisfaction, trust to the supplier, or a lack of in-
formation. In addition, even though the Third Pack-
age states that changing the supplier should not take 
longer than three weeks, switching might require up 
to two months. 
In summary, even though full eligibility of custom-
ers is mandatory, and a positive outcome of the lib-
eralization process appears to be the general increase 
in choice of suppliers and tariffs, the degree of retail 
market liberalization and competition still varies sig-
nificantly across the EU. There is a consensus about 
“room for more competition in retail power markets” 
(Lowe, 2011). Two major drawbacks persist:
First, national governments have typically been re-
luctant to eliminate regulated end-user tariffs. As 
reported in ERGEG (2010), in 17 countries regulated 
electricity retail prices exist; and also for business 
customers this is still a common practice (see Figure 
10 in Annex 1). However, regulated tariffs discour-
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age consumers from searching for alternative sup-
pliers and, even more consequential, might prevent 
their exposure to more elaborate price signals. Un-
fair competition arises if these tariffs are ill-designed 
and calculated, establishing values deliberately below 
the minimum levels needed to cover the cost of en-
ergy (plus the regulated charges, which include the 
network tariffs and other charges such as subsidies 
to renewables, cogeneration, local fuels, institutions 
or taxes). Such too low regulated end-user tariffs do 
not only hamper the functioning of retail markets, 
but also the wholesale liberalization process as they 
might foster market foreclosure to the benefit of in-
cumbent suppliers (de Suzzoni, 2009). It should be 
noted, though, that measures implemented to protect 
vulnerable consumers do not equate to maintaining 
regulated energy prices for certain categories of con-
sumers. Customer protection and the protection of 
vulnerable customers, instead, are social issues rather 
than energy policy issues, and it should be the na-
tional governments’ responsibility to define accord-
ing tools.
Second, insufficient unbundling can be one of the 
most serious obstacles to retail competition given 
that DSOs shall act as “‘entry gates’ to retail markets 
[…] making them an important influence on the level 
of competition as well” (CEER, 2013). As recently re-
ported in CEER (2013), not all Member States have 
fully implemented the Third Package. Moreover, not 
all countries have transposed the formulated require-
ments in EU Directives to the same extent into na-
tional laws. For instance, rebranding7 is not required 
to comply with the Third Package in all countries. The 
report also shows that in those countries where un-
bundling has taken place, the rebranding of DSOs is 
7. Rebranding: DSOs are required to change their commu-
nication and branding in such a way that they can clearly 
be distinguished from supply branch and, thus, create a 
clearly separate image.
sometimes not fully satisfactory and could still leave 
room for confusion among customers.
Negative effects of insufficient unbundling are also 
widely recognized in the literature (see e.g. Nikogo-
sian and Veith, 2011, and references therein). Davies 
and Waddams Price (2007) find “clear evidence that 
those UK incumbent electricity suppliers which re-
mained vertically integrated […] have retained a 
higher market share than those where these func-
tions have been undertaken by separately owned 
companies.” Harmful practices that can prevent the 
retail market from successfully developing are mani-
fold. Such practices might include an asymmetry in 
access to commercial information, giving the retailer 
belonging to the same group as the distributor an ad-
vantage; the (illegal) use of references to the distribu-
tor’s services (e.g. advantages in technical service or 
QoS) in the retailer’s commercial advertising; a lack 
of adequate procedures to switch supplier and undue 
delays; or discriminatory practices, including exces-
sive rates, in relation with renting, installation and 
maintenance of metering equipment if this is the re-
sponsibility of the distribution company.
Finally, it will make a difference for regulatory con-
sequences whether the adequate DSO regulation and 
distribution tariff design, or the right vertical bound-
aries of DSO tasks vis-à-vis the TSO and/or the mar-
ket are discussed within a more simple system archi-
tecture as we had it in the past, or whether in contrast, 
one considers increasing complexities coming along 
with the increasing penetration of DER (Cossent et 
al., 2009; Frias et al., 2010; EDSO, 2012; Eurelectric, 
2013). At one extreme, there are areas without a note-
worthy penetration of DER and where investments in 
distribution grids are solely motivated by a renewal 
of aging infrastructure and the connection of new 
consumers. The distribution grid is expanded radially 
and designed such that grid user needs are satisfied. 
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In contrast, there are systems with a substantial pen-
etration of DER and small-scale consumers behaving 
as prosumers already today. 
It also will make a difference whether the respective 
DSO is subject to (voluntary) ownership unbundling 
as is the case in the Netherlands, or whether in con-
trast it is a small integrated operator being exempted 
from any unbundling provisions. This for instance 
often is the case for small German (“Stadtwerke”) or 
Spanish (“Cooperativas”) utilities, which also engage 
in other-than-energy social activities within their ter-
ritory and might actually be able to act as a kind of 
‘large DLSs’.8 With increasing complexity in the sys-
tem architecture, the need for DSOs to actively man-
age the distribution network increases. However, as 
shown in Figure 6, more than half of the European 
DSOs are not unbundled (most of these are very 
small and supply a reduced percentage of customers), 
either because of a lacking implementation of the 
provisions set out in the Third Package, or because 
of a national decision to apply the exemption rule for 
small DSOs. As discussed above, also implemented, 
but still insufficient, unbundling can be one of the 
most serious obstacles to retail competition.  
8. Selected cases of exemplary types of European DSOs, il-
lustrating persisting heterogeneity:
Alliander: Dutch DSO with about 3 million connected cus-
tomers, legally unbundled, owned 100% by Dutch munici-
palities, manages gas and electricity networks in five differ-
ent Dutch provinces/areas.
Stadtwerke Emden: Small German DSO “Stadtwerk” in 
Northern Germany, ca. 50,000 connected customers, ex-
empted from unbundling, 95% owned by local firms and 
5% owned by the City of Emden, manages gas, electricity, 
district heating, water and city transport for the City of 
Emden, more than 80% DER (mostly wind).
ERDF: French DSO with about 35 million connected cus-
tomers, legally unbundled, owned by EDF (with EDF being 
traded on the Paris Stock exchange and 85% shares belong-
ing to French state).
4. Assessment of the four 
regulatory areas 
High levels of DER penetration in local electricity 
markets affect all areas of DSO regulation. In the fol-
lowing, we assess these areas within the previously 
identified four categories: DSO remuneration, distri-
bution network tarification, the boundary of DSOs 
vis-à-vis the market, and the boundary of DSOs vis-
à-vis the TSOs. 
4.1 Adequate regulated remunera-
tion of distribution network activities 
This section discusses the need to revisit current reg-
ulatory practice in terms of regulating DSO expendi-
tures as well as stimulating DSO innovation. 
4.1.1 Regulating expenditures for active dis-
tribution system management
For high amounts of DER connected to distribution 
systems, the total costs of business-as-usual manage-
ment of distribution networks (that is, a continued 
“fit-and-forget” grid management) will likely increase 
in most systems. Yet, increasing amounts of DER 
have a twofold impact on DSOs’ cost structures: First, 
substantial future investments are required to prop-
erly connect all DER to the distribution networks, to 
enable the system to deal with increased volatility of 
flows and net demand and peak demand fluctuations, 
and to set up ICT infrastructure that empowers DSOs 
to employ DER for their daily grid operations. Sec-
ond, DER at the same time offer a new set of instru-
ments for grid operation and thereby a tool for DSOs 
to better perform their tasks of ensuring a reliable, se-
cure and efficient electricity distribution. DER allow 
for an active distribution system management and 
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have the potential to decrease the total costs of DSOs 
compared to not relying on DER in local system man-
agement. For instance, relying on DER to solve local 
congestion can postpone investments in new lines. 
In terms of operating and capital expenditures 
(OPEX and CAPEX), the use of DER in distribution 
grid management can decrease OPEX compared to 
business-as-usual, for instance related to contracting 
system services from competing DER instead of re-
lying on more expensive in-house solutions for volt-
age control and loss compensation. In contrast, how 
the use of DER will impact CAPEX is not obvious. 
Using DER for grid operation can decrease CAPEX 
in the longer-run if grid investments can be deferred 
(CAPEX hence being substituted for OPEX). On the 
other hand, in the short-run significant expenditures 
for investments into grids and ICT infrastructures 
supporting grid monitoring and automation are 
needed upfront. 
That employing DER can lead to overall cost savings 
for DSOs compared to business-as-usual is also con-
firmed by Yap (2012) or Cossent (2010), as shown in 
Figure 7.9 Cossent estimates non-negligible cost sav-
ings from using an active system management ap-
proach for rural, sub-urban and urban areas in the 
Netherlands, Germany and Spain, especially so for 
increasing DG shares on the way to 2020. In a similar 
vein, Mateo and Frias (2011) and Pieltan-Fernandez 
et al. (2011) argue that unless the DSO controls elec-
tric vehicle charging within an active system manage-
ment approach, the DSO would have to heavily invest 
into low- and medium-voltage lines to compensate 
for local peak demand resulting from EVs. This ex-
ample from EVs clearly demonstrates the trade-off 
between CAPEX and OPEX and resulting potentials 
to avoid unnecessary costs for DSOs. 
9. Even though the cost reductions from active system 
management compared to BAU scenarios might not for 
all systems be significant (especially in those where peak 
demand remains unchanged or even increases with a high-
er penetration of EVs, and the DSO hence cannot avoid 
building new lines), in systems with high degrees of active 
demand and storage, the volatility of distribution flows can 
be decreased, grid planning is eased, and potentially also 
less new lines have to be built.
Figure 6: Insufficient unbundling 
Source: Own depiction using data from EC (2012c) 
Disclaimer: This figure does not represent shares of customers connected to the respective types of DSOs. Such a figure ideally should also be shown in terms 
of kWh distributed and in terms of number of supplied consumers. However, unfortunately these data are not available.
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National regulators establish national approaches to 
DSO remuneration for a specified regulatory period 
and for a range of services DSOs are supposed to de-
liver. Delivering these services requires the DSO to 
undertake CAPEX and OPEX. The regulation there-
fore usually specifies how CAPEX and OPEX are 
treated, if they are treated differently, and what form 
of regulation (e.g. cost- or revenue-based) is applied 
for either type of expenditures. Specifying services 
is usually referred to as output-based regulation. In 
contrast, regulators could in principle also specify the 
inputs and clearly define the investments a DSO is al-
lowed to undertake. Output-based regulation may be 
preferred by the regulatory authorities, who do not 
possess sufficient information on what optimal inputs 
would be. However, regulating outputs is difficult, 
too, due to challenges related to their measurement 
and verification. Furthermore, investments might be 
undertaken in one regulatory period, while the out-
puts are realized only during the following period(s). 
These difficulties directly point to the question of how 
to incentivize DSOs to engage in active distribution 
system management. Active system management ag-
gravates the measurability of delivered services. At 
the same time, CAPEX will temporarily increase in 
order to undertake needed upfront investments and 
regulators have to find a way to incentivize DSOs to 
engage in efficient CAPEX. Furthermore, as OPEX 
are expected to increase, regulators have to imple-
ment smart ways to benchmark new types of opera-
tional expenditures. If negotiation and benchmarking 
CAPEX and OPEX becomes too complex due to new 
types of costs (ICT infrastructure, new platforms to 
procure system services, et cetera), regulatory au-
thorities have to increasingly rely on engineering es-
timates of expected costs of engaging in more active 
system management. 
Traditional models are not suited anymore and new 
types of engineering models are needed, although 
they take significant effort to build so that they can 
incorporate the essential technical features of distri-
bution networks and DER connection. Such refer-
Box 3: Evidence for the cost of integrating distributed generation
A lot of evidence for system cost changes resulting from the integration of distributed generation exists already. Power injection 
from DG changes flows, modifying energy losses. This effect can be both, positive or negative, depending on a number of pa-
rameters, namely the penetration level, the concentration and location of DG units within the system, as well as the technologies 
themselves, see e.g. Ackermann and Knyazkin (2002), González-Longatt (2007), de Joode et al. (2009), Cossent et al. (2010), Yap 
(2012). A low penetration of DG tends to reduce losses as local generation is absorbed by local load. As the penetration of DG 
increases, generation starts to exceed local demand (particularly for lines of low load and/or at time of low demand), leading to 
reverse flows and increasing losses. In DG GRID (2006), minimum losses for the UK system, for instance, have been calculated for 
a DG penetration of 5GW. Quezada et al. (2006) also find that wind power shows the worst behavior with respect to losses reduc-
tion, and that DG units with reactive power control provide a better network voltage profile and lower losses.
The need for grid reinforcements will strongly depend on the system management approach. In DG GRID (2006), the authors 
illustrate substantial benefits from active network management for different levels of DG penetration and concentration. Again 
for the UK distribution system, up to 50% (15-40%) of the cost of upgrading the system could be saved for an installed capacity of 
5GW (10GW). Moreover, a reconfigurable network, i.e. a network that can change its topology by opening and closing switches 
on power lines and thus dynamically changing its topology in response to load and supply, can allow grid operators to reduce 
losses and to accept more intermittent renewable generation (see Lueken et al. (2012) for simulation exercises thereon).
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ence network models (RNMs) are for example ap-
plied in Spain, as discussed by Gómez et al. (2013) 
and Mateo Domingo et al. (2011) and have been also 
used in Sweden and Chile, at least. Being large-scale 
distribution network planning tools, RNMs can be 
used to estimate efficient distribution cost and to 
plan distribution networks – both green-field or in-
crementally from existing grids. In contrast to tra-
ditional planning tools where it is the modeller who 
provides network expansion candidates, such RNMs 
generate network reinforcements automatically. See 
also Gómez et al. (2012) for different case studies that 
illustrate the applicability of these models to the as-
sessment of the impact of massive DER deployment. 
In the absence of sufficient information on multi-
ple actual cases of distribution network costs in the 
presence of diverse levels of DER penetration, which 
would render benchmarking possible, RNMs are the 
only tool presently available to regulators to make a 
reasonable assessment of efficient distribution costs. 
Admittedly, RNMs are complex to develop and to 
use, and are still a subject of research. 
A promising alternative approach is currently taken 
in the UK, with the “RIIO” model.10 This new regu-
latory framework aims at incorporating investment 
incentives by relying on an output-based, total ex-
penditures approach, hence bypassing the problem 
of estimating, negotiating or benchmarking CAPEX 
and OPEX. The regulatory period was extended from 
5 to 8 years with a possibility of a partial review after 4 
years. Thus, investments and services produced with 
investments are more aligned to one regulatory pe-
riod. Ofgem defines six output categories (consumer 
satisfaction, reliability and availability, safety, condi-
tions for connection, environmental impact and so-
cial obligations). Each DSO then has to come up with 
10. “RIIO” stands for “setting Revenue using Incentives to 
deliver Innovation and Outputs” (Ofgem, 2010), and incor-
porates three basic elements: (1) an ex-ante price control 
that sets the outputs that network companies are required 
to deliver and the revenue they are able to earn for deliv-
ering these outputs efficiently, (2) the option to leave the 
realization of infrastructure projects to third parties, and 
(3) a time-limited innovation stimulus. For a more detailed 
discussion see Benedettini and Pontoni (2012).
Figure 7: Savings in total distribution costs from active system management for selected countries 
Source: Cossent et al. (2010)
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an eight year business plan that specifies TOTEX and 
services to be delivered. 
Whether such an output-based TOTEX approach 
outperforms updated current CAPEX and OPEX 
mechanisms also depends on the amounts of invest-
ment needed (differing among Member States and 
distribution systems), and also on the information 
and precision of cost estimates available to different 
national regulators. Potentially, for Member States 
with many DSOs, for which estimating the needed 
expenditures for each distribution system becomes 
complex, RIIO-like total expenditures might be well 
suited. Whenever national regulators suffer less from 
information asymmetries and hold more information 
and better estimates on distribution cost structures 
(also because less investments might be needed due 
to a limited penetration of DER), an updated regula-
tion with negotiating on CAPEX and benchmarking 
OPEX could be the preferred solution.
The problem of not being able to properly estimate 
DSO expenditures gains even more importance be-
cause DSO revenues at the same time might decrease 
as DER penetration increases (Bauknecht, 2012). This 
might be a source of perverse incentives for DSOs, 
since the most common approaches to distribution 
network remuneration are based on the volume of 
distributed energy (see also Section 4.2 for further 
discussions thereon). With the integration of distrib-
uted generation, probably even connected to local 
storage, as well as demand response and energy con-
servation measures at the consumer side, revenues 
for DSOs might decline as demand can be (partly) 
satisfied locally and less energy needs to be distrib-
uted (Pérez-Arriaga, 2010). 
4.1.2 Stimulating DSO innovation
Besides mere compensation of DSO expenditure, the 
regulation of DSOs also has to stimulate innovative 
solutions to distribute electricity. While the form of 
remuneration itself results in different incentives to 
be cost-efficient (e.g. within a revenue-based system 
DSOs get to keep all the savings from cost reduc-
tions), and also in the choices among CAPEX and 
OPEX, the regulatory framework can also include 
additional elements that stimulate DSOs to deploy 
innovative technologies and operating procedures. 
These elements can range from tendering funds for 
which DSOs can compete with innovative investment 
models to increased remuneration for certain innova-
tive investments compared to their standard invest-
ment counterparts. 
Italy, for instance, in 2011 introduced a WACC ex-
tra-remuneration for modernizing distribution net-
works in a ‘smart way’, i.e. deploying solutions such 
as control, regulation and management of load and 
generating units, including also EV charging systems. 
Moreover, demonstration projects can receive an ex-
tra remuneration on CAPEX.11 In the UK, innovation 
– which might include not only technological devel-
opments but also the implementation of new opera-
tional processes or commercial arrangements – will 
be supported through two mechanisms. First, the 
longer-term, output-led, incentive-based, ex-ante de-
fined revenue streams for distribution companies do 
not penalize unsuccessful innovation. Second, partial 
financing for innovation projects will be provided, 
awarded based on competitive processes. Required 
funds are planned to be raised from use-of-system 
11. Extra WACC of 2% is allowed for 12 years on the part of 
the RAB associated to investments needed for demonstra-
tion project (ordinary WACC is 7% pre-tax; so total WACC 
for smart grid demonstration projects is 9%, and after 12 
years it then falls back to 7% for rest of life span of the in-
vestment), see CEER (2011).
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charges which in turn are recouped from consum-
ers. They will be treated as a pass-through cost in the 
price controls of the regulated companies (see Ofgem, 
2010; 2011). The £500 million Low Carbon Network 
Fund was introduced in 2010. For a detailed com-
parison between the Italian and the UK innovation 
schemes see Benedettini (2012).
4.1.3 Policy implications and EU involvement
An adequate incentive regulation is not easy to design 
and may in addition be prone to trade-offs among, for 
instance and in line with the above, low allowed reve-
nues for DSOs and their ability to finance innovation. 
Indeed, in a survey conducted by CEER (2011), two 
major barriers to the deployment of smart and active 
distribution systems were identified, namely first, to 
encourage network operators to choose the most cost-
efficient investment solutions, and second, to encour-
age network operators to choose innovative solutions. 
In many EU Member States, the current regulation of 
DSOs does not always provide the right incentives to 
efficiently develop and operate the grid, and to consid-
er new flexible resources in network planning made 
possible by DER.12 DSOs need to know that they will 
properly be compensated for eventual cost increases 
coming with DG integration, which is not guaranteed 
under today’s regulatory schemes. That DSO regula-
tion has to be reviewed is widely recognized, see de 
Joode et al. (2009), Bauknecht (2012), Benedettini 
and Pontoni (2012), and Agrell et al. (2013).
Increasing levels of DER lead to increasing costs for 
DSOs. New models and approaches to help regulators 
estimating the remuneration of distribution networks 
12. Niesten (2010), for instance, discussing the Dutch elec-
tricity sector, argues that existing regulation delays grid ex-
pansions and is insufficient to coordinate DG and network 
investments. 
with strong DER penetration are acutely needed. 
Cost increases can be cushioned by investing in active 
system management tools. Therefore, incentive regu-
lation for DSOs has to allow for overall higher com-
pensation of DSOs, but at the same time set sufficient 
incentives to invest in ICT and grid infrastructure 
in order to exploit the full potentials that DER offer. 
Summing up, regulation that efficiently incentivizes 
DSOs to engage in active system management has to 
take account of i) changing OPEX and CAPEX struc-
tures, ii) the optimal choice among both, that is how 
DSOs can be incentivized to find the optimal trade-
off between using DER or building new lines, and iii) 
how to incentivize DSOs to be innovative and find 
solutions (e.g. for ICT, data handling but also system 
services) in-house or by outsourcing. 
Regardless of what regulatory mechanism precisely is 
chosen, there are general improvements that within 
each regulatory framework can incentivize needed 
future investments. Such improvements could in-
clude a prolongation of regulatory periods, a higher 
focus on measurable output definitions and accord-
ing DSO performance indicators, through which 
DSOs are compensated for a higher DER penetration 
in their grids and the implementation of innovative 
projects.13 In the UK, for instance, a revenue incre-
ment per kW of connected DG has been included 
into DSO remuneration (Frias et al., 2010).
13. CEER (2011) discusses a number of (technology-neu-
tral) indicators that can help to quantify the effects/benefits 
of grid ‘smartness’. Indicators of adequate grid capacity in-
clude for instance the hosting capacity for DER in distri-
bution grids (used in Italy as a revenue driver; minimum 
requirements in the UK and Norway), or the energy not 
withdrawn from RES due to congestion or security risks 
(used for monitoring in different Member States). Indica-
tors of enhanced efficiency and better service include for 
instance grid user satisfaction, the level of losses, the actual 
availability of network capacity with respect to its standard 
value, or the time to connect a new user.
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Alternative approaches will not always work for all 
existing distribution systems, and the appropriate-
ness of certain regulatory instruments may depend 
on the existing regulatory framework, the penetra-
tion of DER, et cetera. We see neither the need nor 
a solid justification for an EU-wide harmonization of 
the regulation of DSOs. Nevertheless, national regula-
tors probably can benefit from sharing bad and good 
practices. EU guidelines for a sound regulation and 
adequate remuneration should be formulated and 
regular monitoring and benchmarking can help to re-
veal shortcomings of national regulatory approaches. 
4.2 Adequate distribution network 
tariff structure and format
The allowed remuneration discussed above material-
izes in the form and level of distribution network tar-
iffs. Rodríguez-Ortega et al. (2008) already pointed 
out that “a higher degree of efficiency will be reached 
not only by introducing competition in generation 
and retailing activities, but also by designing [ ] dis-
tribution tariffs that send sound economic signals.” 
Distribution network tariffs typically include connec-
tion charges and use-of-system charges.
Connection charges differ substantially in different 
Member States, as also demonstrated in Section 3. 
Shallow charges only cover the direct cost of connec-
tion to the nearest point of the distribution grid and 
result in subsidization of new grid users whenever the 
full costs on the system exceed the connection charge 
to be paid. In contrast, deep charges additionally in-
clude an estimate of the costs of necessary upstream 
network reinforcements and, thus, carry a strong lo-
cational signal for new grid users (including DER).14 
14. Also deep connection charges might lead to biased 
investments. If deep charges increase with the amount of 
DER connected, but fall again once grid investments have 
Likewise, a mix between shallow and deep charges 
(e.g. deep charges for units above 10 MW as in the 
Netherlands, see Cossent et al., 2009), that only subsi-
dizes small units, but deeply charges large (commer-
cial) ones have their drawbacks. Such charges are not 
technology-neutral and might result in a sub-optimal 
choice of DER scales. An adequate design of connec-
tion charges has to take account of these trade-offs. 
In contrast to connection charges that require a one-
time payment only, use-of-system (UoS) charges 
have a relatively larger impact on grid-users. How-
ever, a sound methodology to design UoS charges for 
the different agents with very diverse consumption or 
generation patterns (including DG, or aggregations 
of consumers, producers, local storage, fleets of EVs, 
micro-grids, et cetera) does not exist. Elements that 
bias a level-playing field for grid users may come in 
various forms, generally occurring whenever agents 
can reduce network charges by combining different 
DER at one metering point. Such cases establish hid-
den subsidies, might lead to business models arbi-
traging the network charges, can contribute to inef-
ficient allocation of DG units, and, likewise, have the 
potential to erode the financing of distribution sys-
tems. Given that DSOs have to raise a fixed amount 
of income, such arbitrage leaves other agents that do 
not or cannot combine sources contributing relatively 
more to finance the distribution system. Moreover, in 
many countries, UoS network charges are to a large 
part recovered via energy-related tariffs. Capacity-
related or fixed charges usually represent only a fairly 
minor share of the network tariff for (especially resi-
dential) customers, although a large share of system 
costs is eventually determined by the maximum re-
been undertaken, investment in DER may halt as costs in-
crease. DER investors will likely wait for others to invest 
first, expecting new grid investment and lower deep charg-
es afterwards.
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quired capacity of the grid user at a specific location 
and time.  
Very little progress has been made by regulation in 
this respect, despite of the fact that DG has been pre-
sent in many distribution networks for a long time 
already. How network costs are allocated among grid 
users, however, will become particularly important in 
future times when local entities like DER may com-
pete with centralized resources for the provision of 
electricity to end consumers. 
In some countries, use-of-system charges also include 
an assortment of policy costs (from subsidies to re-
newables or domestic fuels, to stranded generation 
costs or the cost of institutions, see Table 6 in Annex 
1), which are added to the purely network charges to 
become an “access tariff ” that all consumers have to 
pay. For the sake of transparency these costs should 
be treated separately, so that the reference framework 
to be presented does not apply to them. 
4.2.1 Regulatory principles for the pricing of 
electricity networks
A satisfactory tariff design is essential both to pro-
mote optimal short-term system usage and to guide 
efficient long-term grid development. When setting 
grid tariffs, a number of regulatory principles, there-
fore, should be considered (see also Lévêque, 2003; 
Pérez-Arriaga and Smeers, 2003; Sakhrani and Par-
sons, 2010). These principles include: economic sus-
tainability (or revenue sufficiency – tariffs shall fully 
recover the infrastructure cost), allocative efficiency 
(tariffs should send economic signals that encourage 
efficient operation and investment) and cost-causality 
(costs should be allocated to those agents who make 
the network to incur in these costs), as well as non-
discrimination (or equity – not implying that the same 
amount of costs should be allocated to all grid users, 
but instead that the same use of the network must re-
sult in the same network tariff under the same cir-
cumstances). Moreover, tariffs should be transparent 
Box 4: Examples for ill-designed network charges
Certain network charging schemes are particularly biasing, as for instance volumetric network charges together with net-metering, 
particularly if old meters (still predominant in most EU countries; these meters only provide the accumulated net consumption 
over a long period of time until the value is recorded, typically one or two months) are used. Volumetric charges imply that grid 
users pay according to the amount of energy taken or fed into the system (€/kWh). Net-metering implies that, if at one agent’s 
meter point both load and generation exist, the agent only pays for the net energy fed into or taken from the system during a 
specified period of time. If, say, the metering interval is 24 hours, then netting energy fed into or taken from the grid neglects 
that, for instance, during the morning and evening peak hours much load was taken from the system, and during mid-day hours 
much energy was fed into the system (e.g. from rooftop solar PV). This way, the distribution system is used during most of the 
time interval. However, the netted amount of energy could be close to zero and thereby reduce the network charge substantially. 
This problematic issue also is recognized elsewhere. Different forms of net-metering also exist in many US States, see Yap (2012). 
EEI (2013) express concerns about US distribution tariff structures typically resulting in non-DER customers absorbing the lost 
revenues occurring due to net-metering. The authors call for a revision of tariff structures, particularly in states with potential for 
high DER adoption to mitigate cross-subsidies and to provide proper customer price signals that finally will support an economic 
implementation of DER.
Yet another example of ill-designed network charges relates to volumetric use-of-system charges that increase in brackets over 
the energy consumed. Again, if net-metering is applied, by combining load and distributed generation at one meter point, the 
agent can fall in a lower bracket and significantly reduce his network charges, while the impact of the agent on the network costs 
probably remains the same. Consequently, high-consumption grid users then fall into the group of low-consumption users and 
benefit from more favorable tariffs. 
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(the method of computing the tariffs must be known 
to the public), stable in order to minimize regulatory 
uncertainty, simple in the methods proposed to facili-
tate comprehension and acceptance, and obviously 
also consistent with the legislation in place.
These multiple objectives are not always compatible 
with one another, and often are in outright conflict. 
It is impossible to simultaneously meet all of them, 
at least in their full dimensions. A higher allocative 
precision and time resolution of pricing will conflict 
with simplicity, and also perhaps with the stability 
requirements. The principle of economic efficiency 
may clash with sustainability since network charges 
that are based on marginal costs are not expected to 
provide full cost recovery (due to the lumpiness of 
grid investments, economies of scale, reliability con-
straints), et cetera. The efficient allocation of costs 
for which cost-causality cannot be determined (e.g. 
subsidies to renewables) should follow the Ramsey-
pricing principle, which is clearly discriminatory. 
Tariffs ideally should be allocated as far as possible 
based on the principle of cost-causality. Cost-causali-
ty forms a paramount principle that is important not 
only for the reason of non-discrimination and also 
economic sustainability, but in a context of liberal-
ized markets also for economic efficiency. In fact, as-
suming the absence of any market power and perfect 
information, the maximization of global surplus can 
be achieved by a tariff system where the costs for net-
work infrastructure are allocated to those who cause 
them or benefit from the assets (Pérez-Arriaga and 
Smeers, 2003). In what follows, we present a refer-
ence framework for the design of distribution grid 
tariffs that is based on the overarching principle of 
cost-causality.
4.2.2 Reference framework for the design of 
distribution grid tariffs
Today, individual grid users no longer can be consid-
ered “simple consumers”. In contrast, they are agents 
connected to the distribution grid, which can have 
very diverse consumption and/or generation patterns, 
being able (and willing) to react to price signals. In-
creasingly, grid users should be seen as complex, so-
phisticated agents, able to actively participate in the 
electricity market, and with net profiles of consump-
tion and production (the only information available 
about what happens behind the meter for tariff de-
sign purposes) that will be totally disparate. In other 
words, they can be understood as the simplest version 
of a distributed local system, representing a combina-
tion of demand (conventional demand but also new 
consumption from electric vehicles), local generation 
and potential for energy storage and/or demand re-
sponse. 
This fact demands the immediate overhaul of the 
current paradigm of network tariff design, to be re-
placed by another one following the guidelines to 
be cautiously proposed here. The current paradigm, 
exclusively designed for pure consuming agents and 
where distributed generation was considered a minor 
exception, does not hold anymore. The power system 
of the future (of the present already in many coun-
tries) will be much more complex and the tariff de-
sign paradigm has to be changed immediately, before 
much efficiency distortion is created and many agents 
will acquire rights to ill-designed subsidies. A con-
tinuation of traditional tariff design methodologies 
applying widely uniform charges over the whole dis-
tribution system and, thus, socializing network cost 
among all “consumers”, would imply an increasing 
cross-subsidization. Such practice clearly is against 
the principles of cost-causality and economic effi-
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ciency and will create all sorts of perverse incentives 
to game the tariff system. 
Instead, grid tariffs, on top of guaranteeing full cost 
recovery, should be able to convey efficient economic 
signals to the entire diversity of agents that may con-
nect to the distribution grid. We shall assume avail-
ability of detailed on-line information about the net 
demand minus generation profile of the agents, as 
provided by an advanced meter (if this is not the case, 
reasonable assumptions and simplifications will have 
to be made, until universal hourly meters in the EU 
will be a reality). Three cost drivers15, depending on 
the geographic location in the distribution system as 
well as on the profile of injection/withdrawal from 
the connection point, can be identified, following 
Rodríguez-Ortega et al. (2008):
 • First, the existence of the agent (as well as of all 
other agents, which jointly require a minimum 
basic network to be connected to the grid) in a 
specific geographical location; and the grid user’s 
subscribed capacity;16
 • Second, the grid user’s contribution to the local 
distribution peaks that have an impact on the de-
sign of the distribution network at all voltage lev-
els. (Two kinds of peaks have to be considered, 
15. As summarized in Rodríguez-Ortega et al. (2008), cost 
drivers should be derived from the cost-causality function 
and should (i) have a great impact on network cost, (ii) 
be easy to measure, and (iii) be useful when charging grid 
users, that is, they should be related to their decisions on 
where when and how to consume.
Transmission network charges might be subject to a simi-
lar (probably less detailed) treatment. This report only 
deals with distribution network regulation.
16. This concept does not exist in many countries, and the 
availability of hourly meters renders it mostly irrelevant. A 
shallow connection charge and the voltage level of the con-
nection may take care of any major differences among the 
sizes of the agents. 
since a feeder can either be in import or export 
mode. A grid user can then either help the sys-
tem at the coincidental peak times – e.g. by in-
jecting power when there is excess demand – or, 
in contrast, may worsen the situation – e.g. by 
injecting power when there is excess supply or 
having net consumption when there is excess 
demand. Hence, the respective tariff component 
can be either positive or negative. This cost driv-
er is expected to have the most impact on cost 
allocation and it is the one that will vary drasti-
cally with the nature and behavior of the agents 
connected to the grid.); and
 • Third, the grid user’s aggregated contribution to 
losses based on her (yearly) profile. Optimal re-
duction of total network losses with appropriate 
network reinforcements also has an impact on 
network design. 
A network reference model (as briefly described in 
Section 4.1 and presented in-depth in Gómez et al., 
2013) can be very useful to evaluate these three com-
ponents of distribution network charges and how the 
costs to be allocated to the agents depend on the char-
acteristics of the driving factors: location and profile. 
Signals need to be efficient and predictable. This im-
plies that a sound methodology respecting as far as 
possible the principle of cost-causality should be im-
plemented.17 Since agents connected to the distribu-
tion grid can change their usage pattern in the mid-
17. The other two basic principles of network cost alloca-
tion at transmission level as in Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga 
(2009) (“network charges should not depend on commer-
cial transactions” and “network charges should be com-
puted ex-ante”) become less relevant here. Commercial 
transactions by default are already ignored in tariff design 
at distribution level. And network charges cannot be com-
puted ex-ante for agents that may change their profiles 
drastically in a short time (e.g. by installing some local 
storage). 
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term (imagine, for instance, a prosumer, consuming 
most electricity during morning and evening peak 
hours and injecting power from rooftop solar PV 
during off-peak mid-day hours, who decides to invest 
into energy storage capacity), the charges associated 
to the grid users’ contribution to the peaks need to 
be adapted closer to real-time (e.g. monthly; with a 
zero charge in most months). Charges reflecting a 
grid user’s aggregated contribution to losses, in con-
trast, could be computed and charged over a longer-
term (e.g. annual) horizon since it is the aggregated 
value of losses for a long time that has an impact on 
network design; therefore this charge can be made to 
depend on the yearly net-consumption profile. 
Admittedly, the proposed reference framework for 
the design of electricity distribution grid tariffs in-
volves many complexities and the calculation of 
individual tariffs for each grid user would not only 
involve extremely high computation efforts and 
transaction costs, but would also result in tariffs per-
ceived as difficult to understand and to implement. 
Applied to real-world settings, therefore, a transpar-
ent, sufficiently simple and implementable method-
ology could consider a number of “zones within the 
distribution system” (those predominantly importing 
power, exporting power or neutral), and a number of 
“types of agents” connected to it, perhaps correspond-
ing to some sort of classification of types of profiles. 
When distribution costs are allocated to those who 
cause them – admittedly not a simple task – distri-
bution tariffs will induce a more efficient behavior of 
grid users. 
Note that, with very few exceptions (such as big industrial 
consumers) distribution tariffs will not be a key determi-
nant of siting decisions. On the other hand, distribution 
tariffs can be used to send signals adapted to the location 
and the utilization patterns of different kinds of users, with 
the purpose of reducing the local peak demands and thus 
the overall capacity needs and distribution costs.
Some intriguing issues will have to be contemplated 
in a detailed design of distribution network charges. 
One is how to make compatible the generalized policy 
of a “single socialized tariff ” for residential consum-
ers in many European countries with the multiplicity 
of tariffs that will be needed to deal with the diversity 
of profiles of the agents. Another one is the treatment 
to apply to any agent or grouping of agents that de-
cide to function in partial or total independence from 
the grid (e.g. autonomous micro-grids), but who are 
responsible for the network development to supply 
them in the past. 
The proposed reference framework has not addressed 
the resolution of network constraints that may re-
quire the curtailment of generation or demand at dis-
tribution level. This is a short-term issue that must be 
dealt with separately from the design of tariffs to re-
cover the costs of the distribution network. Situations 
of critical network congestions should be addressed 
by demand and local generation response programs 
(offering remuneration for a certain demand reduc-
tion or extra production in a certain period of time 
and location) or by emergency curtailments.  
4.2.3 Policy implications and EU involvement
Insufficiently differentiated grid tariffs that do not 
reflect the impact of grid users with different con-
sumption and/or production patterns on system costs 
increase cross-subsidization between grid users and 
counteract the principles of cost-causality and eco-
nomic efficiency. An overhaul of current tariff design 
methods and the development of a sound method-
ology for the design of electricity distribution tariffs, 
therefore, are urgently needed. 
Implicit subsidies inherent in existing tariff struc-
tures have to be identified and made transparent. The 
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combination of net-metering, traditional electricity 
meters and volumetric network charges, for instance, 
results in non-DER users typically cross-subsidizing 
“prosumers”. Moreover, distributed generation in nu-
merous Member States is exempted from distribution 
network UoS charges, which in some cases should 
be positive and negative in other cases. Such hidden 
subsidies or penalties should be removed as soon as 
possible and replaced (if this is the case) by sufficient 
but direct subsidies that do not turn into inefficient 
signals. This in turn does not only avoid distortions 
in competition, but also allows for sending efficient 
economic signals to renewable generators in order to 
better reflect the actual costs (or benefits) they cause 
to the system. The scale of investments needed in the 
coming decades and their correlation with genera-
tors’ siting decisions is such that, even if there is no 
consensus on what is the best methodology to apply, 
the effort is justified. 
We see neither the justification nor even the conveni-
ence for an EU-wide harmonization of distribution 
tariff design. However, national regulators will cer-
tainly benefit from sharing good practices and a set 
of EU guidelines on how to improve tarification. Tar-
iffs should be allocated as far as possible based on the 
principle of cost-causality, and as system architecture 
and functioning get more complex, it has become 
clear that the absence of economic signals to certain 
groups of grid users and the hidden subsidies to oth-
er groups cannot be justified. At least policy makers 
have to start by replacing exclusively volumetric tar-
iffs, by adding a capacity charge that properly reflects 
the impact of the agents in the cost of the network. 
Distribution network charges must depend on a grid 
user’s geographic location in the distribution system 
as well as on the profile of injection/withdrawal from 
the connection point. 
It is out of the scope of this report to offer a detailed 
proposal for robust tariff designs. Research is imme-
diately needed to come up with detailed proposals for 
distribution network tariff design that provide a level-
playing field for all types of grid users, and that do not 
Figure 8: Reference framework for the design of electricity distribution grid tariffs
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distort (or minimize the distortion of) economic effi-
ciency. It should be noted, though, that policymakers 
might have a preference for cost socialization instead 
of introducing economic signals that deteriorate the 
situation for certain users, as well as for keeping grid 
tariffs simple and easy to understand.18 
4.3 DSO activities vis-à-vis the energy 
and power markets
DSOs are supposed to be neutral market facilitators 
with ‘markets’ being not only retail markets, but also 
energy and power markets for balancing purposes 
and ancillary services. A range of different agents are 
conducting businesses within the distribution sys-
tem, such as retailers, metering companies or ICT 
companies. In the future, the number of agents will 
increase, as retailers but also new specialized agents 
can engage in offering, and possibly also aggregating, 
energy services from different sources. As the num-
ber of agents and the complexity of the system tasks 
increase, the question arises what tasks exactly lie in 
the domain of the DSO, and what tasks can be well 
performed by market players. 
On the one hand, there are basic DSO tasks (such as 
planning, operating and maintaining the distribution 
grid) which due to its cost structure are monopolistic 
activities and have to be regulated. These tasks can be 
disaggregated into a set of DSO services (Hermans, 
2013). When drawing from past experience in the tel-
ecom industry, the business approach of network op-
erators might move from ‘managing assets’ to ‘man-
18. In this vein, BDEW (2013) found that the introduc-
tion of very sophisticated grid tariffs (in this case includ-
ing also locational signals) would likely suffer from high 
implementation efforts and difficulties related to political 
enforcement. 
aging a portfolio of services’.19 Accordingly, one could 
think of energy transport services (with clear and dif-
ferent product specifications, including the transpor-
tation of electricity to consumers, but also e.g. feed-in 
of electricity from DG, or the charging of EVs), access 
services, market facilitation services (e.g. facilitating 
supplier switch), and finally system operator services.
On the other hand, there are clearly commercial ac-
tivities for which the DSO ought to provide a level-
playing field (such as buying/selling electricity) and 
regulatory intervention here should be restricted to 
support an efficient market functioning. The transi-
tion towards a system with large amounts of DER im-
plies the advent of new business models, as discussed 
above. Also margins related to the implementation 
of IT hard- and software arise, which will technically 
enable market participants to take part in local ener-
gy markets as close to real-time as possible. In smart 
distribution systems, data volumes and the value of 
data will increase drastically. 
Several tasks within this new market environment in 
theory may be fulfilled by regulated agents (which 
could be the DSO or also a third regulated party) or 
by non-regulated ones. Hence, the regulatory chal-
lenge here is to clearly define the roles, boundaries 
and responsibilities. The following examines the 
boundary between the DSO and the markets and pre-
sents different arguments for tasks to be regulated as 
DSO responsibility or to be delivered by commercial 
actors. We concentrate on those areas where there 
19. Initially, a phone call could only be made over a copper 
wire to which also a telephone number was directly con-
nected. Infrastructure and services were integrated. Later, 
service and infrastructure were decoupled when customers 
could move and keep their telephone number. Today, with 
the emergence of the internet, the service was split into a 
telecom transport service (DSL-, VPN-service, etc.) and 
many end-user application services (e.g. a voice-over-IP 
service). New end-user services and new business models 
emerged on top of well-defined telecom transport services.
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is no consensus about whether the respective tasks 
should be under the responsibility of the DSO or in 
contrast be managed by a third regulated agent or by 
the market. Concretely, we discuss (1) the ownership 
and management of metering equipment, (2) data 
handling and (3) EV charging infrastructure. Other 
activities that in some countries are part of the DSO 
activities but not in others, including public service 
obligations, supply of last resort, public lighting, bill-
ing, or the compensation for losses are not in the fo-
cus of our analysis.
4.3.1 Ownership and management of meter-
ing equipment
One of the main policy drivers in Europe for consid-
ering intelligent metering and more informative bill-
ing has been the Energy Services Directive (Directive 
2006/32/EC). With the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(Directive 2012/27/EC), the requirements for accu-
rate billing information based on actual and historical 
consumption have been reinforced. Moreover, given 
a positive cost-benefit analysis, at least 80% of all con-
sumers shall be equipped with advanced metering 
systems by 2020.20 Metering services consist of sever-
al activities that do not necessarily all have to be car-
ried out by a single party. These services include the 
meter manufacturing and provision (a clearly com-
petitive activity), meter installation and ownership, 
meter operation, and data handling. In what follows, 
we concentrate on the ownership and management 
of metering equipment. For an in-depth discussion 
of the institutional organization of data handling see 
Section 4.3.2. 
20. See Haney et al. (2009) for a summary of various cost-
benefits analyses related to the rollout of advanced meters 
that have been conducted internationally. As also high-
lighted in Joskow (2012), costs and benefits vary across 
customers, distribution systems and regions, depending 
amongst others on the penetration of DER.
Deciding on who should control metering equipment 
is important for several reasons. Advanced meters 
are strategic assets that can provide significant value 
to suppliers and customers alike (Haney et al., 2009; 
Olmos et al., 2011). Benefits of advanced metering 
include benefits for suppliers and network operation 
(e.g. reducing technical and non-technical losses, 
reducing the cost of meter reading) as well as direct 
customer benefits (e.g. cost savings from increased 
operational efficiency of metering passed to custom-
ers, easier supplier switching due to remote meter 
reading). Ownership structures and management 
responsibilities will have an impact on the rollout of 
advanced meters in individual countries. Moreover, 
advanced meters might become an object used to 
create barriers to competition by raising market entry 
and switching costs, especially in case the retailer is 
the owner of the meter. 
Ownership and management of electricity meters 
have traditionally been the domain of network op-
erators, bundled as a component of network manage-
ment and electricity distribution services. In recent 
years, however, several countries have pursued com-
petition in metering, and consequently, today, two 
main models can be observed in EU Member States:
1) First, a regulated model (applied in most coun-
tries, e.g. Italy, Sweden) where metering activities 
are treated as a regulated monopoly and in which 
the regulator sets the rules according to which 
advanced meters can or have to be installed, to-
gether with the methodology to remunerate the 
corresponding costs;
2) Second, a liberalized model (e.g. Germany, 
UK)21 where some or all metering activities are 
21. The UK is the only country where meter reading is the 
responsibility of the supplier. Large customers can buy and 
manage their own meters, and it is also possible to out-
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open to competition and in which the installation 
of advanced meters is left to the free initiative of 
market agents. 
Hence, depending on the arrangements in place, the 
(advanced) electricity meter may be the property 
of the DSO, an independent meter operator, the re-
tailer or even the customer himself. The organization 
of the metering market has an impact on how costs 
and benefits are distributed across the supply chain, 
which in turn can have a significant effect on the de-
cision on whether and how to deploy advanced me-
ters. Under a regulated model costs can be recovered 
through regulated charges which are directly passed 
on to customers. In contrast, in a liberalized model, 
the costs will also be passed on to customers, but in a 
competitive setting. 
Batlle and Rodilla (2009) and Schächtele and Uhlen-
brock (2011) discuss these alternative approaches. 
The major advantage of the liberalized model is that 
technology choice is left to the market. In case of 
complete market liberalization, as introduced in Ger-
many, any party who wants to enter the market – be it 
a retailer, DSO or any third party – is allowed to do so 
and can compete for consumers. Competitive pres-
sure should foster operating efficiency and incentiv-
izes agents to innovate and to seek new technological 
solutions. However, when the retailer owns the meter, 
there is a certain risk that it might turn into a barrier 
for the consumers to switch providers, since changing 
the equipment might not be straightforward or cheap. 
source meter provision to a meter operator and meter as-
set manager (i.e. meter package tailored to large customers’ 
needs, as for instance is interesting for a chain with many 
stores). In Germany, the metering market is liberalized but 
the DSO is assigned the default metering operator in case 
the consumer does not make an active choice. However, it 
remains to be verified how successful or unsuccessful (in 
terms of proven positive effects for the customers) the ap-
plication of a certain model has been so far.
There is a need for certain clauses allowing the retail-
er to hedge against the risk of incurring stranded cost 
if the consumer decides to switch soon after the new 
equipment is installed. Meter operators could reduce 
their investment risks by offering longer-term service 
contracts to consumers taking on the investment cost 
and recouping them over the contract period. In con-
trast, the regulated model can simplify a mass-rollout 
of the new technology. Investment risks are low and 
costs can be socialized. 
Member States can choose among a mandatory or a 
market-driven approach regarding the rollout of ad-
vanced meter infrastructure. A mandatory rollout 
forcing every consumer to install an advanced meter, 
however, might not be cost-effective since for some 
consumer groups costs might exceed potential ben-
efits. On the other hand, a mandated, comprehensive 
and coordinated introduction of advanced meters 
could allow for a lower-cost rollout benefiting from 
economies of scale (Schächtele and Uhlenbrock, 
2011; Frontier Economics, 2007a). Moreover, Wiss-
ner and Growitsch (2010) argue that if consumers 
underestimate the savings potential from using an 
advanced meter, they would have an inadequately low 
willingness to pay.
A general way to guarantee the installation of advanced 
metering infrastructure is to introduce certain com-
pulsory requirements related to the functionalities 
of electricity meters. The Standardization Mandate 
M/490 to European standardization organizations to 
support the deployment of smart grids, formulated by 
the EC in 2011, in this vein calls for the development 
of a “set of consistent standards within a common 
European framework […] integrating a variety of 
digital computing and communication technologies 
and electrical architectures, and associated processes 
and services.” Standards for meters, communication 
procedures and data formats become even more cru-
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cial in a competitive environment, where investment 
risks without any standards in place may be very high 
in case the competitive meter owner/operator cannot 
be sure that the investment will not become stranded 
if, for instance, the customer switches to a supplier 
who does not agree to use the same technology.
In summary, under a liberalized model, advanced 
meter implementation likely will occur more slowly 
and in a more fragmented manner, as the customer 
has the choice to pay for an advanced meter or not. 
However, once barriers to a wide-spread rollout have 
been removed (e.g. via some form of standardiza-
tion), competitive forces will likely reflect in more ef-
ficient outcomes in the long-run. Competition shall 
be conducive for innovation and cost reductions and 
may support the development of a broader range of 
metering technologies and solutions in contrast to a 
situation in which a single regulated market actor (or 
policy maker) attempts to choose a ‘winning’ tech-
nology early in its innovation chain.
The decision on how to organize the metering mar-
ket is influenced by a number of parameters. First, a 
higher magnitude of potential scale economies in the 
rollout will speak in favor of metering activities be-
ing treated as a regulated monopoly. A single meter 
operator here would cause lower cost, at least in the 
short-run. Second, if there are economies of scope with 
other DSO activities, there are arguments for giving 
the responsibility of meter ownership and manage-
ment to the system operator. Third, uncertainty about 
best suited technological solutions calls for a setting 
where market agents compete with each other. Fur-
ther arguments relate to possible market entry bar-
riers. If metering is unbundled from DSO activities, 
there are some doubts whether small retailers will 
have the capital necessary to invest in metering and 
related ICT infrastructures. Larger players might use 
metering services to build entry barriers. Last, one 
might argue that the regulated model seems to be the 
most appropriate to achieve a fast mass rollout of ad-
vanced meters that is required in order to facilitate the 
development and optimal system integration of DER. 
Ultimately, the choice also depends on the number 
and size of DSOs in different countries. With many 
small DSOs that do not allow for significant scale or 
scope economies, commercial agents might well un-
dertake meter reading. Similarly, in Member States 
with high DER penetration and strong benefits from 
a timely rollout of advanced meters, supporting DSOs 
as meter owners and innovators might be the most 
promising solution, not at least because the most suc-
cessful rollouts all benefited from political and regu-
latory support.
4.3.2 Data handling
Data is an information good and stands in contrast to 
classical private goods, which are excludable and for 
which rivalry occurs. Data, as an information good, 
is non-rivalrous, because consuming data does not 
diminish the amount available to others. For instance, 
data on consumption patterns of end-users might 
be used by more than just one retailer to construct 
tailor-made contracts. Depending on the technology 
and the legal regime, data can be to a certain extent 
non-excludable (meaning it cannot be used and con-
sumed by just one agent who can exclude others from 
using it). Technologically, data is often consumed by 
several parties at a time (e.g. by retailers, who observe 
data of power flows and prices for end-users, and by 
end-users who observe such data to possibly adjust). 
Hence, situations can occur in which certain actors 
cannot be excluded, especially those signing a mutual 
contract and having to verify its fulfillment ex-post.22
22.  For a more detailed illustration of these characteristics 
of information goods see Varian (1999). 
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In smart distribution systems, data volumes and the 
value of data will increase drastically and data sup-
ports three categories of activities within the distri-
bution system, being a key input for (i) commercial 
operations, but also for (ii) ensuring a stable system 
functioning and quality of supply, and (iii) efficient 
grid planning. The Smart Grids Task Force Expert 
Group (EG) 2 distinguishes between “personal and 
non-personal data; personal data is considered as 
specific data and can be traced back to the individual 
consumer whereas non-personal data could be aggre-
gated data and does not contain references to natural 
persons.” This definition will be important for both 
ownership and data security implications, which EG2 
is currently examining. In this section, we discuss 
whether all data should be managed and provided for 
by a single regulated entity and if yes, whether this 
entity should be the DSO. 
Three data models have been developed within the 
Smart Grids Task Force EG3. In a first model, it 
would be the DSO acting as a market facilitator and 
being responsible for all sub-processes related to me-
tering and data processing. In an alternative model, 
these tasks would be undertaken by an independent 
third party, also regulated as a natural monopoly. In 
contrast, a third model proposes the creation of a 
“trusted data access point manager”, a commercial 
role played by certified companies. Hence, whereas in 
the first two models data handling would be organ-
ized by regulated entities and on data hub(s), this is 
not the case for the third one. See Table 1 in Annex 
2 for further details. Models might co-exist and even 
be combined. For data security and privacy reasons 
customers will always be the owners of their ‘person-
al’ data and have to approve if data should be sent to 
third parties. 
A major decision national regulatory agencies have 
to make is if data is best handled with one regulated 
entity (as in the first two models) or within a com-
mercial market setting (as with the third model). In 
theory, if data is non-excludable and a public good, it is 
best treated at a regulated monopolist, because other-
wise, under-provision of data would occur. Alterna-
tively, DAMs would have to be obliged to provide all 
critical data to the DSO, but also make certain non-
personal and aggregated data visible on platforms to 
increase market transparency and ease the entry for 
new business models. Similarly, if data is partly ex-
cludable, the market is no solution either. Commer-
cial market actors focusing on data trade only, will 
not be able to recover their investments in data ag-
gregation or generation. Only one market actor that 
holds total exclusivity rights for data can offer data as 
a monopolist. Finally, if data is excludable, market ac-
tors can, however, bundle data generation and trade 
with operations on the infrastructure or energy and 
capacity markets. In this way those actors will be able 
to subsidize data processing, and are thus able to offer 
costly services related to data aggregation or genera-
tion as part of a bigger product package.
While aggregated data is enabling the market, per-
sonal data is in fact driving it. There is a commer-
cial use for personal data where retailers, traders or 
aggregators can take margins from and the market 
might be able to take care of personal data efficient-
ly. Actors engage into contracts with these data, and 
owning data and having sufficient knowledge guaran-
tees profit margins. Hence, the performance of new 
business models, as well as the functioning of retail 
market competition, will rely on comprehensive con-
sumer data. Any interested party should be able to get 
access to such data – provided that individual con-
sumers give their authorization for the use of their 
personal profiles – and data should be provided as 
cheaply as possible. The definition of the specific for-
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mat of data provision and related cost recovery and 
possible cost socialization (i.e. one of the three data 
models introduced above, or a combination thereof) 
can then be left to the Member States. Data required 
by system operators for security of supply and system 
integrity as well as for optimal planning of the net-
work (which is customers’ configuration data but also 
behavior data, i.e. consumption and feed-in volumes 
and capacities), should always be provided to the rel-
evant party. 
As summarized in Table 2 and discussed in-depth 
within the Smart Grid Task Force EG3 and elsewhere 
(EC, 2013a), all models have their pros and cons con-
sidering (a) the efficiency in supporting the rollout of 
advanced meters and related infrastructures at lowest 
possible costs, and (b) the implementability of each 
solution. Therefore, a minimum set of requirements 
regarding how the data are obtained, stored, made 
available and privacy is preserved – as far as possible 
independently of the respective data model – should 
be defined at EU level. Minimum requirements 
should follow at least three high-level principles that 
take account of consumer, DSO and market actor 
needs. First, the data interface should be designed ac-
cording to clear and transparent rules respecting cus-
tomer privacy and customer access to their own data. 
Second, network operators must have access to data 
needed for ensuring the network performance. Third, 
(cross-border) trade among market actors should 
be enabled by simple and cost-efficient interfaces to 
existing (interregional or international) data hubs. 
These minimum requirements then shall be met any-
where in Europe, regardless of the model(s) that is 
(are) chosen by each Member State.
One regulatory option to support a level-playing 
field could also be to oblige DSOs to ensure access 
compatibility to its ICT infrastructure for all market 
players. Market players then could find the most effi-
cient technology standards for their own ICT devices, 
while the DSO then has to ensure that this standard 
is compatible to its central network ICT. This prin-
ciple of market leadership in ICT deployment and 
standards and DSO guaranteed applicability of such 
standards avoids technological lock-in, compared to 
a situation in which DSOs are first movers in imple-
menting ICT. Furthermore, this principle aggravates 
potential market abuse of insufficiently unbundled 
Box 5: Proposed data models
DSO: All personal and aggregated data is with the DSO, who stores the data in one or several data hubs. One data hub can also 
be jointly operated by several DSOs. Metering and all sub-processes stay with the DSO. Supplier switching takes place via the DSO 
and the hub. Also TSOs can ask for relevant information from such data hubs.
Central data hub: All personal and aggregated data is with a newly introduced regulated third party. This entity is independent 
from the DSO and all other market players, and stores all relevant market information in one or several data hubs. Metering and 
sub-processes might then be undertaken by the DSO or commercial market players. This new central data hub agent will also be 
responsible for organizing supplier switching.
Data access-point manager: Personal and aggregated data is not centrally stored and no official market data hubs exist. Data 
is directly extracted from meters for all necessary processes. The entity responsible for guaranteeing data access at each meter 
point is the data access-point manager (DAM), which can be any certified commercial actor. Hence, several DAMs might co-exist 
and compete for delivering their services to grid users. However, the metered agents (households, distributed storage, EVs or 
distributed generation) do not per se choose their respective data manager, but the entity that invests in the installment of ad-
vanced meters.
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DSOs that possibly could use ICT standards to the 
disadvantage of competing retail firms.
A key question to be addressed here is also how to 
achieve cooperation and synergy between DSOs and 
ICT companies while maintaining a level-playing 
field in the market. Hermans (2012) proposes a joint 
venture model where communication infrastructure 
for smart grids becomes part of smart grid infrastruc-
ture, i.e. falling into the regulated domain, but at the 
same time ICT companies provide their expertise in 
building and operating this new infrastructure, thus 
generating revenue outside the regulated domain. 
Merging distribution and data infrastructure business 
models, however, opens new regulatory concerns that 
should be addressed in future research. 
4.3.3 Electric vehicle charging infrastructure
Recent debates show that there also is a need to dis-
cuss which types of agents should be authorized to 
provide EV charging infrastructure, which theoreti-
cally could be considered a fully regulated monopoly 
or a commercial activity. One could imagine three 
general possible ownership structures, namely (i) 
DSOs or similarly regulated entities, (ii) commercial 
actors and private investors (including retailers or ag-
gregators), or (iii) public entities, maybe even offer-
ing free access. Today, all forms of ownership can be 
observed: In Germany, more than 50 DSOs operate 
charging stations (VKU, 2012). In Florence, Italy, SIL-
FI SPA, the public lighting company, operates more 
than 100 charging stations. But also private investors 
are entering the market, often backed-up by pilot-
project initiatives and corresponding public funding 
(PikeResearch, 2012).
Recognizing that “a question of great importance 
concerns the degree of regulation needed for an ef-
fective and efficiently functioning market for charg-
ing infrastructure”, Eurelectric (2010c) describes four 
possible market models for public charging infra-
structure23:
1. Integrated infrastructure market model: The 
charging infrastructure is fully integrated into 
the DSO’s assets and the commercial relation-
ship stays between customers and retailers us-
ing this infrastructure. The main difference to a 
conventional electricity contract is that custom-
ers are allowed to charge at any location within 
the charging network managed by the DSO while 
still receiving one bill from the retailer. Charging 
infrastructure would be collectively financed with 
costs being reflected in tariffs for grid usage.
2. Separated infrastructure market model: EV 
charging infrastructure is conceived as a new, 
separate and independent step in the value chain, 
and therefore a new agent, the “charging infra-
structure operator” would be created. This new 
operator still is a special distributor that is inde-
pendent of retailing activities, and infrastructure 
falls under rules concerning unbundling. Retail-
ers have access to all EV charging sockets of all 
charging infrastructure operators. Charging in-
frastructure would be financed based on the “us-
er-pays” principle. 
23. It is typically distinguished between three types of EV 
charging (Gómez et al., 2011; Eurelectric, 2010c), namely 
(a) private areas with private access (e.g. charging your car 
in your own garage); (b) private areas with public access 
(e.g. supermarket); and (c) public areas with public access 
(e.g. public parking lot; charging here typically by EV cus-
tomers who live in apartments without private charging 
facilities, or by customers parking their car for a shorter 
stay – whereas the first require long-term charging, the lat-
ter might need “fast charging”, which is a special technical 
concept).
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Option 1 – DSO as a market 
facilitator 
Option 2 – Central data 
hub 
Option 3 – Data access 
point manager 
Efficiency criteria
Non-discriminatory, neutral 
market facilitation? 
Problems if 
Insufficient unbundling 
(possible inefficiencies on 
retail market, strategic ac-
tions might increase switch-
ing cost, et cetera)
Difficult to properly monitor 
DSOs (e.g. for countries with 
very large number of DSOs)
Third party = regulated, 
neutral actor providing 
non-discriminatory ac-
cess to information
DAM = commercial role
DAM shall “provide and 
prioritize rights” of any 
market actor à possibly 
critical situation since 
data responsible party 
should act in a non-dis-
criminatory manner
DSO able to ensure sys-
tem stability?
Yes
(+ possible benefits from 
synergies)
Yes 
(given that DSO gets all necessary data in a timely and 
efficient manner)
Incentives to innovate 
and to improve data 
infrastructure?
Lower
(depending also on whether an ‘intelligent’ incentive 
regulation can be introduced)
Higher
Economies of scale and/
or scope?
Economies of scale and 
scope
Economies of scale Lower
Regulatory efforts Regulation has to prop-
erly incentivize tradi-
tional DSO task plus data 
management 
(à multi-dimensional 
incentive regulation)
Possible high installment 
costs for new regulated 
agent
Two monopolies in a row 
(DSO & CDH) have to be 
regulated // might imply 
redundancies 
Many market actors need 
to be “certified”
Implementability
Simplicity and clarity for 
consumers?
Higher consumer efforts 
to (a) deal with many 
interfaces and to (b) take 
many decisions
Trust from consumer side 
// privacy concerns
All data goes to central 
hub (but fact that DSO 
is well-known, already 
regulated entity may add 
consumer confidence)
Regulator can control se-
curity and privacy issues
All data goes to central 
hub
Regulator can control se-
curity and privacy issues
Consumers individually 
decide themselves to 
whom to give data (or 
not)
Possibility to socialize 
costs among grid users?
Yes No No
 
Table 2: Comparison of the proposed data models
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3. Independent e-mobility market model: An “inde-
pendent e-mobility provider” would install a pro-
prietary network of EV charging sockets and pro-
vide electricity bundled with other services (incl. 
the charging). Charging infrastructure would be 
financed based on the “user-pays” principle.
4. Spot operator owned charging stations market 
model: Charging stations and selling of electricity 
are conducted by parking spot owner or operator 
who does not directly own the spot but rather has 
the right or license to operate it. Multiple market 
players together with existing players like retail-
ers and DSOs (outside their regulated activity) 
would compete. Charging infrastructure would 
be financed based on the “user-pays” principle. 
EV charging infrastructure does not inherit cost 
structures that would lead to a natural monopoly 
(that is, sub-additivity of costs is not given), nor can 
under-provision due to a notion of public goods be 
expected, given that there is a sufficient amount of 
EV users and demand for charging stations. Taken to-
gether, this speaks clearly in favor of a market-based 
approach.24 However, in practice, business models 
suffer from at least two major challenges that justify 
policy intervention: 
First, there will be no demand for electric vehicles 
without charging stations, but also no incentives to 
invest in charging stations without the penetration of 
a sufficiently large number of vehicles. Policy inter-
vention might be justified to address this “chicken-
and-egg problem”, to stimulate the demand for EVs 
and charging stations and thus to kick-start the de-
ployment of this technology. This is also confirmed 
24. Furthermore, charging stations do not necessarily have 
to have access to the grid, as the electricity can also be pro-
vided for with local generation. Such non-grid competition 
further argues in favor of a market-based solution.
in various empirical studies. Schroeder and Traber 
(2012), for instance, show that a market-driven rollout 
of public fast charging stations in the German market 
is unlikely to be profitable and that such investments 
are fairly risky (e.g. due to uncertain EV adoption 
rates, local use rates, competition between public and 
private charging facilities). If private investments take 
place at this premature stage, it appears to be driven 
by other motivations (charging stations may be used 
to attract consumers with main revenues generated 
from non-electricity sales). 
Similarly, Tran et al. (2012) argue that - on individual 
consumer level - the adoption of EVs mostly is mo-
tivated by financial incentives (e.g. tax deductions), 
environmental concerns or affinity towards new 
technologies. However, because consumers tend to 
be risk-averse, they also conclude that policy inter-
vention is required to accelerate EV adoption. Us-
ing a simulation approach, they find that for battery 
electric vehicles to be competitive on the market for 
cars, a) EVs would have to lose 20% of their price pre-
mium compared to internal combustion engine cars, 
and b) this has to be combined with a 60% increase in 
EV refueling possibilities. Ito et al. (2013) argue with 
positive externalities of charging stations. Investment 
in infrastructure has a direct and an indirect gain. 
First, there are direct gains from the charging stations 
itself, and second and indirect, one charging station 
increases the vehicles cruising range. This is another 
argument in favor of policy intervention supporting 
EV infrastructure, at least initially.
Note, however, that the “chicken-and-egg problem” 
which speaks in favor of actions to jump-start ade-
quate infrastructure investment and customer adop-
tion must not necessarily result in public or DSO 
ownership of charging stations. Alternatively, also 
competitive tenders for infrastructure roll-out or sub-
http://think.eui.eu 37
 From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: Rethinking the regulation of European electricity DSOs 
sidizing pre-qualified private entities can kick-start 
EV adoption.
Besides problems related to externalities, there are 
also different charging systems in place or under 
development, which might diminish incentives to 
change from traditional to electric transportation. 
Standardization, in contrast, ensures interoper-
ability and also can support competition in manu-
facturing. Problems with competing networks and 
standardization have already been studied by Katz 
and Shapiro (1985). In such situations, policy inter-
vention can decrease the adaptation costs that come 
with changing the infrastructure (in this case from 
conventional to electric vehicles) and increase overall 
welfare. In principle, such standardization, however, 
can also arise out of industry self-interest. In the EU, 
the European Parliament in 2010 recognized that it 
is important to achieve a single European EV mar-
ket and called for international or at least European 
standardization of “interfaces between vehicles and 
recharging infrastructure”. After more than two years 
of debate, the EC announced in early 2013 that the 
three-phase coupler developed by the German Men-
nekes would be accepted as EU standard.25 
In the “Mobile Energy Resources in Grids of Elec-
tricity” (MERGE, 2011) project, stakeholders from 
different Member States have been asked about their 
opinion regarding the four models described by Eu-
relectric. Respondents to the questionnaire first agree 
that EV charging in public areas with public access 
is necessary (instead of fully relying on charging sta-
tions on private property) in order to build a suffi-
ciently dense network of charging stations. There 
furthermore is a general consensus that the first two 
options are preferable because of a number of reasons: 
DSOs already have knowledge in building and oper-
25. Official press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-13-40_en.htm
ating grids; Options 3 and 4 could represent a step 
back in unbundling of distribution and retailing; and 
independent e-mobility agent or spot operator also 
may find that volume of sales in a certain geographic 
area may be insufficient to recover cost at least in ini-
tial stages of EV uptake.
The above arguments are in line with Gómez et al. 
(2011). The authors argue that for EV charging points 
in private areas with private access, the EV owner 
should take care of the charging point. For charging 
points on private property but with public access, 
this would be the tasks of a charging point manager. 
In contrast, for the charging infrastructure in public 
areas, installation cost would be substantially higher 
and the business model would involve higher risks. 
Therefore, in order to ensure a large rollout, this busi-
ness should be regulated and charging stations should 
be developed by the corresponding DSO. Obviously 
the regulation should include the mechanisms for the 
recovery of the costs of deploying and operating these 
facilities. 
Hence, to conclude, the key point seems to be that 
‘if we want EV deployment to happen, a non-market 
based solution is required – at least in the initial phase 
of market uptake.’ However, such intervention has to 
be done with care. If regulated models are used to 
push the adoption of EVs, the future market structure 
will be heavily influenced. Once EVs are adopted and 
demand for charging stations is high enough, mar-
ket solutions can outperform the regulated solution. 
However, by that time the market will be dominated 
by formerly regulated incumbent companies running 
the charging stations. Furthermore, EV technology 
is changing and regulating the market today might 
hamper the adoption of even better technologies (ve-
hicle technology and charging technology) tomorrow. 
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Ultimately, the decision on which model to imple-
ment should be left to Member States. The deploy-
ment of EV charging stations by DSOs requires mas-
sive amounts of investment, but it cannot be assumed 
that the financial situation of all DSOs is the same 
throughout Europe. Moreover, the EV penetration 
differs among systems, as does the interest to build 
these infrastructures and use them to develop busi-
ness models for V2G service provision. The “chick-
en-and-egg problem” will thus also be more or less 
severe in different Member States. Hence, the market 
integration of EVs should be tailored to the differ-
ent specific characteristics of DSOs and distribution 
systems. Nonetheless, for all policies it holds that EV 
integration should proceed gradually, as technologies 
are still evolving and technological lock-in, especially 
a publicly supported one, should be avoided.
4.3.4 DSOs’ operating procedures to procure 
DER services
Today, DSOs mainly ensure system reliability along 
three major lines of tasks: network investments, 
maintenance and reinforcement, voltage control, and 
load/generation curtailment. While the first implies 
providing grid infrastructure, both latter tasks con-
cern the operation of the grid. Voltage control helps 
to keep adequate levels of quality of supply. With 
load curtailment in case of local congestion, DSOs 
can handle emergency situations.26 Hence, DSO net-
26. In some countries (e.g. Italy, Spain, Ireland), curtail-
ment management is with the TSO and the respective 
DSOs have to ask the TSO to constrain DG (mostly only 
possible for generation units above a certain capacity 
threshold), see Eurelectric (2012). There are different ap-
proaches in different Member States regarding a potential 
curtailment of DG (Eurelectric, 2013). In Belgium, curtail-
ment by the DSO is allowed for security issues. In case of 
congestion at the TSO level, the TSO has to send an order 
to the DSO. In Germany, generation units above a certain 
size can be curtailed also in normal operation.
work management has been until now mainly based 
on acting directly on the networks, e.g. changing the 
load flows, trying to deviate the potential surcharges 
through alternative circuits, but not managing certain 
loads unless in cases of emergency events, in which 
DSOs guide their operation decisions by security pro-
tocols that in principle are agreed with the regulator 
or at least are subject to ex-post supervision.
Increasing amounts of DER offer new means for 
system operators in executing their tasks. Primarily, 
DER offer solutions for grid operation. But short-run 
grid operation measures also have positive effects on 
the longer-term planning and grid investments, since 
using DER to manage congestion in the short-run at 
the same time can postpone or even avoid future grid 
investments. Therefore, the potentials of DER can be 
used to perform short- and long-term DSO duties. In 
particular, DER offer network operators additional 
instruments to (i) manage short-term problems in 
the grid, (ii) to optimize the cost of maintaining the 
desired quality of service, (iii) to reduce grid losses 
and (iv) to reduce or postpone future investments. In 
this vein, the Electricity Directive (Art. 25(7)) already 
mandates that “when planning the development of 
the distribution network, energy efficiency/demand-
side management measures or distributed generation 
that might supplant the need to upgrade or replace 
electricity capacity shall be considered.”
Eventually, to engage in an efficient use of DER, 
more active DSOs will have to contract energy- and 
capacity-related products, and therefore likely em-
ploy market-based mechanisms such as procurement 
auctions, similar to the ones TSOs are currently us-
ing to procure reserves. The involvement of DSOs in 
such commercial activities leads to the overarching 
question whether, and if yes, how, DSOs should be al-
lowed to purchase services with economic value from 
DER, such as network congestion management, volt-
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age control, or support to system recovery after a lo-
cal blackout. This question is of special relevance giv-
en that many DER technologies in principle can also 
provide services with economic value to other market 
agents, as it could be for instance the case of retailers, 
who could either resort to them for their own needs 
(to minimize the cost of their imbalances) or eventu-
ally to resell them in the ancillary services markets 
and services run and acquired by the TSO.
Thus, the DSO would compete directly with com-
mercial local aggregators in distributed local systems. 
This competition could result in incentives for the 
DSO to abuse its role as a market facilitator. New reg-
ulation, hence, should encourage DSOs to start new 
market places to procure system services. Since DSOs 
are regulated firms, they should be subject to specific 
operating procedures to regulate the ways in which 
they conduct and channel their DER acquisitions. 
Essentially, as discussed by Batlle and Rivier (2012), 
these procedures should ensure that DER resources 
purchased by distributors are acquired transparently 
and impartially (i.e. in public auctions supervised by 
the regulator) and that products purchased by dis-
tributors in such auctions are clearly defined and at 
the avail of the system operator at all times (see the 
discussion on TSO and DSO coordination later in 
Section  4.4). Regulator supervision has to guarantee 
that DSOs purchase DER services from retailers under 
conditions in which all are treated equally (e.g. guar-
anteeing that the group’s own retailer is not favored).
4.3.5 Policy implications and EU involvement
The newly emerging market environment not only re-
quires infrastructure for energy distribution. In addi-
tion, also infrastructure for metering, data handling, 
and EV charging is needed. Currently, there is no 
consensus about whether the respective tasks to pro-
vide such infrastructures should be under the respon-
sibility of the DSO or not. The regulatory challenge 
is to clearly define the roles, boundaries and respon-
sibilities, so that there is a level-playing field for all 
potential and valuable business models. When mov-
ing from “passive distribution networks” towards “ac-
tive distribution system management”, DSOs become 
real system operators and the existing hosting capac-
ity of the distribution network can be used more ef-
ficiently if an optimal use of DER is considered. Thus, 
DSOs become agents that manage local markets for 
network services or directly purchase services with 
commercial value from other agents, and their role 
and organization will have an important impact on 
(retail) market functioning. 
The regulatory principle in this transition should be 
such that whenever new responsibilities are best per-
formed by competitive market actors, the DSO’s role 
remains to facilitate local markets and to act as an 
enabler and smart integrator of competitive services 
that make use of the distribution network in their 
business processes. In turn, whenever new responsi-
bilities show sufficient synergies with the traditional 
tasks of regulated monopolies that operate the net-
work, the DSO should be made responsible for these 
new services. In this case, therefore, regulators also 
have to provide appropriate regulation and incentives 
that properly embed all new responsibilities into the 
existing incentive regulation schemes.
Different proposed (regulated as well as liberalized) 
models for (1) the ownership and management of 
metering equipment, (2) data handling and (3) EV 
charging infrastructure all have their advantages and 
disadvantages. These tasks may or may not be offered 
at lowest cost (due to sufficient synergies with grid op-
eration) or in a more qualitative way by the DSOs as 
compared to other third regulated agents or commer-
cial actors. The suitability of a certain model will de-
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pend on system-specific conditions and the decision 
about whether to include such tasks into the DSOs’ 
portfolio should, therefore, be left to national au-
thorities. Though, if a full rollout of advanced meters 
(including data management), and also EV charging 
infrastructure shall be provided in a timely fashion, 
advantages lie in the domain of the DSO. Regulators, 
however, have to take care not to foreclose market 
structures through DSOs becoming incumbents, be-
cause once new technologies are deployed at scale, 
commercial actors could enter the market and enrich 
competition and the quality of respective services.
For all new infrastructure services it holds that when 
regulators opt for implementing these new tasks via 
DSOs, possible repercussions on energy and power 
markets have to be ruled out. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3, retail market competition and, in particular, 
the current levels of unbundling are not fully satis-
factory. With an increasing penetration of DER and 
the accompanying advent of new market actors and 
business relations, the negative effects of limited un-
bundling might become aggravated. Ownership un-
bundling would effectively eliminate any incentive for 
inappropriate practices. When mandatory ownership 
unbundling, however, is politically not enforceable, 
or is economically counterproductive for the custom-
ers’ choice (through a drastic reduction of suppliers 
on the market) or for the customers’ bill (through du-
plication of costs in separated entities or loss of syn-
ergy with other local utility functions) stricter imple-
mentation of unbundling requirements and market 
transparency measures should be mandated as more 
responsibilities are given to DSOs. Accordingly, as the 
complexity of the system increases, an insufficiently 
unbundled DSO could then either stay with a restrict-
ed set of tasks, or the DSO could expand its portfolio 
of activities, but accompanied with an increasing lev-
el of unbundling, i.e. towards “higher Chinese walls” 
between DSOs and their subsidiary retailers that en-
gage in trading of distributed sources.27
At the same time it has to be noted that before in-
vestigating new forms of “Chinese walls”, the imple-
mentation of, and the compliance with, existing un-
bundling requirements have to be reinforced. In the 
past, unbundling frameworks have gradually been 
implemented, becoming stricter over time. CEER 
(2013) sees still limited progress on DSO unbundling 
in countries that do not fully transpose the 2009 Di-
rectives and corresponding requirements. Moreover, 
throughout the EU unbundling efforts are still on-go-
ing and, thus, a final evaluation is not possible at this 
stage. In this light, for DSOs that expand their port-
folio of regulated tasks, the timely compliance to ex-
isting unbundling requirements gains in importance.
Hence, the existing unbundling rules place minimum 
requirements on DSOs, on top of which additional 
requirements can gradually be added as the role of a 
DSO changes with an increasing penetration of DER. 
These additional requirements could mostly center 
around the use of customer data and transparency in 
procurement of services for DSO system operation. 
For instance, switching procedures should include 
clear mechanisms for accessing commercial infor-
mation. An appropriate data management procedure 
should guarantee the availability of information for 
all interested retailers, to the extent allowed under 
data protection legislation. With regard to procure-
ment of DSO services, market transparency could be 
facilitated by obliging DSOs to ex-post publishing 
procurement-related data. In this way, all units, also 
27. Of course, individual Member States always can decide 
to apply stricter rules. As suggested by Batlle (2013), ad-
ditional procedures might include preventing users from 
choosing the supplier pertaining to the same group as their 
distribution company, or not allowing regulated retailers to 
operate in areas supplied by their group distribution com-
pany.
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those not controlled by the DSO’s integrated retailer, 
can control if their bid was treated according to official 
procurement rules. Also, public auction mechanisms 
could be imposed to DSOs to transparency and non-
discrimination. Another more severe measure might 
include limiting the maximum duration of contracts 
or providing for cancellation. Strict supervision by 
regulatory agencies is necessary to prevent potential 
irregular practices and furnish advice on the appro-
priate package of measures to be finally adopted.
It has to be discussed if small DSOs that want to 
engage in additional tasks as introduced above, but 
which currently might be exempted from strict un-
bundling requirements, should also be exempted 
from additional “Chinese walls” that come with these 
new tasks. On this level, EU and national regulation 
will have a very high impact on local governance and 
municipal structures, in which often a part of the 
profits from distribution activities are also used for 
municipal social activities. Nonetheless, all problems 
arising from unbundling that are extensively dis-
cussed above likewise apply to small DSOs. If general 
exemptions from unbundling for small DSOs prevail, 
other regulatory means gain in importance. There-
fore, especially for small exempted DSOs, new ICT or 
EV infrastructure needs to be sufficiently standard-
ized such that third party market entry is facilitated. 
Furthermore, it should also hold for small DSOs that 
market data relevant to accessing this ICT infrastruc-
ture and finally relevant for trading and retailing has 
to be made available such that barriers to market en-
try are further reduced. Hence, also the minimum re-
quirements for data handling introduced above apply 
to small DSOs. 
A further interesting regulatory option is to incentiv-
ize groups of small DSOs to jointly invest in ICT or 
EV infrastructure. Joint ventures among DSOs solve 
two problems. First, joint investments exploit syner-
gies and reduce each DSO’s contribution to the costs 
of setting up such new (and costly) infrastructure. 
Second, given that each DSO belongs to different 
companies with different respective affiliated retail-
ing incumbents, negative effects from limited unbun-
dling can be mitigated.
4.4 DSO activities vis-à-vis the TSO 
As stated in Art. 12 and 25 of the Electricity Directive 
(Directive 2009/72/EC), both the TSO and the DSO 
are deemed responsible for “ensuring the long-term 
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for 
the transmission [distribution] of electricity, for op-
erating, maintaining and developing […] [their] sys-
tem.” With regard to short-term reliability and system 
stability, though, it is currently foremost the TSO who 
is responsible for “ensuring a secure, reliable and effi-
cient electricity system and, in that context, for ensur-
ing the availability of all necessary ancillary services”. 
More active DSOs will, however, play an increasing 
role here, too, and as a consequence, an increased 
cooperation among DSOs and TSOs – not only with 
regards to long-term planning as done so far in many 
EU Member States – becomes crucial. From a regu-
latory perspective, the tasks of the different network 
operators have to be clearly defined to allow for an 
efficient system operation and cooperation.
As discussed above, the potentials of DER can be 
used to perform short- and long-term TSO and DSO 
duties. Therefore, the functions of DSOs will likely 
become more similar to the functions TSOs have. 
While DSO network management has been until now 
not based on managing certain loads unless in cases 
of emergency events, TSOs have pursued tasks that, 
besides long-term grid planning, are more directly 
related to balancing the network and, hence, relate 
to short-run supply security. These tasks typically in-
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clude frequency containment, frequency restoration 
and replacement of generation units. Representative 
products that deliver the respective services are re-
ferred to as primary, secondary and tertiary reserves 
(ENTSO-E, 2012).
Because the business of TSOs and DSOs are heavily 
interlinked, the regulatory border between these two 
types of system operators has to be reviewed. To this 
end, the following distinguishes between differentia-
tion and coordination among DSOs and TSOs.
4.4.1 Differentiation among DSOs and TSOs
There is a wide range of products that DER could offer 
to network operators. Table 4 lists major services and 
identifies the type of DER that theoretically could be 
able to offer those. By their technical nature, there are 
various factors limiting the potential (or also suitabil-
ity) of certain resources to provide certain services. 
Moreover, not all DER can be treated equally. Larger 
DG for instance could be monitored and remote-
controlled while other, especially small-scale, DER 
may not be dispatchable and should be forecasted 
and monitored by the DSO on an aggregated basis at 
substation level.
In general, DER can be used by both the DSO and the 
TSO and for both congestion management and bal-
ancing purposes. Assuming that the DSO is respon-
sible for local congestion and the TSO for the overall 
system balance, four cases can arise: the distribution 
system is balanced and there is no congestion (normal 
operations); the system is balanced, but there is con-
gestion (DSO should act); the system is unbalanced, 
and there is no congestion (market parties should act, 
as also the TSO); the system is unbalanced, and there 
is congestion (DSO should act on congestion, market 
parties and TSO on the unbalance). While the reason 
for TSO or DSO operations might differ, the sources 
they use for their tasks may come from DER and clear 
rules for TSO-DSO responsibilities and coordination 
are hence needed.
For some of the above products in Table 4, it is 
straightforward if it is either the DSO or the TSO 
who can demand them. However, for others, in prin-
ciple all network operators can have an interest. Even 
though technically possible, it today is an open ques-
tion to what degree DSOs would use DER on a very 
short-term basis (hourly or daily as TSOs do with tra-
ditional balancing and ancillary services), as mecha-
nisms to contract products on an hourly or daily basis 
might be very costly for DSOs. Certainly, it should be 
expected that DSOs will use DER for mid- or long-
term contracts in order to optimize grid operation 
DSO TSO
Long-term distribution grid planning and grid develop-
ment 
(including the connection of load and DG and guaranteeing 
efficient access and use of the grid) 
Long-term transmission grid planning and grid devel-
opment 
(including the connection of bulk generation (and load) and 
guaranteeing efficient access and use of the grid)
Grid operation, in particular:
•	 Voltage control
•	 Load/DG curtailment in case of emergencies
Grid operation, in particular
•	 Frequency containment
•	 Frequency restoration
•	 Replacement of generation
Table 3: A taxonomy of system operators’ tasks directly related to grid management
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and grid expansion.28 Such procedures help avoiding 
or postponing investments, especially in regions with 
heavy seasonal peaks such as holiday areas, or where 
there are local concentrations of loads – such as elec-
tric vehicles – which can be easily shifted in time. 
In fact, the DSO is well-positioned to purchase and 
aggregate diverse system operator services of use to 
the TSO. In addition, whenever DER sources in prin-
ciple can be used for different services and by both 
TSO and DSO, the products have to be clearly defined 
and rules have to be set out on who can use these 
products. Besides technical differentiations, products 
with economic value to system operators can be dif-
ferentiated by region and over time: 
 • Products first can be attributed to be location-
specific or system-wide. For instance, a DSO pro-
curing voltage control services will have to rely 
on local resources within its distribution area, 
while system-wide services can be delivered by 
resources spread across different distribution 
systems. Moreover, in order to use DER for con-
gestion management, available resources need 
to be assigned to certain zones in the electricity 
system. Differentiated areas have to be defined.
 • Second, products can be characterized by their 
time of delivery. Wherever DSOs and TSOs in 
principle can procure the same service, a more 
clear coordination among DSO and TSO is 
28. Th ereby, the product defi nition should take account of 
the fact that system balancing remains a TSO task, while 
services DSOs demand in general relate to “local conges-
tion management” rather than what could misleadingly be 
referred to as “local system balancing”. Balancing implies 
placing imbalance costs on parties that create the imbal-
ance. In contrast, congestion management implies costs 
for either the DSO (in case of shortage of agreed transport 
capacity) or for grid users (in case of excessive volumes be-
ing offered and having to be refused in the day ahead plan 
by the DSO).
needed the more this product relates to real-
time trading. The closer products become used 
in real-time, the more they have system security 
character, and have to be procured and used by 
the entity that is eventually responsible for main-
taining short-run supply security. 
Generally, there is no need to modify the TSO balanc-
ing market, because they by definition clear at system 
level. However, an efficient market functioning is key 
and any barriers (for certain groups of agents such as 
DER or aggregators) to participate in these markets 
should be removed as far as possible. As for the use 
of DER for local feed-in and curtailment manage-
ment for example, rules are missing (e.g. in Austria) 
or only determined at the TSO level (e.g. in Spain 
or Italy), or defined at both the TSO and DSO level 
(e.g. in Germany), see Eurelectric (2012). The regula-
tory aim should be to allow DER competing on equal 
terms with the agents that currently provide system 
operators with valuable services. In this vein, the 
Energy Efficiency Directive, demanding that system 
operators, in meeting requirements for balancing and 
ancillary services, shall “treat demand response pro-
viders, including aggregators in a non-discriminatory 
manner, on the basis of their technical capabilities,” 
goes into the right direction. Moreover, as discussed 
in-depth elsewhere, it is necessary to improve market 
price signals and adjust regulatory incentives to bet-
ter reflect – i.e. recognize and remunerate – the value 
that flexibility resources can provide to the system.29
29. Ruester et al. (2012b) conclude that balancing market 
rules should be modified such that they relax minimum 
bidding requirements and rules requiring symmetric up- 
and downward bids in order not to impede market access 
for small, decentralized market players. This will allow 
DER to value services they technically can provide, and 
thus probably also will have a positive impact on market 
liquidity. For the provision of ancillary services, replac-
ing bilateral contracts by competitive tendering wherever 
possible could help revealing and quantifying the value of 
alternative flexibility means. In the conception of tender-
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Nonetheless, even if products for system services 
are well defined, as discussed above, some technolo-
gies could offer their services to both DSO and TSO. 
Batlle and Rivier (2012). discuss examples for such 
operations. The DSO could either procure services to 
satisfy its own needs only, or procure services also on 
behalf of the TSO, or both system operators engage 
in simultaneous procurement. Note that especially 
for the first two options, the procurement procedures 
differ. If, as discussed in Batlle and Rivier (2012), the 
DSO only procures according to its own need, say 
capacity to limit demand in one of its several distri-
bution areas, the procurement procedure would only 
invite bids from that distribution area. If the DSO, 
however, would also procure additional resources for 
the TSO, the DSO could accept bids from several or 
all of its distribution areas. The DSO in this way can 
find the cheapest sources within a larger geographical 
area and, if sources are not needed, pass on to the TSO 
(without acting commercially, that is, not changing 
the terms of the initial bid submitted by the DER or 
aggregator). This example already suggests that even 
with efficient designs of services coordination among 
DSOs and TSOs will be needed.
ing, it is also recommended to adopt performance-based, 
source-neutral remuneration schemes.
4.4.2 Coordination among DSOs and TSOs
Coordination among DSOs and TSOs and infor-
mation exchange will play a particular role as the 
amount of DER increases and as DSOs become more 
active and ‘real system operators’. Today, at the trans-
mission level, generators send schedules to the TSO 
for system balance purposes. On the distribution 
level, DSOs have no systems installed for acquiring 
data from DG (especially of smaller size). Only in 
some cases TSOs receive information from DG in 
real-time. There usually is no short-run operational 
exchange between TSOs and DSOs. In future systems 
with even higher DER penetration, however, a well-
structured and organized information exchange be-
tween relevant actors is necessary: the DSO will need 
information about DG forecast, schedules and active 
dispatch to improve their visibility and to assist with 
close to real-time management of the distribution 
network including local network constraints. On the 
one hand, the participation of flexibility resources in 
balancing markets run by the TSO could lead to con-
straints in the distribution grid. On the other hand, 
DSO congestion management to solve constraints 
could have repercussive effects on transmission grids 
and TSO operation.
Given the complexity of the tasks and the large num-
ber of agents involved, a hierarchical decomposition 
of the supervision and control actions is adequate. A 
Service Type of DER  able to offer the 
service
System operator procuring such 
services 
System balancing services All types of DER TSO 
Frequency control All types of DER TSO
Voltage control All types of DER DSO
Blackstart Larger-scale DS and DG TSO and DSO
Short-term security congestion 
management
DG, DS, DR, (EV) TSO and DSO
Table 4: Major services which DER can provide to TSO and/or DSO
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clear hierarchy of functions between TSO and DSOs 
has to be established. The TSO is the party that is 
responsible for system balancing. DSOs, after hav-
ing undertaken their DER-related activities should 
submit their protocols to the TSO, who is the final 
responsible system operator. Such protocols are espe-
cially important for those DER that can provide ser-
vices to both TSO and DSO. In this sense, all DER 
have to be monitored with respect to what product 
they are offering and at which time. In turn, then the 
data on dispatch should be given to DSOs as soon as 
possible, so that the DSO can react accordingly in 
emergency situations and curtail the most appropri-
ate DER. Moreover, any action on distribution net-
work users requested by the TSO should be agreed 
with the respective DSO. A TSO should not act on 
any individual DER connected to distribution grid, 
but an order from a TSO towards DER embedded in 
distribution systems should be executed by the DSO.
In line with the integration of the internal energy 
market in Europe, also the EU network codes have 
to take account of the new tasks and need for coor-
dination for system operators. These network codes 
have to account for the possibilities for cost recovery 
of European DSOs and TSO, as otherwise the respec-
tive system operators do not have sufficient incentives 
to engage in their tasks. For first basic principles on 
network codes for system operation see Eurelectric 
(2012b).
4.4.3 Policy implications and EU involvement
The general responsibilities of network operators with 
respect to grid management do not change, but the set 
of tools available to perform their tasks is enriched by 
DER. DER can offer a range of products to (i) manage 
short-term problems in the grid, (ii) to optimize the 
cost of maintaining the desired quality of service, (iii) 
to reduce grid losses and (iv) to reduce or postpone 
future grid investment needs. Some of these products 
are clearly relevant for either the TSO or the DSO, 
whereas other types of services might be of interest 
for both types of network operators. The aim should 
be to allow DER to compete on equal terms with the 
agents that currently provide TSOs with ancillary ser-
vices and to offer valuable products also to distribu-
tion system operators. 
Note that, in line with the above, to enable DSOs to 
engage in active system management they need to 
have a clearly defined legal basis for doing so. With 
DSOs applying new short-term tools made possible 
by DER, also clearly defined rules have to be estab-
lished. As DSOs, when procuring system services, 
interact with the energy market in a more direct way 
than before, these processes must be in line with strict 
rules under coherent supervision. These rules imply 
that DSOs only buy flexibility offered from DER or 
aggregators thereof, and do not act like commercial 
players (i.e. using these resources for arbitrage pos-
sibilities instead of system services), only acting “be-
yond the grid user’s meter” in absolute emergency 
situations in order to ensure grid integrity.
A clear product definition for the use of DER in DSO 
and TSO operations is needed. Tasks of the different 
network operators have to be clearly defined to allow 
for an efficient system operation. In principle it is not 
problematic when DER can provide services to both 
the DSO and the TSO. However, clear protocols have 
to be established regarding which resource has sold 
products already, to whom, and for what time-frame. 
Clear product definitions have to be established due 
to the current absence of any regulation addressing 
how DSOs can engage in the use of DER. The product 
definition shall comprise technical features (capaci-
ties, et cetera), local features (e.g. whether it is pos-
sible to deliver system-wide services), and time di-
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mensions. Wherever DSOs and TSOs in principle can 
procure the same service, more coordination among 
DSO and TSO is needed the more this product relates 
to real-time trading. A clear hierarchy of functions 
between TSO and DSOs has to be established. 
Coordination needs will differ among systems. It will 
make a difference whether a distribution system con-
tains only an insignificant amount of DER, whether 
in contrast there is a large penetration of distributed 
generation with installed capacities considerably ex-
ceeding peak demand, or whether it contains a whole 
portfolio of DER including also non-negligible vol-
umes of local storage and demand response potential. 
Moreover, it will make a difference which voltage lev-
els are part of the distribution activity in the respec-
tive country and coordination needs probably will 
increase when DSOs also operate MV (or even HV) 
grids. For instance, in case the when the HV or UHV 
network is saturated, connection of generation to the 
MV network cannot be planned without taking into 
account the conditions at HV network.
With respect to EU involvement, procedures and 
principles of coordination between DSOs and TSOs 
should be defined at a European level in order to 
avoid distortions in competition and barriers for mar-
ket entry due to different rules and market designs in 
different Member States. The possible set of distribu-
tion company functions needs to be extended. Also 
the currently developed EU network codes need to 
take account of the need for coordination and rules 
among system operators that rely on DER services. 
In this respect, the network codes should not hinder 
cost recovery of European DSOs and TSO, as other-
wise the respective system operators do not have suf-
ficient incentives to engage in their tasks.
5. Conclusions
Technological advances are reshaping today’s elec-
tricity markets. More mature technologies for local 
renewable generation and decreased investment costs 
thereof, joint with national support schemes, led to a 
significant market penetration of distributed genera-
tion in many EU countries. In addition, new meter 
and appliance technologies allow consumers to react 
to local and upstream generation patterns and prices. 
Traditional downstream power flows from sources 
connected to the transmission grid to consumers at 
the distribution level are challenged by local distrib-
uted generation and local means of electricity trade. 
These changes are driven by the newly emerging 
broad range of distributed energy resources, be it dis-
tributed generation, local storage, electric vehicles or 
demand response, and pose challenges for DSOs and 
their regulation alike. Today, some challenges arising 
with DER technologies are only a possibility. Other 
challenges, foremost related to DG technologies, are 
already established facts and observable in many dis-
tribution systems. However, the same technologies 
that are causing substantial challenges already today 
can – with the right regulation and market design 
– be exploited to establish a more efficient and also 
cleaner electricity system than our current one. 
This report argues that the priority task in regulation 
is not to try to predict what the future will be, but to 
make possible all welfare-enhancing business models 
under any future market development. Regulation 
needs to ensure that DSOs are not negatively affect-
ed by the market penetration of DER with respect 
to their ability to manage the system and to finance 
all needed system tasks. Nonetheless, the regulation 
of DSOs should not place any barriers, but create a 
level-playing field for all technologies and agents who 
want to make use of them under different formats. As 
DER might cause drastic changes to the architecture 
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of power markets, all areas of DSO regulation have 
to be examined on if they might hamper an efficient 
integration of DER and the full use of these resources 
in the consumers’ and producers’ interest. In this re-
spect, we identify four categories in which DSO regu-
lation has to be reviewed: regulated DSO remunera-
tion, distribution network tarification, the activities 
of DSOs vis-à-vis markets, and the activities of DSOs 
vis-à-vis their respective TSO.
First, remuneration schemes for DSOs need to be re-
viewed. On the one hand, increasing amounts of DER 
require substantial investments to properly connect 
all DER, to enable the system to deal with increased 
volatility of (net) peak demand, and to set up ICT 
infrastructure that empowers grid-users with better 
communication tools to align generation and con-
sumption patterns. On the other hand, DER offer a 
new set of instruments for grid operation and have 
the potential to decrease the total costs of DSOs com-
pared to business-as-usual (that is, a continued “fit-
and-forget” grid management). With high levels of 
DER penetration, current approaches to distribution 
remuneration create financial risks for distribution 
companies, potential extra costs and degraded qual-
ity of service for the network users. A sound regu-
lation that efficiently incentivizes DSOs to engage in 
active system management has to take account of i) 
changing OPEX and CAPEX structures, ii) the opti-
mal choice among both, and on iii) how to incentivize 
DSOs to be innovative.  
Second, the customary present design of network 
charges does not provide a level-playing field among 
all agents that use the distribution network. With an 
increasing penetration of DER and the likely creation 
of new business models at distribution level, ill-de-
signed network charges will become very problemat-
ic, resulting in cross-subsidization and inefficient in-
centives. Moreover, grid users are becoming complex, 
sophisticated agents, which can have very diverse 
consumption and/or production patterns, and be-
ing able (and willing) to react to price signals. Tariffs, 
therefore, should reflect the true costs (or benefits) of 
different types of load and generation for the distri-
bution system, which will depend on the agent’s geo-
graphic location in the system as well as on the profile 
of injection/withdrawal from the connection point. 
This report proposes a reference framework to design 
sound distribution tariffs that meet the new demand-
ing requirements, but it is beyond the scope of this 
report to offer a detailed method. Urgent research is 
needed to come up with proposals for distribution 
network tariff design that provide a level-playing field 
for all types of grid users, and that do not distort (or 
minimize the distortion of) economic efficiency. 
Third, there are a number of areas in the newly emerg-
ing market environment where there is no consensus 
about whether the respective tasks should be under 
the responsibility of the DSO or not. The regulatory 
challenge here is to clearly define the roles, boundar-
ies and responsibilities of DSOs. DSOs need to have a 
clearly defined legal basis for engaging in active sys-
tem management. Especially as DSOs, when procur-
ing system services, interact with the energy market 
in a more direct way than before, these processes 
must be in line with strict rules under coherent su-
pervision. These rules imply that DSOs only buy flex-
ibility offered from DER or aggregators thereof for 
their own sake of system management, and do not act 
like commercial players.
Different proposed (regulated as well as liberalized) 
models for (1) the ownership and management of 
metering equipment, (2) data handling and (3) EV 
charging infrastructure all have their advantages and 
disadvantages – these tasks may or may not be offered 
at lowest cost (due to sufficient synergies with grid 
operation) or in a more qualitative way by the DSOs 
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as compared to other third regulated agents or com-
mercial actors. The suitability of a certain model will 
depend on system-specific conditions, and therefore, 
the decision about whether to include such tasks into 
the DSOs’ portfolio should be left to national authori-
ties. The regulatory principle should be that whenever 
new responsibilities are best performed by competi-
tive market actors, the DSO’s role remains to facilitate 
local markets. In turn, whenever new responsibilities 
show sufficient synergies with the traditional tasks of 
regulated monopolies that operate the network, the 
DSO should be made responsible for these new ser-
vices. Nonetheless, if new tasks can be performed by 
market players, but markets develop slowly relative to 
policy goals, markets may be (at least during the initial 
phase) kick-started via DSOs or other regulated enti-
ties. In this vein, if a full rollout of advanced meters 
(including data management), and also EV charging 
infrastructure, shall be provided in a timely fashion, 
advantages lie in the domain of the DSO. Regulators, 
however, have to take care not to foreclose market 
structures through DSOs that become incumbents 
once new technologies are deployed at scale and com-
mercial actors want to enter the market.
Last, the main responsibilities of network operators 
with respect to grid management do not change, but 
the set of tools available to perform their tasks is en-
riched by DER. In general, DER can be used by both 
the DSO and the TSO and for both congestion man-
agement and balancing purposes. While the reason 
for different TSO or DSO actions might differ (restor-
ing voltage or frequency, or relieving congestion), the 
sources used for these tasks may come from the same 
DER and clear rules for TSO-DSO responsibilities 
and coordination are needed. Furthermore, products 
that system operators use to ensure reliable grids (and 
often procure for this sake) should be clearly defined 
in terms of geography and timing. Coordination 
needs will differ among systems. It makes a differ-
ence whether a distribution system contains only an 
insignificant amount of DER, or whether it contains a 
whole portfolio of DER including also non-negligible 
volumes of local storage and DR potential. Moreover, 
it will make a difference, which voltage levels are part 
of the distribution activity and coordination needs 
probably will increase when DSOs also operate MV 
(or even HV) grids. 
In the European context, regulation has to be kept at 
minimum level, respecting the principle of subsidiar-
ity. Accordingly, we see neither the need nor a solid 
justification for an EU-wide comprehensive harmo-
nization of the regulation of DSOs, although we rec-
ommend setting clear minimum requirements in a 
few key regulatory aspects, as well as the publication 
of EU guidelines to spread, encourage and monitor 
good regulatory practices in some of the critical areas 
that have been identified in this report. 
 • National regulators could benefit from shar-
ing experiences on bad and good practices. EU 
guidelines for a sound regulation and adequate 
remuneration of DSOs should be formulated, 
followed by regular monitoring and benchmark-
ing to reveal shortcomings of national regulatory 
approaches. Similarly, although distribution grid 
tarification is – and should remain – a national 
issue, again, it is urgent that research is conduct-
ed to develop a set of EU guidelines that should 
be recommended and monitored to reveal short-
comings of national regulatory approaches and 
to improve tariff design practices. 
 • The performance of new business models and 
the functioning of retail market competition 
rely on comprehensive consumer data. The EU 
should provide a minimum level of support in 
that respect, mandating – provided that indi-
vidual consumers give their authorization for 
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the use of their personal profiles – that consumer 
data are made available to registered agents. The 
definition of the specific format of data provision 
(i.e. one of the three proposed data models, or 
a combination thereof) can then be left to the 
Member States.
 • Depending on system complexity and the num-
ber of tasks to be accomplished by DSOs, stricter 
unbundling requirements should be mandated. 
As system complexity increases, an insufficient-
ly unbundled DSO could either stay with a re-
stricted set of tasks, or the DSO could expand its 
portfolio of activities, but accompanied with an 
increasing level of unbundling. Increasing levels 
of unbundling could be implemented by “higher 
Chinese walls” between DSOs and their subsidi-
ary retailers that engage in trading of distributed 
sources. The EU should provide guidelines for 
measures to reinforce “Chinese walls” between 
any DSO and the DER-related businesses that may 
exist under the same holding that owns the DSO.
 • If general exemptions from unbundling for small 
DSOs prevail, additional regulatory means gain 
in importance. Therefore, especially for small 
exempted DSOs, new ICT or EV infrastructure 
needs to be sufficiently standardized such that 
third party market entry is facilitated as far as 
possible despite the lack of unbundling. Further-
more, it should also hold for small DSOs that 
market data relevant to accessing this ICT infra-
structure and finally relevant for trading and re-
tailing has to be made available such that barriers 
to market entry are further reduced. Hence for 
both the standardization of ICT infrastructure 
and according data availability EU guidelines 
should be formulated such that they explicitly 
include small DSOs.
 • Finally, procedures and principles of coordina-
tion between DSOs and TSOs also should be 
defined at a European level in order to avoid 
distortions in competition and barriers for mar-
ket entry due to different rules and market de-
signs in different Member States. The possible 
set of distribution company functions needs to 
be extended. Also the currently developed EU 
network codes should take account of the need 
for coordination and rules among system opera-
tors that rely on DER services. In this respect, the 
network codes should not hinder cost recovery 
of European DSOs and TSO, as otherwise the re-
spective system operators do not have sufficient 
incentives to engage in their tasks.
Necessary regulatory actions must be developed in a 
timely manner in order to minimize regulatory risk 
and barriers and increase investment activities in distri-
bution and retail market segments as soon as possible.
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Annex A-1: Additional data and 
figures 
Directive 2009/72/EC, Art. 26 – Unbundling of 
distribution system operators 
1. Where the DSO is part of a vertically integrated 
undertaking, it shall be independent at least 
in terms of its legal form, organisation and 
decision making from other activities not 
relating to distribution. Those rules shall not 
create an obligation to separate the ownership of 
assets of the DSO from the vertically integrated 
undertaking.
2. In addition to the requirements under paragraph 
1, where the DSO is part of a vertically integrated 
undertaking, it shall be independent in terms of 
its organisation and decision-making from the 
other activities not related to distribution. In 
order to achieve this, the following minimum 
criteria shall apply: 
a. those persons responsible for the 
management of the DSO must not participate 
in company structures of the integrated 
electricity undertaking responsible, directly 
or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation 
of the generation, transmission or supply of 
electricity;
b. appropriate measures must be taken to 
ensure that the professional interests of the 
persons responsible for the management of 
the DSO are taken into account in a manner 
that ensures that they are capable of acting 
independently;
c. the DSO must have effective decision-making 
rights, independent from the integrated 
electricity undertaking, with respect to assets 
necessary to operate, maintain or develop the 
network. In order to fulfil those tasks, the 
DSO shall have at its disposal the necessary 
resources including human, technical, 
physical and financial resources. This should 
not prevent the existence of appropriate 
coordination mechanisms to ensure that 
the economic and management supervision 
rights of the parent company in respect 
of return on assets, regulated indirectly in 
accordance with Article 37(6), in a subsidiary 
are protected. In particular, this shall enable 
the parent company to approve the annual 
financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, 
of the DSO and to set global limits on the 
levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It 
shall not permit the parent company to give 
instructions regarding day-to-day operations, 
nor with respect to individual decisions 
concerning the construction or upgrading 
of distribution lines, that do not exceed the 
terms of the approved financial plan, or any 
equivalent instrument; and
d. the DSO must establish a compliance 
programme, which sets out measures taken 
to ensure that discriminatory conduct is 
excluded, and ensure that observance of it 
is adequately monitored. The compliance 
programme shall set out the specific 
obligations of employees to meet that 
objective. An annual report, setting out the 
measures taken, shall be submitted by the 
person or body responsible for monitoring 
the compliance programme, the compliance 
officer of the DSO, to the regulatory authority 
referred to in Article 35(1) and shall be 
published. The compliance officer of the DSO 
shall be fully independent and shall have 
access to all the necessary information of the 
DSO and any affiliated undertaking to fulfil 
his task.
3. Where the DSO is part of a vertically integrated 
undertaking, the Member States shall ensure 
that the activities of the DSO are monitored by 
regulatory authorities or other competent bodies 
so that it cannot take advantage of its vertical 
integration to distort competition. In particular, 
vertically integrated DSOs shall not, in their 
communication and branding, create confusion 
in respect of the separate identity of the supply 
branch of the vertically integrated undertaking.
4. Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 
1, 2and 3 to integrated electricity undertakings 
serving less than 100 000 connected customers, 
or serving small isolated systems.
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Directive 2009/72/EC, Art. 18 – Independence of 
the transmission system operator 
1. Without prejudice to the decisions of the 
Supervisory Body under Article 20, the 
transmission system operator shall have: 
a. effective decision-making rights, independent 
from the vertically integrated undertaking, 
with respect to assets necessary to operate, 
maintain or develop the transmission system; 
and
b. the power to raise money on the capital 
market in particular through borrowing and 
capital increase.
2. The transmission system operator shall at all 
times act so as to ensure it has the resources 
it needs in order to carry out the activity of 
transmission properly and efficiently and develop 
and maintain an efficient, secure and economic 
transmission system.
3. Subsidiaries of the vertically integrated 
undertaking performing functions of generation 
or supply shall not have any direct or indirect 
shareholding in the transmission system 
operator. The transmission system operator shall 
neither have any direct or indirect shareholding 
in any subsidiary of the vertically integrated 
undertaking performing functions of generation 
or supply, nor receive dividends or any other 
financial benefit from that subsidiary.
4. The overall management structure and the 
corporate statutes of the transmission system 
operator shall ensure effective independence of 
the transmission system operator in compliance 
with this Chapter. The vertically integrated 
undertaking shall not determine, directly or 
indirectly, the competitive behaviour of the 
transmission system operator in relation to the 
day to day activities of the transmission system 
operator and management of the network, or in 
relation to activities necessary for the preparation 
of the ten-year network development plan 
developed pursuant to Article 22.
5. In fulfilling their tasks in Article 12 and Article 
17(2) of this Directive, and in complying with 
Articles 14, 15 and 16 of Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009, transmission system operators shall 
not discriminate against different persons or 
entities and shall not restrict, distort or prevent 
competition in generation or supply.
6. Any commercial and financial relations between 
the vertically integrated undertaking and the 
transmission system operator, including loans 
from the transmission system operator to the 
vertically integrated undertaking, shall comply 
with market conditions. The transmission system 
operator shall keep detailed records of such 
commercial and financial relations and make 
them available to the regulatory authority upon 
request.
7. The transmission system operator shall submit 
for approval by the regulatory authority all 
commercial and financial agreements with the 
vertically integrated undertaking.
8. The transmission system operator shall inform 
the regulatory authority of the financial resources, 
referred to in Article 17(1)(d), available for future 
investment projects and/or for the replacement 
of existing assets.
9. The vertically integrated undertaking shall refrain 
from any action impeding or prejudicing the 
transmission system operator from complying 
with its obligations in this Chapter and shall 
not require the transmission system operator to 
seek permission from the vertically integrated 
undertaking in fulfilling those obligations.
10. An undertaking which has been certified by the 
regulatory authority as being in compliance with 
the requirements of this Chapter shall be approved 
and designated as a transmission system operator 
by the Member State concerned. The certification 
procedure in either Article 10 of this Directive 
and Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 or 
in Article 11 of this Directive shall apply.
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Table 5: Connection and access regimes & grid tariffs for DG 
Source:  Own depiction based on ACER/CEER (2012, Annual report on the results of monitoring the internal electricity and 
natural gas markets in 2011) & DG GRID (2007, Regulatory Review and International Comparison of EU-15 MSs)
Source ACER/CEER (2012) ACER/CEER (2012) DG GRID (2007)
Grid connection Grid access Connection charge Use of system charge
Austria Non-discriminatory (ND) Guaranteed access Deep No
Belgium Priority connection Priority access Shallow Yes
Bulgaria ND Guaranteed access Deep
Cyprus ND Priority access
Czech R. Priority connection Priority access Deep
Denmark ND Priority access Shallow Yes
Estonia ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Deep
Finland ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Yes
France ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Semi-deep No
Germany Priority connection Priority access Shallow No
Greece ND Priority access Shallow
Hungary ND Priority access Semi-shallow
Ireland ND Priority access Shallow No
Italy Priority connection Priority access Shallow Yes
Latvia ND Absence of priority dispatching Deep
Lithuania Priority connection Priority access Semi-shallow
Luxembourg ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Yes
Malta ND Priority access
Netherlands ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Shallow Yes
Norway ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Shallow
Poland ND Priority access Shallow
Portugal ND Guaranteed access Deep No
Romania ND Guaranteed access Semi-deep
Slovakia Priority connection Priority access Deep
Slovenia ND Priority access Shallow
Spain Priority connection Priority access Deep No
Sweden ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching Semi-deep Yes
UK ND Guaranteed access w/o priority dispatching (UK) Semi-shallow Yes
Connection and access regimes for RES-E in 2011 Grid tarification for DG
Table 6: Regulatory charges included in network tariffs 
Source: Eurelectric (2013c)
Type of regulatory charge Country
RES and/or CHP fee AT, CZ, CH, ES, PT
Taxes paid to local authorities AT, BE, CH, ES, FR, NO, PL, PT
Public service obligations AT, BE
Other energy policy costs DK, ES, FI, IT, LT
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Table 7: Distribution network tariff structure in selected EU Member States 
Source: Eurelectric (2013c)
Figure 9: Electricity retail prices in 2011 (€/kWh for a representative household consuming 2500-5000 kWh/a) 
Source: EC (2012c - SWD(2012) 368)
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Figure 10: Distribution of cost factors within retail electricity prices in 2011 (%) 
Source: EC (2012c - SWD(2012) 368)
Table 8: Electricity switching rates in 2010 (%) 
* Percentage by which the switching rate has changed from the value in 2009 to the value in 2010
Source: EC (2012c - SWD(2012) 368)
2010
Change to 
2009 * 
2010
Change to 
2009 * 
2010
Change to 
2009 * 
Austria 1.8 0.5 1.7 0.5 2.1 0.4
Belgium 10.0 3.1 8.8 2.4 16.0 5.9
Bulgaria N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Czech R. 3.3 1.8 3.2 2.1 7.9 3.8
Denmark 4.3 -1.9 4.2 -1.9 11.4 -5.1
Estonia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Finland 7.6 -0.5 7.6 -0.5 N/A N/A
France 2.0 -1.4 2.3 -1.4 0.9 -0.4
Germany 6.3 1.4 6.0 1.3 7.5 1.6
Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hungary N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ireland N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Italy 5.9 1.4 4.1 1.8 12.4 -0.1
Latvia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Lithuania 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.1
Luxembourg 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1
Malta N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Netherlands 8.9 -2.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Norway N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Poland 0.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Portugal 2.3 0.0 2.1 0.0 27.4 8.2
Romania 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 N/A
Slovakia 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.6 -1.0
Slovenia 1.9 0.5 1.0 -0.1 9.6 4.7
Spain 7.4 6.6 2.1 1.6 17.3 8.2
Sweden 9.4 -1.8 8.2 -1.6 1.2 -0.2
UK N/A N/A 17.3 -1.1 N/A N/A
Retail market, total Household customers Non-household customers
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Figure 11: End-user price regulation in different electricity market segments 
Source: Own depiction using data from ERGEG (2010)
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Annex A-2: Regulating data 
provision?
In what follows, we first present a summary of the 
three proposed data models (Table 9). Then, we argue 
that advanced meter data provision by nature involves 
infrastructure, or platforms, on which several market 
actors are demanding data. We briefly discuss missing 
incentives to invest in such platforms, and how 
demanding actors might be discriminated against, or 
payments for data access might by socialized across, 
platform users. 
#1 – The economics of providing advanced me-
ter data: Data hubs as platforms
Advanced meter data handling includes the 
aggregation and processing of data, as well as the 
provision of data to the relevant market actors at 
the distribution level. Therefore, data provision 
establishes infrastructure that delivers a platform for 
local energy market players. Such a platform brings 
together multiple users that have interest in using 
advanced meter data for engaging in mutual contracts 
and reduces transaction costs for all users. Retailers 
and various service providers (e.g. aggregators, 
ESCOs) need data to verify the fulfillment of their 
Table 9: Data model description  
Option 1 – DSO as a 
market facilitator 
Option 2 – Central data 
hub 
Option 3 – Data access 
point manager 
General model 
description
Model based on data 
hub(s) operated by the 
DSO 
Via hub(s), the DSO pro-
vides data to the market
Model based on data 
hub(s) operated by an 
independent third party, 
the so called “central data 
hub” 
Creation of “trusted data 
access-point manager” = 
commercial role played 
by certified companies
Data hub?                   (i.e. 
standardized commu-
nication platform for 
authorized parties with 
a certain geographic 
scope)
Yes 
Centralized (e.g. national) or decentralized (e.g. sub-
national)
No
Enables activation of dif-
ferent actors to retrieve 
data directly from the 
meter
Party responsible for data 
handling = regulated 
entity?
Yes
DSO = regulated market 
facilitator providing a 
platform 
Yes
Central data hub = regu-
lated third party
No
DAM = commercial role 
taken by certified com-
panies
Metering DSO responsible for all 
sub-processes
CDH does not meter; 
data collection and 
delivery would be with 
other parties (e.g. DSO, 
supplier) // CDH does 
only receive, process and 
deliver data
Different actors can di-
rectly retrieve data from 
the customers’ meters
Customer interface Supplier can remain main contact point “Granularity and inter-
faces to be decided by 
customer”
Supplier switching All transactions take 
place via the DSO 
All transactions take 
place via the CDH
“technically similar to 
switch mobile phone 
supplier without chang-
ing SIM card”
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contracts and to design better products for their 
contracted end-users. End-users need data to also 
verify contractual agreements or to react to (real-
time) price incentives provided in such contracts. 
Also regulated players, such as the DSO, need steady 
access to data to ensure system reliability.
The economic nature of such a platform is well 
reflected in the EC Smart Grids Task Force discussion 
on data hubs. In fact, data hubs are platforms in 
the above sense. For two of the three models the 
Task Force is proposing, namely for the “DSO as a 
market facilitator” and the “Third party as a market 
facilitator” models, such data hubs are regulated. In 
the third model, data access-point managers (DAMs) 
offer their own platform each. Hence, for all three 
proposed models, providers of data offer a platform 
and face a multi-sided market with several types of 
actors being interested in advanced meter data.30
#2 – Supply: Investing in infrastructure for data 
provision - missing incentives
The benefits of implementing platforms for advanced 
meter infrastructure are distributed among several 
actors, and hence also investment incentives might 
be lower than the total gain obtained from such 
investments. Also McKinsey (2010) notes that 
“fragmentation across the value chain” has diluted 
investment incentives in advanced meter equipment 
for any single market actor. Moreover, externalities 
within one horizontal layer may reduce investment 
incentives. For instance, one retailer that invests 
in advanced meter data infrastructure establishes 
positive externalities for competing retailers, who 
tomorrow might take over customers and, when 
doing so, at least partly gain from this established 
infrastructure, too.
#3 – Demand: Paying for data provision - dis-
criminating prices and socialization of costs
If not regulated, pricing structures on platforms 
30. A multi-sided market involves the provision of goods 
or services – via a platform – to at least two distinct groups 
of customers. Indirect network effects furthermore lead 
to positive externalities. The value that customers on one 
side can realize increases with the number of customers on 
the other side, i.e. the more consumers join a platform, the 
higher the value of using the platform.
usually price discriminate among platform users (see 
Evans and Schmalensee, 2007; and Evans, 2009). For 
instance, a retailer running a data platform might 
not charge consumers to increase its customer base 
and amount of data, but instead pass all costs on to 
aggregators or other traders wanting to have access 
to the data. 
On the other hand, with additional regulation, 
socialization of costs for data provision can occur, for 
at least two reasons. First, it can occur if regulation 
is imposed on otherwise commercial players, say 
a government wants to increase participation of 
consumers in using advanced meter data. Suppose a 
retailer is running a platform but for this reason is 
not allowed to charge consumers who increasingly 
use the data platform. Then costs will be passed on to 
all consumers, those with traditional and non-price 
responsive demand patterns and those who actively 
use the data. Second, if a regulated entity is running a 
data hub, and not charging pay-by-use fees, costs for 
data provision are socialized, too, most likely via the 
grid fee. 
Annex A-3: Conclusions Industrial 
Council Meeting (based on report 
version “V0”, 03/2013)
Serge Galant
Technofi
The question
The issue at stake is to revisit the role of distribution 
networks from a regulatory perspective, in view 
of the several drivers, which push them to adapt to 
a changing electricity system. The question to be 
answered is two-fold:
1.  What are the regulatory options to make 
distribution network enablers of the evolving 
electricity system, such options aiming at 
limiting/avoiding / removing existing or 
expected regulatory barriers conducive of market 
inefficiencies (or even market failures)
2. To what degree EU-based intervention / 
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coordination / harmonization might facilitate 
(accelerate) the deployment of such regulatory 
options for distribution networks which would in 
turn lead to a more competitive electricity market, 
in line with the two other EU policy pillars? 
Completeness of the draft report
It is advised to introduce the following improvements 
in the next version, in order to ensure greater 
completeness of the study.
Mapping of DSO activities in EU Member States
First, a reminder of EU energy policy pillars 
(competitive electricity market, sustainability via 
the decarbonization of the full electricity systems, 
security of supply) must be provided since it will 
be one of the filters used to select potentially new 
regulatory options. Then, a more complete mapping 
of the 5000+ DSOs and retail markets in EU27 should 
allow to define a few classes of DSOs according to 
their capability to comply with EU policy pillars  (a 
purely qualitative assessment). It is then assumed that, 
depending upon their policy compliance capability 
to-day and in the future (a dynamic perspective), 
regulatory changes should be recommended which 
would be selected according to:
•	 The type of change drivers which must be 
taken into consideration to comply with EU 
policy goals,
•	 The existing work performed at EU or 
Member State level which try to shed light on 
the most promising regulatory evolutions
This work is made very difficult due to the complexity 
of the DSO landscape in EU27. Yet, this rough 
(“quick and dirty”) classification would certainly 
help justifying the studied options including the ones 
already described in the draft report:
•	 The role of DSOs, for data management and 
provisions,
•	 The role of DSOs for electric vehicle charging 
infrastructure,
•	 The evolving boundaries between TSOs and 
DSOs
State of the art
The following work must be taken into account:
•	 The Smart Grid Task Force outputs
•	 The CEER report on DSO good practices as 
viewed from the electricity consumers ,
•	 Large scale demonstrations which cover 
some of the wished evolutions of regulatory 
schemes (GRID4EU, ECOGRID….)
Drivers for change coming from several stake-
holders
Several drivers for change, which go beyond the ones 
listed in the draft report, have been mentioned:
•	 The arrival of new technologies (Advanced 
meters, Distributed Generation, Demand 
Response, Electric Vehicles, Energy Storage), 
but also system challenges induced by 
network ageing which should require the 
implementation of new architectures, 
new network operations, new network 
maintenance processes
•	 The implementation of new retail models 
(aggregators, energy services, new service 
provision to the electricity system…)  which 
bring new players to relate with DSOs
•	 The financing gaps to implement new 
technologies and new electricity retail models: 
there is a growing gap between investment 
selection criteria by banks and the economic 
background into which DSO are operating 
(for instance ROI very long with review 
periods of 4/5 years which create uncertainty 
on revenues)
They should be added in the report as drivers for 
other regulatory options than the ones listed in the 
first version of the report.
Justification of the regulatory involvement
For each of the above drivers, the objective of the 
study is to analyze the ones which would benefit from 
regulatory evolutions enabling DSOs to support the 
electricity system evolutions while keeping in line 
with EU energy policy pillars. Thus, 
http://think.eui.eu 65
 From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: Rethinking the regulation of European electricity DSOs 
•	 There might more than three regulatory 
options worth studying 
•	 The ones which will retain must be justified
Clarity of the draft report
The objective of the present work is not to rank the 
studied regulatory options able to lean on the drivers 
which, in the end, make the electricity system in line 
with EU policy pillars.
This work must rather detail the regulatory options at 
a level which can be grasped by non-experts, and in a 
dynamic, quantitative appraisal.
The expected impacts for each regulatory option will 
drive the priority for implementation. Amongst the 
studied impacts, resulting from their implementation 
the ones below are the ones which would maximize 
the probability of deployment:
•	 Creation of new services which value the 
distribution network: from DSOs to TSOs, 
from aggregators or energy service providers 
to DSOs, from DSOs to retailers and 
conversely.
•	 Optimization of the unbundling process: 
legal, ownership, with avoidance of market 
concentration if properly implemented, both.
•	 Improved links between electricity and gas/
telecom networks/regulations.
•	 Improved customer awareness, smartness 
and behavior.
•	 Improved network economics: adequate 
remuneration of network operators, adequate 
network changes for users.
On the basis of the studied evolutions, tentative 
implementation plans must be described in order to 
give more credibility to the study: implementation 
at EU level, implementation at national level, 
implementation at regional level.
Coherence of the draft report
Coherence of the study will improve when addressing 
the issues below:
•	 A full mapping of the DSO landscape is not 
possible: a disclaimer is needed on the type of 
DSOs classes that will be sorted out.
•	 A quantitative assessment of the impacts of the 
studied regulatory options is out of question: 
yet, there might be a need to uncover the type 
of R and D needed to provide in the future 
quantitative regulatory policy impacts.
•	 The report must stress the leading role of 
DSOs, as market facilitators.
Annex A-4: Summary Public 
Consultation
Serge Galant
Technofi
The public consultation
The report which was put into public consultation 
aimed at revisiting the role of distribution networks 
from a regulatory perspective, taking into account 
several drivers which push them to adapt to a 
changing electricity system. Two questions are then 
raised:
1. What are the regulatory options which would 
help making distribution network enablers of the 
evolving electricity system, such options aiming 
at limiting/avoiding / removing existing or 
expected regulatory barriers conducive of market 
inefficiencies (or even market failures)?
2. To what degree EU-based intervention / 
coordination / harmonization might facilitate 
(accelerate) the deployment of such regulatory 
options for distribution networks, which would 
in turn lead to a more competitive electricity 
market, in line with the two other EU policy 
pillars? 
Overall, the respondents have challenged the report 
on the following topics:
•	 Ownership unbundling of DSOs to increase 
retail competition 
•	 Role of the EC in defining guidelines for DSO 
roles and duties 
•	 Distribution network tariffs
•	 New DSO tasks
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•	 Real-time pricing of electricity
•	 Smart metering ownership and data handling
•	 DER-enabled cost savings for DSOs
•	 Cooperation TSO/DSO
•	 EV charging infrastructure
•	 Conventional versus smart grid investments 
•	 Cost recovery of smart grid investments
•	 Smart distribution and IT investments
Ownership unbundling of DSOs to increase re-
tail competition
The report claims that the observed lack of retail 
competition in EU27 is mainly due to insufficient 
unbundling of DSOs. It then recommends ownership 
unbundling and /or higher Chinese walls between 
distribution and supply activities, since many such 
organizations belong to the same utility. 
As a matter of fact, the report should acknowledge 
that this statement would be true if the effects of two 
other possible causes for the lack of retail competition 
(which may be interfering with the competition level 
on the retail market) can be separated, viz. (a) the 
existence of regulated end-user tariffs, and (b) the 
regulated part of the electricity bill which is about 
50% of the total electricity bill. 
Little margin is then left over for savings on the client 
side and, consequently, there is little room for retail 
competition.
Ownership unbundling is therefore overemphasized 
as a key political measure to increase retail 
competition, whereas other cheaper options  may 
exist like strong governance rules in line with the 
Third Energy Package, and the adverse effects of 
ownership unbundling do exist when considering 
customer’s choice (reduced number of retailers in the 
market), and customer’s bills (higher costs related to 
separated structures).
Last, but not least, it is stated that “insufficient 
unbundling clearly IS a problem, (…)”. This suggests 
that – as a principle – the current situation concerning 
unbundling is not optimal, which is also not in line 
with the real life, as highlighted in the recent CEER 
report. The current issue of lack of retail competition 
comes also from the (ab-)use of market power of big 
incumbent suppliers in their home territory where 
they are the historically established brand.
Role of the EC in defining guidelines for DSO 
roles and duties 
It must be noticed that the report recommend on 
p 47 that the Commission sets “some minimum 
requirements in a few key regulatory aspects, as well 
as the publication of EU guidelines”, for instance for 
measures to reinforce the above Chinese walls. Such 
guidelines appear too early for many respondents 
since:
•	 The CEER Status Review on DSO unbundling 
published in April 2013 suggests that no 
premature actions should be taken as long as 
the 3rd energy package is properly transposed 
by the Member States.  
•	 More research is needed about the economic 
efficiency of DSO unbundling. Let us mention 
several issues for which detailed impact 
assessment are needed:
•	 legal unbundling has not been applied so 
far to small distribution companies (those 
with less than 100.000 clients) for so-called 
“economic reasons”
•	 if unbundling is key to support retail 
competition, the same rules should apply 
to all DSOs, since conditions for retail 
competition should not depend on the size 
of the distribution company serving any 
particular geographical area
•	 there is no apparent correlation between the 
DSO size and the efficiency/quality of supply
•	 Implementing the 3rd Energy package should 
therefore remain a priority of the European 
Union until 2014, while pursuing in-depth 
research on the impacts of the 3rd Energy 
package.  
Distribution network tariffs
The report lacks policy recommendations to propose 
concrete suggestions on how to design improved 
network tariffs. A common methodology to design 
regulated tariffs is indeed required at EU level since 
an internal energy market requires hopefully an 
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agreed joint approach to allocate regulated costs. 
A majority of Member States still address network 
tariffs for households and small businesses using 
energy volume (kWh): it allows recovering at least 50 
% of the allowed DSO revenues31. Yet, network costs 
are mainly capacity driven where volumetric tariffs 
set signals to reduce energy consumption: they do not 
reflect the specific costs coming from consumption at 
peak hours. 
Future network tariff structures should therefore 
incentivize both demand response and energy-
efficient behaviors, while, at the same time, providing 
a long term stable framework for both customers’ 
bills and DSO revenues32 and investments: 
 • For instance, a new model is possible where two-
part network tariffs would involve a capacity and 
an energy component: capacity tariffs or volu-
metric time-of-use network tariffs would then 
allow different prices for peak and off-peak en-
ergy.
•	 But also an increased coordination is 
needed for electricity prices which are 
strongly impacted by various taxes and 
levies, introduced by Member States in 
an uncoordinated way, and which further 
constrain the possibilities for customers 
to benefit from market liberalization and 
competitive wholesale prices.
Output-oriented regulatory schemes33 also requires 
further research to allow DSOs gaining the capability 
to influence the measured outputs with consistent 
incentives, which, in turn, would limit DSO 
uncertainty and favor long term distribution network 
investments. 
New DSO tasks
The report needs to better emphasize the needs for 
31. See EURELECTRIC Report ‘Network tariff  structure 
for a smart energy system’, May 2013. 
32. Specifi c regulatory charges or taxes developed by Mem-
ber States makes the comparison between DSOs extremely 
difficult.
33. See EURELECTRIC report Regulation for Smart Grids, 
February 2011.
regulators to shape new tasks for DSOs. Increasing the 
electric system flexibility (while optimizing network 
investments to reach affordable costs) will indeed 
pave the way for new business at DSO level, with the 
proper remuneration of such flexibility services.  
•	 Overall, regulators should make DSOs 
responsible for these new services with 
appropriate regulation and incentives to 
carry out these new responsibilities, wherever 
the new responsibilities are best suited to a 
regulated natural monopoly.
•	 DSOs should be responsible for investment 
in active management systems and necessary 
data acquisition infrastructure throughout 
the distribution network up to the point 
of interconnection of customer loads and 
generators.
•	 DSOs could be encouraged by regulators to 
initiate new remunerated services to procure 
system operator services from distributed 
energy resources located on their network 
that assist the DSO in meeting their regulated 
outputs, including system reliability and 
availability, voltage control, minimizing 
losses, and facilitating integration of 
distributed generation. 
•	 DSOs as aggregators of system operator 
services procured by the TSO could facilitate 
these markets via its role as neutral data hub.
Real-time pricing or critical peak pricing of elec-
tricity
The recommendation of real-time pricing should 
be more detailed with pros and cons as well as 
comparison of other options, where, for instance, the 
design of time-of-use pricing can reflect the system 
costs of system. The specific very high price issue 
(1000 €/MWh and more) coming from real-time 
pricing should be addressed. 
There is also a need for a transparent comparison 
between the different market design options when 
implemented in national energy markets using 
the principle of subsidiarity. It includes the costs 
of transaction and the temporality of the studied 
solutions: short term solutions (operational to reflect 
current costs) versus long term solutions (investment 
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to release constraints). For instance, Real-Time Tariff 
or Critical Peak Pricing has proven to be cost and 
technical effective (2 GW of peak is avoided in France 
through the EJP tariff).  
Smart metering ownership and data handling
The report should further expand on the options 
available to support the role of DSOs about smart 
metering ownership and data handling. There is 
indeed a lot of controversy about smart metering 
investment and the Data Access Manager (DAM) 
model since raising a lot more questions than answers: 
Option 1
•	 DSO as market enablers ensure the investment 
of smart meters, with a question on Data 
handling (The Data Access Manager, DAM)
•	 Market facilitation consists in allocating the 
right volumes of energy to the right market 
parties, with processes like supplier switching, 
moving etc….Yet, the DAM does not provide 
an efficient solution for this process.
•	 Data handling processes are currently 
integrated and managed by a single entity in 
many Member States: separating them into 
multiple sub-processes managed by separate 
entities introduces costs and complexity 
(beyond the dilution of responsibility).
•	 Issues of interoperability34 are more stringent 
when an entity different from the DSO is 
carrying out the rollout with consequences 
on the stranded investments and customer 
switching. The two countries mentioned in 
the report (UK and Germany) which have 
adopted the liberalized models have not been 
success stories in smart metering.
Option 2
•	 On another hand, assuming that DSOs 
are responsible for investment in active 
management systems and the necessary 
data acquisition infrastructure throughout 
the distribution network up to the point 
34. Incremental IT costs arise because the total number of 
systems increases and, in general, an increased coordina-
tion effort in IT system development and maintenance.
of interconnection of customer loads and 
generators, then advanced metering of loads 
and generators becomes the responsibility of 
the competitive metering market. 
•	 National standards for advanced metering 
are established by a relevant standards 
agency, consistent with a common European 
framework. 
•	 DSO’s are empowered to require customers 
to install advanced meters capable of real-
time measurement of two-way power flow 
for any customer classes for which benefits 
outweigh costs, including those with installed 
distributed generation, EV charging points, or 
any customers that seek to engage in demand 
response markets.
•	 The DSO becomes the regulated entity 
centrally responsible for acquisition and 
management of data on customer load and 
any generation connected to the distribution 
system, as well as the state of any monitored 
network components. 
•	 The DSO provides access to any data necessary 
for system operators to ensure security of 
supply and optimal network planning, as well 
as create rules for non-discriminatory access 
to any data necessary to create a level playing 
field for various competitive markets. 
•	 The DSO ensures the privacy and security of 
any personal data and identifying information 
collected from customers. 
•	 Standards established for smart metering 
infrastructure provides for standardized data 
formats for the collection by the DSO of data 
on customer-sited generation and loads.
DER-enabled cost savings for DSOs
The draft report states: “there can be benefits from a 
reduction in losses and the ability of DER to release 
network capacity which can be used to accommodate 
future loads”. “Netting” generation and demand 
brings poor or no reduction in network investment, 
especially in networks with high DER penetration. 
Electric vehicles may even increase the maximum load 
in the network. Moreover, the rise of decentralized 
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generation should increase the network costs since 
the grid ought to be designed to cover peak demand 
when there is no local production. New system 
services embedded in active distribution system 
management solutions are able to mitigate these cost 
increases compared to the business as usual solutions.
Cooperation TSO/DSO
The report must stress the need of a framework for 
effectively sharing operational information between 
network operators, and between network operators 
and end customers. TSOs are encouraging smart 
substations to exchange operational information 
with DSOs which they need from final customers or 
prosumers connected to distribution networks. The 
joint Research and Innovation TSO roadmap, which 
has just been reviewed by ACER35, has included several 
R&I projects supporting increased cooperation 
amongst operators via AC-funded approaches.
EV charging infrastructure
The paper should be more explicit about the different 
models relating to the EV charging infrastructure. 
The infrastructure investments may be recovered 
either only by the e-mobility customers (independent 
e-mobility model) or can be integrated in the grid 
tariffs, thus socializing the costs between all grid 
users (integrated infrastructure model). Even though 
it is up to the Member States to decide on the most 
accurate market organization according to the 
national characteristics (both electricity market and 
mobility needs), EV charging infrastructure does not 
appear to exhibit cost structures that lend to natural 
monopoly (as discussed on p. 36-7). While the initial 
roll-out of charging infrastructure appears to have 
a public goods quality, there should be sufficient 
customer demand to support investment in charging 
stations once sufficient market adoption of EVs is 
achieved, (just as their exists sufficient demand today 
for investment in petroleum-based fuel stations). 
If “non-market” actions to jump-start sufficient 
infrastructure investment and customer adoption 
(as is likely the case) are needed, other public 
35. Opinion of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators N° 11/2013, 28-th May 2013 on “The Entso-e 
research and development roadmap 20 13- 2022 and the 
implementation plan 2014-2016 of the research and devel-
opment roadmap 2013-2022”
policies can be implemented such as competitive 
tenders for infrastructure roll-out on public property 
or subsidization of the first phase of roll-out by 
qualifying private entities. Technology standards for 
charging infrastructure should also be established by 
relevant national standards agencies in order to reduce 
investment risks associated with interoperability. The 
EC has for instance already designated the “Type 2” 
three-phase coupler as the Europe-wide standard for 
EV charging ports. 
Conventional versus smart grid investments 
The demand for investments in smart distribution 
solutions happens to peak at the same time as the 
need for renewal of the conventional grid is also 
urgent. Most of the conventional electricity grids in 
Europe were built in the post-war years and have now 
reached the age when they need to be replaced with 
modern (conventional or smart) solutions.
The rising demand for security of supply where the 
economy may greatly suffer from power outages of 
few seconds, pushes for an optimal combination of 
“smart” and conventional grid investments. To-day’s 
regulatory schemes tend to focus in deploying Smart 
Grid solutions (which includes smart metering), while 
forgetting the need to maintain the more traditional 
grid infrastructure performance.  Incentives may 
be needed to reward DSOs when balancing grid 
investments in order to avoid irreversible investments 
which would prevent distribution investments to 
switch to smarter operations of the distribution grid.
Cost recovery of smart grid investments
The report states that “Under a regulated model, 
where the DSO is responsible for metering, costs can 
be recovered through regulated charges which are 
directly passed on to customers.”
It should however be recalled that costs of smart 
metering and of other network investments can 
also be recovered through efficiency gains in DSO 
operations, without necessitating recovery via grid 
use fees and passed on to end consumers. The part 
of the costs which can be recovered by increased 
operational efficiencies of course depends upon 
the specific situation of the DSO and the associated 
network configuration.
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Smart distribution solutions using the back-
ground of telecom networks 
The report addresses the concept of the “energy 
control box” where it must be emphasized that current 
regulations are responsible for a “silo” approach 
of (i) the roll out of smart meters by DSO’s and (ii) 
the introduction of consumer energy management 
applications (CEM) by market parties.
The pros of existing models, together with an 
examination of the IT perspective of the investments 
(a common practice in the Telco/ITC markets), lead 
to the following recommendation: (a) the meter 
and its ICT platform (gateway) should be invested 
by DSO’s, which requires a gain in expertise about 
complex IT systems; (b) applications will be run on 
top of this ICT platform: they should be developed 
and operated in the open commercial market.
Thus, the ICT platform/gateway would, as a market 
enabling service, facilitate market parties and 
customers in a very effective way: it avoids the 
investment burden from market parties (in the 
liberalized model), but, at the same time, would 
enable the liberalized model, where market parties 
could compete on applications.
When DSOs enter this type of innovation, they 
should be compensated for in the WACC, especially 
when realized in cooperation with the ICT/Telco 
sector. Yet, for DSO companies who are legally 
unbundled (but not ownership unbundled), OT 
OPEX and CAPEX are very often decided by the 
DSO organizational unit of the energy company. 
However, the IT OPEX and CAPEX is much more 
controlled/ decided at the organizational group level 
(especially if the IT function is organized as a group 
shared service center). A strict unbundling regulation 
for DSOs, which also stimulates the integration of 
IT and OT, should recommend that IT OPEX and 
CAPEX expenditures need to be decided at the DSO 
organizational level, and not at group level.
Box 1: Three-step evolution of distribution systems (Eurelectric, 2013)
The development towards ‘smart’ distribution systems can be described in three steps. First, the traditional passive distribution 
networks have been developed based on a “fi t-and-forget” approach. With an increasing penetration of DER, also system ‘smart-
ness’ should increase. An approach used already today in some countries with a high share of DG, therefore, is a reactive network 
integration, or “operation only” approach. Congestion and other grid problems are solved at the operation stage by restricting 
load and generation, i.e. DSOs solve problems once they occur. 
An active system management would allow DSOs to become “real system operators”. The existing hosting capacity of the distri-
bution network can be used more efficiently if an optimal use of DER is considered. Eurelectric (2013) proposes that DSOs should 
have the possibility to buy flexibility on so-called “flexibility platforms” to optimize network availability in the most economic 
manner and to solve grid constraints. Network reinforcement then could be deferred until it becomes more cost-effective than 
procuring services from DER. However, in-depth analyses going beyond the current more conceptual discussion are required 
to propose suitable concrete architectures and responsibilities, including an answer to the question on who should set-up and 
coordinate such a flexibility platform.
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1. Introduction and summary 
 
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)1 welcomes the draft THINK 
document: “From distribution networks to smart distribution systems: Rethinking the 
regulation of European DSOs” and their call for a review of traditional regulatory 
approaches to facilitate the incorporation of distributed energy resources into the grid.  
 
This document sets out CEER’s response to the THINK draft consultation document. It draws 
upon the work that is currently being progressed by CEER and individual National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRA).   
 
This is an area where there has already been a number of CEER initiatives and which is a 
key priority for CEER. We consider that the THINK report represents a thorough examination 
of the issues facing distribution networks at a time of considerable change. Our comments 
are on the actions which are already being taken forward by CEER members and on some of 
the detail.  
 
The three main issues we wish to raise are –  
 
• the role of the consumer and other parties in the value chain  
• allowing for regional/country based regulatory approaches in areas where there is 
scope for market development 
• the importance of sharing best practice in regulation and disseminating learning 
 
The document is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on three key issues 
which we consider should be given further consideration in the draft consultation. The 
second section provides detailed comments on the four areas of regulation in the THINK 
report. Some further detailed comments and corrections are in the annex to this paper. 
2. Context 
 
The EU energy sector is in the midst of a transformation which requires an innovative 
regulatory approach that balances the demands on the grid posed by distributed energy 
                                               
1
 CEER is a not-for-profit association in which Europe's independent national regulators of electricity and gas voluntarily 
cooperate to protect customers’ interests and to facilitate the creation of a single, competitive, efficient and sustainable internal 
market for gas and electricity in Europe.   
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resources with new commercial opportunities, and considers the need to keep energy 
affordable to consumers. 
 
A broad range of what the report refers to as distributed energy resources (DER) (active 
demand response which is price based or volume based, distributed generation, distributed 
storage and electric vehicles) will need to be incorporated into the grid. Regulation should 
enable welfare enhancing business models under any future market development. 
Regulatory and policy uncertainty has been regarded as one of the major challenges facing 
the European power sector and a major barrier to innovation.  
 
The THINK report examines four areas of regulation that will need reviewing and contains 
high level recommendations in each of the following areas: 
 
1- the methods of determining DSO regulated remuneration 
2- design of distribution network charges and levels of tariffs 
3- function of DSOs within the market (unbundling)   
4- the relationship between DSOs and TSOs 
3. Key Issues 
 
A cost efficient move towards low carbon power generation should be facilitated by clear 
policy and regulation. This should provide enough certainty to foster an environment that 
encourages and rewards innovation and provides a framework that allows DSOs and other 
market players to participate and enable the provision of new upstream and downstream 
services.  These services should reflect the needs and reasonable expectations of 
consumers. 
 
We welcome the report’s main aim to rethink the traditional regulatory approach and identify 
areas which will need to be reviewed and updated to ensure the regulatory tools are fit for 
purpose to meet the technological challenges of incorporating significant DER in the coming 
years. We agree with its proposed focus areas and invite the authors to give further 
consideration to the following points which could be expanded within this report. 
3.1 Role of the consumer and other parties in the value chain   
 
We believe that further consideration should be given to the roles and responsibilities of all 
those in the emerging electricity value chain, and especially consumers. The report gives 
significant consideration to the roles of DSOs and TSOs given that these parties are subject 
to the different regulatory regimes across Europe. However, we believe the report should 
also explore the important role of the end-use customer in the value chain, including 
domestic and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) consumers. Bearing in mind that 
consumers, especially vulnerable customers, have to be protected by adequate regulation, 
when necessary, also believe consumers have an important role to play as potential 
providers and beneficiaries of DER services. This calls for roles to be defined and the range 
of services to be identified and eventually remunerated. In addition to facilitating changes in 
consumer behaviour, the roles of TSOs and DSOs themselves should be more clearly 
focused on responsiveness to customers, be they residential consumers or businesses. 
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In 2012, CEER and BEUC, the European Consumers Organisation, developed a shared 
Vision of the energy sector2 that puts customers first: a sector that engages with, and 
understands the diverse needs of customers, be they residential consumers, including the 
most vulnerable ones, or small businesses. This vision is reflected in CEER’s key areas of 
work for 2013.  CEER’s Vision calls for the energy sector to engage with and understand the 
diverse needs of customers and deliver services to meet those needs.   
 
We believe the report should give consideration to the mechanisms through which the DSOs 
should engage, directly or indirectly, with consumers, whether to cater to their specific supply 
needs or to engage them in the provision of commercial services. It should also examine the 
roles and relationships between the DSO and the rest of the parties in the value chain 
including energy suppliers, aggregators and local authorities when relevant.  
 
We welcome the proposal of a more coordinated approach between DSOs and TSOs. 
However, we encourage the authors to go further and consider how DSOs and TSOs should 
engage with the other parties in the emerging value chain in order to unlock the value of 
downstream services while contributing to decarbonisation and energy security objectives.   
 
The roles and responsibilities might well be determined by the different levels of DER 
penetration and the business environment within each Member State. The level of 
penetration of renewable energy sources will differ across Member States and different tools 
would need to be deployed to manage it. Some countries will experience high levels of 
distributed generation which might require the DSOs to take on a more active role in system 
security, including voltage quality; whereas other Member States might rely on offshore wind 
which means that the TSO would be likely to retain all system operation mechanisms.  
3.2 Allow for regional/country based regulatory approaches in areas where there is 
scope for market development 
 
The integration of DER into the grid is driving the shift from a linear supply chain towards a 
more systems based model. This model will see a growing part of domestic consumers 
becoming producers, electricity and information flows moving in two directions along the 
chain and real-time management becoming necessary to manage variable generation. This 
new value chain should provide opportunities for a number of agents who are in a position to 
gain value in the provision of new services - energy services providers, information and 
services platform owners, information services, information devices and appliance owners, 
aggregators, generators, consumers and consumers who both consume and generate 
(“prosumers”).  We believe that NRAs are best placed to decide, in consultation with relevant 
stakeholders, what the best approach should be to unlocking the benefits of the upstream 
and downstream value change.  Some of these areas might be better served by effective 
competition while others might require the development of a framework to facilitate 
information exchange between all the parties. The approach would be largely influenced by 
the right market conditions and the right business environment in each country.  
 
In the case of electric vehicle charging infrastructure, we believe that a market approach 
should be favoured over a regulated approach. There is significant expertise and interest in 
certain countries in the provision of charging infrastructure and ancillary services. This would 
encourage the development of a competitive environment which would ultimately benefit 
customers. We believe more regulation – or the wrong sort of regulation - in this market may 
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 Including electricity, gas and district heating. 
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stifle innovation and hamper the development of viable commercial propositions to the 
detriment of Europe’s sustainability goals.  
 
In order to achieve the economies of scale in these markets which would lower costs and 
enable their expansion, the new technologies developed need to be interoperable. The 
challenge is then to foster innovation while facilitating the creation of consistent standards 
within a common framework. The objective here would be to achieve interoperability and to 
enable the implementation of smart grid technologies at a suitable pace for all market 
players. In this respect, CEER and NRAs contribute to the expert groups of the European 
Commission Smart Grid Task Force and to the European standards bodies CEN-CENELEC-
ETSI. Through the Commission’s task force, we are considering aspects mandated by EC 
(M/490): definition of technical reference architecture, a set of consistent standards and 
sustainable standardisation processes. 
 
3.3 Importance of sharing best practice in regulation and disseminating learning  
 
As smart grids are being developed across Europe as a key component of a smart 
distribution system, it is important to have a coordinated regulatory approach among Member 
States.  
The CEER work programme of 2013 dedicates significant resources and expertise to a range 
of relevant initiatives in this regard. It includes a status review of regulatory approaches to 
smart grids.   
 
Areas for this initiative will include: learning and dissemination of best practice for smart grid 
projects; cost benefit analysis for demonstration and deployment of Smart Grids; regulating 
challenges and incentive mechanisms for the development and deployment of Smart Grids; 
examination of flexibility tools such as electricity storage; and other related areas of work 
around commercial and regulatory arrangements for consumer engagement. 
4. Other areas of consideration  
4.1 DSO regulated remuneration 
 
In order to enable DSOs to actively manage their systems, the report calls for regulation that 
takes into account a number of factors: (a) changing CAPEX and OPEX structures; (b) 
optional choice to allow DSOs to find a cost efficient trade-off between using DER and 
reinforcing network; (c) incentives on DSOs to find innovative solutions for ICT, data handling 
and other services. We note here that while the role of DSOs is changing and they need to 
respond to a new environment, their core role is to maintain grid stability and grid service 
quality.  
 
As mentioned in the report, the approach to calculating revenue as a total - TOTEX3 - might 
prove useful in allowing networks the necessary flexibility to invest in the required 
infrastructure while managing their operational costs to ensure a good level of service to 
customers. Nevertheless, the particular circumstances of different countries must be taken 
into account. Alternative approaches do not always work for all existing systems, and may 
depend on the existing regulatory framework, the actual state of network installations etc. 
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Given the number of different regulatory regimes in Europe, a general recommendation of 
one single model should not be pursued. 
 
The role of the regulator is critical. The regulator should monitor and regulate network 
operators and create an environment where innovative solutions in electricity distribution will 
be enabled. There is also a role for governments in stimulating innovation and enable 
markets to be developed. 
 
CEER initiatives are tackling the issue of regulation and remuneration in relation to smart 
grids from different innovative perspectives. The CEER status review of regulatory 
approaches to smart electricity grids4 focuses on incentives to ensure DSOs investment 
solutions are cost effective for all users. 
 
4.2 Tariff structure 
 
With greater DER and distributed generation, there may be a need for changes in the 
charging structure for DSOs. The way in which charges should develop is however unclear 
and needs further consideration. There is currently no clear indication for any cross-border 
issues. 
  
The report focuses on the importance of reflecting power related signals into tariffs (€/MW) 
for use-of-system charges and connection charges. However, we consider that energy 
related signals (€/MWh) in network tariff are also important in order to direct users’ decisions. 
Energy related signals should encourage consumers to reduce their energy consumption at 
peak times.  
 
At a high level, the power related signal encourages consumers whose consumption is flat 
over time (those who use the subscribed network capacity all the time) to decrease their use 
of network capacity. The energy related signal encourages consumers whose consumption is 
concentrated on a few hours in the year to limit their consumption at peak hours.  
 
For generators, an energy related tariff could potentially create bias in the merit order. 
Whereas power related signals could also create biased allocation of resources between 
different types of producers. Peak producers who have a high power related generation 
charge may be disadvantaged compared to base load producers5.  
 
4.3 The role of the DSO should be clarified in relation to the market  
 
The report describes the transition of the DSO from a neutral market facilitator of energy 
services, who manages the network assets, towards an active system operator who could 
potentially have a wider role. The former role saw DSOs as facilitating the development of 
other markets: retail markets, energy services companies which can be metering companies, 
ICT companies, aggregating services. The latter role might see the DSO as a more active 
                                               
4
 http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Electricity/2011/C11-
EQS-45-04_SmartGridsApproach_6%20July%202011.pdf  
5
 We note that Acer is currently conducting a monitoring on the generation charge with a view to providing a recommendation 
on the appropriate range of generation charges based on Annex B of Regulation 838/2010. 
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player whose role could expand from transportation and access services to market facilitation 
services and system operator services. However, it is important that the roles of different 
entities are clear, in the context of the position in each country.  
 
This is an essential part of the paper discussing the role of DSOs in a future market design. It 
raises the problem of DSOs becoming incumbents in future markets. However, the paper 
does not appear to distinguish clearly between the infrastructure services and market 
activities of DSOs. It is important that there is a level playing field and that market 
participants do not benefit from their position in a related market. This issue should be 
addressed more thoroughly in order to better identify unbundling issues. 
 
We consider that the question of specific unbundling measures (ownership unbundling or 
ITO-like measures) needs to be kept under review. It is difficult to be specific at this stage 
given the uncertainty around how markets will develop.  
4.3.1 Metering Equipment 
 
In regards to ownership and management of metering equipment, the THINK report analysed 
pros and cons of two alternative models (regulated or liberalised) for ownership and 
management of metering equipment. The main conclusion of the report is that both models 
can work in practice. The suitability of a certain model will depend on system-specific 
conditions, and the decision about whether to include such tasks as a function of DSOs 
should be left to national authorities.  
 
In principle, we agree with this conclusion but we wish to contribute to this discussion. In 
addition, CEER is committed to delivering a number of initiatives in 2013 which include 
comparing approaches to managing data from smart meters. In this context, we would like to 
draw your attention towards the following document: “the Guidelines of Good Practice (GGP) 
on Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas”6, and the current work that 
is expected for this year on “Status Review of Regulation on Smart Metering”.   
 
 
4.3.2 Data handling  
 
The report describes three models for data handling: (a) DSO based; (b) 3rd Party Market 
Facilitator; and (c) Data Access point Manager. The report concludes that the definition of 
specific data formats and cost recovery can be left to the EU Member States. However, it 
recommends that at EU level a minimum set of requirements for data provision, storage and 
privacy should be defined (independently of the selected data model(s)). 
 
As we set out in our key issues section, we believe that (NRAs within) the different EU 
Member States are well placed to decide which is the most cost effective arrangement for 
data management.   
 
However, we consider that there should be an initial list of the following high-level principles: 
 
                                               
6http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Customers/Tab2/E10-
RMF-29-05_GGP_SM_8-Feb-2011.pdf 
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• it is of fundamental importance to have a good interface between the existing data 
hubs to enable cross-border activity. This is fundamental to allow the treatment of 
data from different countries, which might possibly have different models in place; 
• the data interface should be shaped according to clear and transparent rules; 
• the operator managing the data shall act as a market facilitator in a neutral and non-
discriminatory manner as well as an enabler for energy-services; 
• network operators must have access to data they need for ensuring the network 
performance (e.g. safety, security, planning) in line with their legal obligations; 
• any data management should be conducted in a secure manner and with respect for 
customer privacy; 
• the models should be driven by high level of transparency, cost-efficiency and along 
interest of customers; 
• a model should be as much as possible open to both centralised and decentralised 
approaches, in order to best meet the specificities of the market design and 
conditions across Europe; and 
• customers should be in control of their basic data and should always be in control of 
and have access to their data in a simple and reliable way without any additional 
costs. 
 
We would also like to make a very important additional point. Different discussions have 
drawn comparisons with the way markets operate to provide innovative services to 
customers in other sectors (e.g. telecommunications, banking). We believe that it is helpful to 
look outside the electricity sector to find market models that challenge the status quo. 
However, we stress that no other market is as physically interconnected as the electricity 
system, requiring the continuous balancing of supply and demand. Maintaining the system's 
security and integrity should not be compromised by market arrangements and any new 
market models should be considered against this primary requirement. 
 
Furthermore, CEER will contribute to this effort through the CEER Benchmarking report on 
Meter Data Management Case Studies7, and the ongoing work on Data Management for 
Better Retail Market Functioning that will provide advice on these issues along this year and 
in 2014. 
4.4 DSO and TSO roles 
 
The traditional role of the DSO has been confined to network asset planning and operation. 
TSOs are responsible for long-term transmission planning and grid development which 
entails balancing the network and ensuring short run supply security.  
 
The report highlights the potential for DER to provide short term and long-term TSO and 
DSO services. The report argues that the DSO should be able to access services with 
economic value from DER such as network congestion management, voltage control, system 
recovery. This can be used to optimise grid operation or expansion and more importantly 
avoid or postpone investments. We agree that the DSO should be able to access these 
services if they are the agents who will draw the most value from them. However, there are 
certain areas in which both TSO and DSOs will want access to the same resources such as 
congestion relief. 
                                               
7http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Customers/Tab3/C12-
RMF-46-05_BR_MDM_07Nov2012.pdf 
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We support the view that DER should be allowed to compete on equal terms with agents that 
currently provide system operators with ancillary services. The report recommends that a 
clear product definition for the use of DER in DSO and TSO operations is needed specially 
since there is no current regulation defining how DSOs can engage in the use of DER. There 
is a need for clear coordination among the parties in cases where they can access the same 
service. 
 
The report calls for procedures and principles of coordination between DSOs and TSOs to be 
defined at European level in order to avoid barriers to market entry and allow competition.  
 
Coordinated efforts are underway in order to define and limit the roles of TSO, DSOs and 
other affected parties. Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity (Third Package) set objectives for the integration of increasing low carbon 
generation, the secure operation of European power systems and the complete functioning 
of the internal market for electricity and cross border trade. The Third Package provided for 
the creation of legally binding European Network Codes (NCs) which are the chosen vehicle 
to deliver the changes in the energy system. The European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is currently developing European Network Codes in line 
with the Framework Guidelines produced by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER). The work on the Codes has brought together DSOs, TSOs, generators, 
suppliers and other stakeholders.  
 
As highlighted in the key issues section above, we believe that the emerging new electricity 
value chain goes further than the DSO/TSO relationship. We recognise the key role the 
DSOs and TSOs play in grid planning and management. However, we believe more 
consideration should be given to new market players within the chain and the relationship 
between consumers and all these new players. In this respect, CEER has been progressing 
some important work examining the DSO functions in relation to markets, including the GGP 
on indicators for retail market monitoring8 (focusing on market conditions and DSO services), 
the CEER status review of their implementation as of 1 January 20129, and our ongoing work 
on “Regulation of the quality of the DSO services: advice from a consumer/prosumer 
perspective”. 
 
 
                                               
8http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Customers/Tab1/E10-
RMF-27-03_final%20GGP%20IRMM_12-Oct-2010.pdf 
9http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Customers/Tab3/C12-
RMF-46-03_RMI-SR_03-Sep-2012.pdf 
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Annex 
Further, more detailed comments 
 
• Page 19, “That employing DER can lead to overall cost savings for DSOs is also 
confirmed by Cossent (2010),...”: sentence difficult to read/contradictory 
 
• Page 4, “(e.g. in Austria, air conditioning is mainly used during night times …): maybe 
instead of “air conditioning” is meant “electric heating systems” or “water heating”? 
 
• Page 11, figure 3: in the Netherlands all grids ≥ 110 kV are operated by the TSO. 
 
• Page 12, table 1: there is only 1 TSO in The Netherlands and 8 DSOs. 
 
• Page 12, Figure 5 / Table 1: data from year 2012 vs. 2010 
 
• Page 40, Footer 27, Austria (and remark p. 43): curtailment for security reasons is 
allowed in Austria 
 
• The savings in total distribution costs are limited and depending on the local situation 
including network topology and technology – as written in the referenced paper: “… 
Most of these savings correspond to the lower transformation capacity that is 
required… and further … This huge savings are basically due to the wide variety of 
response options considered and the extreme planning assumptions considered for 
the BAU situation. Note that under the BAU situation it had been assumed that DG, 
whose penetration levels were very high, did not produce at all at peak load hours 
whereas all units were producing at rated capacity in local valley hours”. To avoid 
misunderstandings within Figure 8, this should be more detailed clarified or deleted.  
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